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ABSTRACT 
The UK Companies Act 2006 has made it a legal requirement for companies, since 
October 2013, to disclose their ‘Strategy’ and ‘Business Model’ as part of their annual 
report. The Act, however, does not define what is meant by the two terms. This means 
that the content of the disclosure remains at the discretion of managers. Prior to this, the 
UK 2010 Corporate Governance Code required companies to disclose their Strategy and 
Business Model. The Code, however, is based on a ‘comply or explain’ approach.  
This study contributes to the understanding of the disclosure of Strategy and 
Business Model in the annual reports of UK listed companies before and after the 
introduction of the regulatory requirements. To achieve this, the thesis aims to investigate 
the extent of the disclosure of Strategy and Business Model, the impact of regulations and 
the determinants of such disclosures. The sample includes companies operating in three 
industry sectors: Banking; Food and Drug Retailers; and Gas, Water and Multi-utilities, 
over a period of 10 years, taking into consideration, the periods before and after the 
Corporate Governance and Companies Act requirements.  
To achieve the aims of the thesis, it has been necessary to adopt a pragmatic approach, 
which entails the use of results from a qualitative approach as inputs to a quantitative 
approach. Further, the study adopts a longitudinal approach and collects empirical data 
from annual reports and databases. This study also relies on agency and signalling theory 
to provide explanations on Strategy and Business Model disclosures in annual reports. 
The study finds that the mandatory requirement has had a statistically significant 
influence on the disclosure of both Strategy and Business Model. However, the practice 
of Business Model disclosure is not yet at the same level as Strategy. Lastly, the findings 
reveal that disclosure is mostly affected by market and corporate governance incentives. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1. Background to the Study 
The widening gap between statutory corporate disclosure and the actual needs of 
investors and stakeholders has become increasingly apparent as business practices have 
developed and more sophisticated investment tools have become widespread. In 
addition, the issue of transparency in the annual report has gained a high profile in the 
last few years, particularly following events such as the Parmalat and WorldCom 
accounting scandals (O’Regan, 2010).  Managers have better information than outsiders 
as well as incentives to favourably bias the information they supply to outsiders and 
take actions that result in deadweight losses and thus reduce firm and equity values 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
Information asymmetry between the firm and third parties, whether these are 
investors, creditors, employees or the public authorities, has been considered as one of 
the main culprits of financial and economic crisis (Yeoh, 2010). Hence, in as much as 
transparency is closely related to corporate disclosure practices, disclosure, whether 
voluntary or mandatory, would have the virtue of reducing information asymmetries, 
allowing effective control of managers, and (re-) establishing good governance.   
Additionally, corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient 
capital market Healy and Palepu (2001)1. In sum, though the problem is not new, the 
last economic crisis has installed transparency, and thus disclosure, as a one-stop 
shopping solution (Farvaque et al., 2011). Interestingly, Farvaque et al. (2011) 
questioned if the magnitude of attention and emphasis placed on disclosure is justified?
                                                        
1 ‘Disclosure research draws upon economic information asymmetry arguments and agency theory, 
dealing with objective economic facts’ (Beattie, 2014, p. 112). 
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The accounting and financial reporting system is a critical source of verifiable 
information that is useful in monitoring and evaluating managers as well their decisions 
and strategies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Bushman and Smith, 2001). Firms provide 
disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, 
footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulated filings (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). 
What is disclosed is viewed as information which may be in the form of 
financial information (quantitative or numerical in nature) or non-financial information 
(narratives, qualitative text) (Beattie, 2014). Accounting narratives offer a very rich and 
complex set of inscriptions and represent a distinct genre of business communications 
(Rutherford, 2005; Rutherford, 2013). Narrative reporting complements financial 
accounting reporting and includes discussions on management’s take on future 
prospects and risks, brand equity considerations, and the planned management response 
among others (Yeoh, 2010; Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). Policymakers have long 
emphasised the importance of narrative disclosures in helping investors understand a 
company’s financial performance and risks (see Leung et al., 2015). Tennyson et al. 
(1990) highlighted that the narrative section of the annual report is management’s 
unique opportunity to communicate directly with present and potential shareholders and 
creditors.  
Also, prior literature has provided evidence on narrative reporting being 
associated with information asymmetry arising from the separation between corporate 
ownership and management is perceived to be resolved through corporate disclosure, in 
particular narrative reporting (Beattie, 2014; Bromwich, 1992). The focus of this study 
is on accounting narratives, in particular, Strategy and Business Model (hereafter, BM) 
disclosure.  A company’s Strategy is the game plan that management uses to stake out a 
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market position, conduct its operations, attract and please customers, compete 
successfully, and achieve organizational objectives (Arthur and Thompson, 2017). 
According to Rumelt et al. (1991) Strategy is about the direction of organizations, it 
includes those subjects that are of primary concern to senior management, or to anyone 
seeking reasons for the success and failure among organizations. Meanwhile, an 
organization’s BM is its system of transforming inputs, through its business activities, 
into outputs and outcomes that aim to fulfil the organization’s strategic purposes and 
create value over the short, medium and long term (Gould, 2014).  Strategy and BMs 
are fundamental to performance hence it has been argued that that they are 
complements and not substitutes (Rudtsch et al., 2014).   
In disclosing valuable information such as Strategy and BM management 
confronts a dilemma; much of the information that investors need in forecasting cash 
flow with less uncertainty, and hence increase the value of the firm, is the same 
information that could affect proprietary costs imposed by the reaction of competitor(s) 
and other actors to the information released (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Coebergh, 
2011a). It is doubted that information can be made available to the securities market 
without being available to competitors. In which case, management has to examine the 
cost and benefit of releasing such valuable information, considering the valuation need 
of the information and the possible proprietary costs associated with such disclosure. 
A description of the business is essential for an investor to gain an understanding 
of the industries and markets in which the entity operates (see Alberti et al., 2009). This 
includes its segments, products and services, BM and processes, distribution methods, 
the business structure including the main operating facilities and their location. 
Further, in order to improve the quality of corporate reporting, a guideline issued by 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA, 2002) emphasizes the 
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importance of disclosing according to a strategic view of business. This framework 
suggests that accompanying narrative information concerning company vision (core 
business and long-term business Strategy), critical success factors, capabilities 
(resources) for achieving desired results, expected results, and connected risks and 
opportunities should be included in annual reports. Furthermore, Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2008) described the ‘richness’ of the content of annual reports as a function both of the 
width of the disclosures on different topics regarding a firm’s BM and value-creation 
Strategy, and of the depth of the disclosures about the presence insights into a firm’s 
future performance.  
Thus, ‘disclosure is viewed as a rational trade-off between costs and benefits – a 
strategic managerial decision involving complex interdependencies’ (see Beattie, 2014). 
In line with this argument, The Steering Committee of the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board suggested the process management should adopt to offer, voluntarily, 
high-quality disclosure. The aim of the process is to recognize and disclose information 
that is useful to investors without affecting the company’s competitive position (FASB, 
2001a). Accordingly, it was stressed that it should be considered whether voluntary 
disclosures about the company’s forward-looking strategies and plans and metrics 
would adversely affect the company’s competitive position and whether the risk of 
adversely affecting competitive position exceeds the expected benefit of making the 
voluntary disclosure.  
Nonetheless, the concern that annual reports, particularly narrative reports, are 
becoming too long and complicated, such that key messages are lost in ‘a sea of detailed 
and regulatory disclosures’, and how best to develop narrative reporting is a debate in 
the UK, Europe, and worldwide (see Beattie and Smith, 2013).  
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1.2 Motivation and Justification for the Study 
Whittington and Yakis-Douglas (2010) stressed that there is a concern that the long-
term strategies of firms are not being adequately understood to serve the long-term 
interests of both firms and economies more widely. Hence, they envisaged that Strategy 
communications would shift from the domain of voluntary disclosure towards more 
mandatory disclosure. In line with this argument for example, corporate laws and 
various capital market regulations in the UK lay down the minimum level of access to 
key corporate information. In 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code introduced a 
requirement for listed companies to disclose in their annual reports their BM and 
Strategy for delivering corporate objectives (FRC, 2010a). The requirement arose from 
responses to consultation on revision of the previous version of the code where 
respondents asked for more contexts with which to interpret directors’ identification of 
key risks.  
Also, in 2012, the UK government proposed a new framework included in 
The Companies Act (2006) for narrative reporting to include a strategic report, though 
like the business review, but quoted companies are required to include a report on their 
Strategy, their BM and any human right issues, effective from October 2013 (FRC, 
2012a). The UK Corporate Governance Code adopts a ‘comply or explain principle’, 
however, although the amended Companies Act has made the disclosure of Strategy and 
BM mandatory, the content of such disclosure remains at the discretion of managers, as 
the Act does not specify the content of the disclosures. However, The FRC made a call 
for comments about its guidance on such disclosures. The conclusion of government 
after the analysis of responses is to allow companies to tell an integrated story in their 
own word, starting with their BM and Strategy.  Furthermore, Richard Lu and Wu 
Tucker (2012) note that very little research on Strategy disclosure exists even though it 
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has been touted as a potential alternative to the (alleged) “short-termism” of providing 
quarterly earnings. Furthermore, Stefanovic and Milosevic (2012) argue that though 
“BM” and “Strategy” are among the most heavily used terms in the field of business 
and management, however, the meaning of these terms is not very well 
understood. This current study contributes to the understanding of both Strategy and 
BM and to their disclosure.  
Additionally, IFAC (2014) pointed out that although BM reporting is on the increase, 
it is a long way off from being a mature practice.  In their study, Alberti et al. (2009) 
contend that there is a ‘technical gap’ about the concept of ‘BM’ that standard setters 
can only fill with the suggestion of a framework that companies can adopt for the fair 
representation of BM in order to disclose such type of information to capital providers 
and analysts in a decision useful narrative report. This current study contributes to the 
literature on Strategy and BM by developing a framework for the interpretation of 
meanings of Strategy and BM and research into the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
Further,  Bini et al. (2016) called out for an investigation into BM disclosure practice among 
different industries, and the possible determinants of such disclosures. Also, Beattie and Smith 
(2013) called for an investigation of the extent and nature of reporting of the components of BM. 
This study focuses on Strategy and BM disclosure in annual reports for listed companies because 
the new legislations were intended mostly for these companies.  The theoretical framework 
employed by this study is agency and signalling theories. This study also uses content analysis to 
investigate the disclosure practice of Strategy and BM.  This leads us to the research objectives 
and questions this study intends to investigate.   
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1.3 Research Objectives and Questions  
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of Strategy and BM 
disclosure in the annual reports. This study is guided by the framework for research on narrative 
disclosures developed by Beattie (2014). The first objective of this study is to develop a 
comprehensive disclosure framework to evaluate the content of Strategy and BM disclosures in 
annual reports, and to investigate current practices of Strategy and BM disclosure. The 
methodological issues of importance here are thus the concepts themselves (Strategy and BM); 
the identification of underlying themes and their measurement (measured as 1 if disclosed and 0 
for non-disclosure). Additionally,  this first objective relates to the first and fifth questions in the 
proposed narratives research framework (Beattie, 2014) ‘what is reported and what should be 
reported’. Thus, the first objective of this study further examines how companies voluntarily 
disclosed their Strategy and BM in the annual reports between 2006 and 2012 and mandatorily 
but with discretion of disclosure content between 2013 and 2015.  
In addition, the components of Strategy and BM that are most and least disclosed are 
identified. Thereafter, this first objective investigates the effect of regulation (both corporate 
governance requirement and mandatory requirement) on the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
Second, this study examines the potential determinants of Strategy and BM disclosures in annual 
reports of UK companies, using regression analysis. This objective is related to the second 
question in the framework ‘what explains observed practice’.  
These research objectives drive the following research questions. The first objective drives 
questions 1 and 2 while, the second objective relates to question 3 below: 
1. Has there been any change in the level of Strategy and BM disclosure between 2006 and 
2015? 
2. What is the extent of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual reports?   
a. What items of Strategy and BM are most disclosed in the annual reports? 
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b. How has regulation been able to influence the disclosure of Strategy and BM? 
3. What are the determinants of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual reports of UK 
listed companies? 
1.4 Research Methodology and Methods 
Given the set objectives and research questions of this study, the philosophical perspective 
applied in the study is a pragmatic approach. This approach provides the appropriate 
understanding of the theory, methodology and methods in this context, and this paradigm shows 
that inductive results from a qualitative approach can serve as inputs to the deductive goals of a 
quantitative approach. The data collected will be qualitative (text) in nature. The study adopts 
agency and signalling theories as the theoretical lens to provide an explanation and better 
understanding of Strategy and BM disclosure practice.  
This study will use a longitudinal study approach to explore and to provide an 
understanding of the disclosure practice of Strategy and BM in the annual reports of UK 
companies. Additionally, this study applies a qualitative content analysis technique to explore 
what is disclosed as Strategy and BM in order to develop an understanding of the content and 
meaning of such disclosure. As such, a manual thematic analysis was adopted to assess the 
narrative information disclosed on BM. However, quantitative content analysis and descriptive 
statistics were adopted to explore the extent of such disclosure (part of the first objective), the 
effect of regulation on such disclosure. The second objective is examined using regression 
analysis - hypothesis testing (see Neuendorf, 2002), and data was collected from databases – 
FAME and IBES2 
                                                        
2 Some of the data used in the study was provided by my second supervisor. 
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1.5 Contributions of the Study 
This study is an exploratory analysis and contributes to the literature on Strategy and BM 
disclosure by investigating the extent of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual reports. 
Previous research on the disclosure of Strategy in annual reports had been on voluntary 
disclosure. Additionally, this current study explores the influence of regulation on the disclosure 
of Strategy and BM. Further, this study examines the possible determinants of the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM. It is the first empirical study on the effect of regulation on disclosure of 
Strategy and BM, as well as the determinants and the extent of such disclosure. Thus, this study 
contributes to the debate about the developments in business reporting models and value creation 
Strategy. It links the accounting literature with Strategy and BM literature, and develops a 
disclosure index that can help inform future research.  
This current study contributes to the accounting literature on capital market research in the 
area of regulation and accounting information disclosure. Kothari (2001) highlight that evidence 
from research on these types of topics is likely to be helpful in capital market investment 
decisions, accounting standard setting, and corporate financial disclosure decisions. At the same 
time, this study has successfully answered the call to assess the extent of BM disclosure (Beattie 
and Smith, 2013), and to examine the potential determinants of BM disclosure, focusing on 
different industries (Bini et al., 2016). 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the 
literature and previous studies in the area of Strategy and BM disclosure. In chapter three, the 
hypotheses development is presented and the independent and dependent variables are described. 
Chapter four focuses on the discussion of the theoretical lens (agency and signalling) adopted to 
explain the disclosure practice of Strategy and BM in the annual reports. Thereafter, chapter five 
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discusses the philosophical perspective, research design and methods of collection and analysis 
for this study, followed by the three empirical chapters.  
Chapter six analyses the first research question, describing the disclosure practice of 
Strategy and BM for the 10-year period. It investigates what is reported as Strategy and BM. It is 
a descriptive study that employs the use of content analysis and disclosure index to explore the 
topic under investigation. The second empirical chapter, chapter seven, examines the extent of 
such disclosure. It goes further to explore the significance of disclosure difference between 
voluntary and mandatory periods, investigating the significance of regulations on the disclosure. 
While, the third empirical chapter, chapter eight examines the second question of the accounting 
narratives disclosure framework looking at what explains observed practice i.e. determinants of 
Strategy and BM disclosure. Chapter nine concludes the intellectual journey where the findings 
of the investigations of the three industries and the three empirical chapters are articulated and 
discussed. It also presents the contributions of the study to the existing debate on the disclosure 
of Strategy and BM. In addition, it provides an overview of the research and discusses the 
limitations of the study. It concludes with the conclusion of the thesis and suggestion for future 
studies
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the literature on Strategy and BM disclosure. It does so in order to 
shed light on the subject matter of this study and to identify the key trends and themes, which 
will inform the study. The first section in this chapter will review the literature on disclosure. 
Thereafter, the literature on the concepts of Strategy and BM is discussed. Then, the disclosure 
of Strategy and BM from previous studies will be reviewed, followed by the relevance, costs and 
benefits of Strategy and BM disclosure. 
2.2 Information asymmetry and corporate disclosures 
The problems of information asymmetry have long been highlighted in the literature, in 
particular in the corporate finance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These information asymmetries oppose the manager and the shareholders, or, following a 
broader view, they oppose on the one hand those who are commonly called insiders (managers 
and majority shareholders) and, on the other hand, the outsiders (minority shareholders, 
creditors, and other stakeholders). One could also include the regulatory authorities among these 
outsiders, as well as information professionals - the rating agencies and financial analysts. As 
part of a separation between the ownership of capital and control, information asymmetries pose 
the problem of the ex post control of the choices of managers by shareholders.  
The response provided by the traditional literature related to corporate governance was the 
definition and implementation of incentive contracts. These were supposed to solve the 
following two problems: first, the cost of perfect information and, second, the inability of 
shareholders to process information correctly (which is the major reason for delegating power). 
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However, incentive mechanisms, whose objectives are to make managers’ interests coincide 
with those of shareholders, have shown their pernicious effects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
the Enron scandal. Since the 1990s and the first decade of the 21
st century, the solution to the 
problem of information asymmetry seems to be disclosure, supported by an apparent consensus 
between economic actors, public authorities and the media. In as much as transparency is closely 
related to corporate disclosure practices whether voluntary or mandatory, the information 
asymmetry arising from the split between ownership and management is perceived to be 
resolved through corporate disclosure (Bromwich, 1992). 
In contrast, a major conclusion from literature (see for example Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007)is that it is not at all obvious that disclosure, whether 
mandatory or voluntary, actually increases the knowledge that economic actors have of the 
company. First, being transparent does not necessarily mean providing information, since third 
parties are not shielded from disclosures of fraudulent information or the concealment of 
important information. Furthermore, current regulation does not include all the necessary 
specifications relating to the disclosure of firm insider information. Second, it is not certain that 
a firm will give investors the information they need to take decisions. The company can 
manipulate the information communicated; it can deliberately make it more complex, or it can 
make it very extensive and difficult to interpret. Transforming information communicated by the 
company into knowledge usable by investors requires a great deal of work. If disclosure makes 
this work less profitable for financial analysts and informed agents, it is possible that the overall 
knowledge of the company will be reduced (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Thus, the fact 
that communication by companies does not create knowledge or even that it reduces the 
information available to shareholders is very pernicious. When companies do not communicate 
much, shareholders know that they do not have information at their disposal, and, as we have 
seen in particular with (Boot and Thakor, 2001), they will try to acquire this in a costly way. 
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Managers will try, through credible signals like smoothing results or dividends, to supply 
information on future profits. But if shareholders have the impression of having information, 
because of an imposed or voluntary communication policy, they will be much less vigilant. They 
will simply have an illusion of knowledge, rather than a real knowledge. They could therefore 
take decisions wrongly believing that they have the relevant information. They will be 
overconfident: they will think that they have good share price expectations, whereas they are 
mistaken; they will under-estimate their capacity for error.  
2.2.1 The role of corporate disclosure in capital markets 
 Corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the 
financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulated filings 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). A major challenge for any economy is the allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities. According to Beyer et al. (2010) accounting information plays two 
important roles in market-based economies. First, it allows capital providers (Shareholders and 
creditors) to evaluate the return potential of investment opportunities (the ex-ante or valuation 
role of accounting information). Second, accounting information allows capital providers to 
monitor the use of their capital once committed (the ex-post or stewardship role of accounting 
information).  
 The demand for accounting information by outsiders arises for two reasons (ex-ante and ex-post 
demand for accounting information). First, ex-ante, firms’ managers typically have more 
information about the expected profitability of firms’ current and future investments than 
outsiders. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for outside capital providers to assess 
the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities. This problem is exacerbated because 
insiders (both managers and owner-managers) have incentives to exaggerate their firms’ 
projected profitability. In turn, if capital providers cannot assess firms’ profitability, they will 
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under-price firms with high profitability and over-price firms with low profitability, potentially 
leading to market failure.  
The information or ‘‘lemons” problem (Akerlof, 1970) and the resulting incentives to disclose 
additional information have long been recognized in the disclosure literature. It can potentially 
lead to a breakdown in the functioning of the capital market. For example, consider a situation 
where half the business ideas are ‘‘good’’ and the other half are ‘‘bad’’. Both investors and 
entrepreneurs are rational and value investments conditional on their own information. If 
investors cannot distinguish between the two types of business ideas, entrepreneurs with ‘‘bad’’ 
ideas will try to claim that their ideas are as valuable as the ‘‘good’’ ideas. Realizing this 
possibility, investors will value both good and bad ideas at an average level. Therefore, if the 
lemons problem is not fully resolved, the capital market will rationally undervalue some good 
ideas and overvalue some bad ideas relative to the information available to entrepreneurs (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Second, the ex-post demand for accounting information arises from a 
separation of ownership and control (a characteristic of modern economies), which results in 
capital providers not having full decision-making rights. To solve the ensuing agency problems, 
both implicit and explicit contracts often use accounting information such as the use of 
resources, decisions taken and generated return on investments. Investors value such information 
ex-post and require a lower rate of return ex-ante when they can rely on such information. 
Hence, optimal contracts between managers and investors will provide incentives for full 
disclosure of private information, thus, mitigating the misevaluation problem (see Kreps, 1990). 
2.2.2 Integrated Reporting  
Integrated reporting has rapidly gained considerable prominence since the formation of the 
International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC – subsequently renamed the International 
Integrated Reporting Council). Initially, social and environmental disclosures were reported 
through the corporate annual reports (De Villiers et al., 2014). However, over the last two 
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decades social and environmental disclosures have increasingly been in stand-alone reports. The 
increased complexities and length of stand-alone social and environmental reports have led to a 
move to integrate social, environmental, financial and governance information (Dey and Burns, 
2010; Hopwood et al., 2010). The main focus of integrated reporting is to provide;  
 
… a concise communication about how an organisation’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its 
external environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, 
medium and long term. … an integrated report may be prepared in 
response to existing compliance requirements … If the report is 
required to include specified information beyond that required by 
this Framework, the report can still be considered an integrated 
report (IIRC, 2013a, p. 7-8).  
Thus, according to the IIRC (2013a, p.3) integrated reporting should contribute to 
allowing efficient and productive capital allocation and act as a force for financial 
stability and sustainability. In creating value, the argument for integrated reporting 
is that the ability of an organisation to create value for itself is linked to the value it 
creates for others. As such, financial capital providers are also interested in the 
value an organisation creates for others when it affects the ability of the organisation 
to create value for itself. Hence, integrated reports should enable providers of 
financial capital to assess whether, to what extent and how an organisation’s use of, 
and outcomes for, all the capitals add financial value (IIRC, 2013b).  
2.2.3 National Factors and Disclosures 
Empirical studies have identified national factors that could explain why firms from the United 
Kingdom and the United States generally disclose more information than firms from other 
countries (Dong and Stettler, 2011). These factors include; a nation’s cultural values (Zarzeski, 
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1996), legal systems (Jaggi and Low, 2000), economic development (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003) and financial systems (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002).  
2.2.3.1 National Culture 
Culture influences how people perceive situations and organise institutions (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003). Hofstede (1991) developed a set of dimensions to characterise national 
factors and to analyse the differences between these countries: power distance, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long-term orientation. Power distance represents the 
extent to which people tolerate unequal distribution of power within a society. There will be a 
less demand for accountability and disclosure in societies with high power distance. 
Individualism describes the relation between an individual and his or her fellow individuals in a 
society, the extent to which people are independent as oppose to collectivism. Uncertainty 
avoidance describes the extent to which people feel challenged by unknown situations. 
Masculinity describes the division of roles between the sexes in the society. Lastly, long-term 
orientation describes the time orientation of cultures. It is expected that investors and other 
stakeholders in short-term oriented societies demand a higher level of disclosure because they 
appreciate transparency and accountability (Santema et al., 2005). Companies in countries that 
place a high cultural value on power distance and uncertainty avoidance are likely to exhibit less 
information disclosure because the business environment is well developed and also because the 
national economy is oriented toward low-risk relationships. In contrast, companies in societies 
exhibiting high cultural values in individuality and masculinity are likely to be more transparent 
and to disclose more (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Gray, 1988).  
2.2.3.2 Legal Systems 
The extent to which a country protects shareholder rights is different across countries. Countries 
with low protection are generally characterized by high concentration of equity ownership within 
firms and lack strong capital markets (see Santema et al., 2005). Legal systems are predicted to 
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affect disclosure because different legal regimes can lead to different orientation of company 
acts and accounting regulations on disclosure. Relatively speaking “common law countries like 
the UK and US protect investors the most, followed by the German law countries and of the 
three origins of code law system, French civil law countries protect the least” (Porta et al., 1998 
p. 1139). The level of enforcement and protection is assumed to influence the level of 
transparency and accountability (Santema et al., 2005). As such it is expected that companies 
listed in the UK disclose more information to their shareholders and other stakeholders than 
companies in countries with lower investor protection.  
2.2.3.3 Economic Systems 
Some scholars have focused on economic perspectives, arguing that the economic environment 
is important to the development of accounting in general and reporting and disclosure in 
particular (Belkaoui, 1983). Put differently, Choi et al. (2005) take a similar approach arguing 
that the development of a disclosure system closely parallels the development of an accounting 
system, and the latter is closely influenced by the level of economic development (p. 146). 
Hence, countries at different stages of economic development are expected to have different 
accounting practices and disclosure behaviour. 
2.2.3.4 National Financial Systems 
Further, the national financial systems may substantially affect accounting measures as well 
as disclosure practices. (Nobes, 1998) suggests that the distinction between “creditor/ insider” 
and “equity/outsider” financial systems is the key in weighting the degree of market pressure 
exerted on those who are responsible for disclosure in financial reports. In credit-based countries 
where banks are the main financial providers, national accounting systems are oriented to protect 
creditors' rights. Thus, the pressure for information disclosure in these countries is relatively 
weaker than in countries with developed equity markets. In contrast, in countries with strong 
equity markets, accounting is designed to help make investors aware of information that may 
18 
 
help predict future performance and associated risks. Disclosure therefore is, intended to meet 
the information needs of public ownership. Santema et al. (2005) found that national differences 
in corporate governance and culture do influence the extent to which companies’ disclosure their 
Strategy. This implies that the corporate governance approach adopted in the UK will influence 
the disclosure practice of companies.  
2.2.4 Disclosure Regulation  
Beyer et al. (2010) pointed out that the literature on disclosure provides two main reasons for 
disclosure regulation. First, the misalignment of insiders’ (entrepreneurs’ or management’s) and 
investors’ incentives can make it difficult for managers to credibly convey information. From 
this perspective, disclosure requirements, accounting standards, auditors, and SEC enforcement 
actions are mechanisms that allow firms to commit to certain disclosure levels and improve the 
credibility of disclosed information. 
Second, the public goods aspect of disclosures results in free-rider problems, creating 
circumstances in which managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose information are insufficient 
even though additional information would improve social welfare. In such cases, regulation 
mandating the disclosure of certain information can be desirable. Hence, disclosure regulation 
will, in part, depend on the kind of information that a firm voluntarily discloses or that can 
(efficiently) be produced by other market participants. 
On the other hand, Healy and Palepu (2001) discussed that regulation could also be motivated 
by concerns other than market failures. This implies that the objective of disclosure regulation 
could be to redistribute wealth, rather than improve economic efficiency. This leaves an 
unanswered question: What is the role of regulators in the regulation of Strategy and BM 
disclosure? Additionally, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) stressed that evidence on the causal effects 
of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. Furthermore, Considering the earlier 
discussion about the information need ex-ante and ex-post, Beyer et al. (2010) contended that, 
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the ex-ante and ex-post demands for accounting information might not always result in the 
information being voluntarily supplied. When managers do not voluntarily disclose all their 
private information, there is room for disclosure regulation in capital markets.  
Whatever the regulation is, disclosure, far from providing the financial stability desired, can 
on the contrary cause crises. In other words, to ensure that managers give investors the 
information they need to take decisions, it is important to ensure that the information disclosed is 
a function of both the width of the disclosures on different topics regarding a firm’s value 
creation BM and Strategy, and of the depth of the disclosures about the insights into a firm’s 
future performance (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008).  
Hence, because of the lemons problem, there is a demand for information intermediaries, such 
as financial analysts and rating agencies, who engage in private information production to 
uncover managers’ superior information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Although, the aim of 
mandated disclosures is to alleviate agency problem, several accounting observers opined that 
mandated disclosures are becoming increasingly irrelevant, because they do not force managers 
to reveal pertinent information (see Lev and Zarowin, 1999a; FASB, 2001a). 
Goto et al. (2008) stressed that the integrity of corporate disclosure sustains investor 
confidence in trading securities at fair prices, and hence is at the heart of well-functioning capital 
markets. In practice, however, a firm’s disclosure may reflect the strategic decisions of self-
interested managers, as it involves a number of estimates, judgments, and assumptions. Thus, 
managers may have an incentive to obfuscate the firm’s true performance, within the allowances 
of investor protection regulations. As such, disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate 
credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these 
problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
2.2.5 Corporate Governance and Corporate Disclosure 
The debate on the role of high quality financial information and corporate governance provisions 
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in reducing information asymmetries and agency conflicts is ongoing (Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013). Recent research argues that these mechanisms (information and governance) are both 
substitutes (Bushman et al., 2004) and complements (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Corporate 
governance is a natural topic in the discussion of how legal systems exert influence on disclosure 
(Pagliarussi and Liberato, 2011). The basic question about corporate governance is how 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). They justify the focus on shareholders by stating that, contrary to 
other stakeholders, the former has a sunk investment in the company. If the firm runs into 
financial difficulties, shareholders are likely to lose their investment whereas other stakeholders 
such as employees can walk away relatively easy. The OECD, the World Bank, the European 
Association of Securities Dealers – the EASD – and the European Commission, have adopted 
this line of argument. Thus, it is argued that financial reporting is shaped by corporate 
governance approaches (Yeoh, 2010).  
So, corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be altered 
through the political process (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Research has shown that the presence 
of directors is strongly associated with increased voluntary disclosure (Fama, 1980; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). In their study, Santema et al. (2005) concluded that 
national differences in corporate governance and culture do influence the extent to which 
companies disclose their Strategy. In this way, the need for Strategy disclosure will be smaller in 
countries with a dual-board system, than in governance systems with a unitary board system. A 
larger degree of protection and enforcement will lead to a prevalence of transparency and 
accountability. An example of this is that companies listed in countries characterized by a strong 
investor protection are compelled by law to disclose more information to their investors and 
other stakeholders than companies in countries with weaker investor protection.  
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According to the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), good corporate governance is 
essential to the effective operation of a free market, which facilitates wealth creation and 
freedom from poverty (FRC, 2010a). It is argued that the more ingrained the system of corporate 
governance in a business community, the less the need for a detailed regulation to ensure 
effective compliance with good standards of business behaviour (FRC, 2010a).  Yeoh (2010) 
opined that under the stakeholder (insider) approach, financial reporting and corporate 
disclosures appears driven more by the legitimacy and institution theories as management strives 
to conform to stakeholders’ and regulators’ expectations. However, under the shareholder 
primacy (outsider) Anglo-saxon approach, financial reporting is used to resolve the information 
asymmetries between management and shareholders in normal circumstances or applied as an 
impression management device in opportunistic situations to manipulate investors’ perceptions 
and response by focusing on the earnings report. This supports the suitability of the theoretical 
framework adopted for this study – “agency and signalling” suggesting that although corporate 
disclosure is used to resolve the information asymmetry between management and shareholders, 
whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, corporate disclosure has the potential of a 
reducing of information asymmetry.  
2.2.6 Voluntary versus Mandatory Disclosure  
Disclosure theory differentiates between mandatory and voluntary approaches. Voluntary 
disclosure is a measure of self-regulation or a response to the expectations of stakeholders and 
civil society for more disclosure (Chandler, 1997). The Financial Reporting Standard Board 
(FRSB, 2001) defines voluntary disclosure as “disclosure, primarily outside of the financial 
statements that are not explicitly required by accounting standards or regulations’. Most studies 
define voluntary disclosure by tracing regulations and accounting standards. For example, 
(Cooke, 1989 p. 171) defines voluntary disclosure of Swedish companies as “those items that are 
not stipulated by the Companies Act 1995, the Accounting Act 1976 and by Notices issued by 
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Accounting Standard Board”. Similarly, Hossain (1994 p. 341) specify voluntary disclosure of 
companies as ‘…which is not referring to the accounting standards promulgated by the MIA 
(Malaysian Institute of Accountants), the Companies Act 1965 and the KLSE listing 
requirements. Voluntary disclosure may be able to be more cost sensitive, but it appears to suffer 
from biasness associated with the problems of selective dissemination and the adoption of 
creative accounting in the earnings report.  
In contrast, mandatory disclosure results from legislation or regulation. Mandatory reporting 
especially on a more standardized basis is justified to bridge the deficit of relevant information 
for users for comparative analysis purposes (Yeoh, 2010). “Mandatory disclosure refers to the 
existence of disclosure regulation” (Dobler, 2008 p.185). Mandatory disclosure would enhance 
transparency, help reduce conflicts of interest, deter abusive use of management power, prevent 
fraud, protect investors, and promote informed decision-making and accountability (Benston et 
al., 2006; Villiers, 2007). It’s been contended that mandatory disclosure requirements only apply 
if the disclosure is material (see Beyer et al., 2010).  
While any Strategy and BM disclosure in a voluntary regime is discretionary, there is 
discretion in Strategy and BM reporting in a mandatory disclosure regime as well. The latter 
stem from disclosure rules that give managers discretion for the quality and content of 
information disclosed. For the purpose of this research, the requirement to disclose Strategy and 
BM in the annual report is regarded as mandatory, considering that it is specified in the 
Companies Act, 2006. However, it is argued that the requirement does not specify the content of 
such disclosures; therefore, management could still influence the ‘quality’ of the disclosure of 
Strategy and BMs in annual reports. It appears that the rationale for a mandatory disclosure 
requirement of strategy and BM information is to create a consistent and continued disclosure 
level for investors that are not privy to managements’ private information (see Bini et al., 2016). 
This study examines the disclosure of strategy both during the voluntary and mandatory periods.  
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2.3   Strategy 
Strategy is about competitive positioning, differentiation, and about adding value. Thus, in 
this way, Strategy is associated with the course of action that allows the firm to create a 
competitive advantage that enhances its value (Porter, 1985; Besanko et al., 2003). (Middleton, 
2006) highlight one unifying theme common with all leading authors on Strategy, namely that all 
definitions of Strategy concern themselves with the future direction of the organization into that 
future.  
According to Rumelt et al. (1991) firms if not all are in competition; such competition 
includes, competition for resources, competition for customers, and ultimately competition for 
revenues that cover the costs of their chosen manner of surviving.  Also, for survival, firms make 
strategic choices which include: the selection of goals; the choice of products and services to 
offer; the choice of an appropriate level of scope and diversity; the design and configuration of 
policies of determining how the firm positions itself to compete in product-markets; and the 
design of organization structure, administrative systems and policies used to define and 
coordinate work (Rumelt et al., 1991). It is a basic proposition of the Strategy field that these 
choices have critical influence on the success or failure of the enterprise, and that they must be 
integrated. It is the integration (or reinforcing pattern) among these choices that make the set a 
Strategy (Rumelt et al., 1991) Figure 2.1 shows various definitions of Strategy. 
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                                             Figure 2.1 Definitions of Strategy 
 
2.3.1 Levels of Strategy in an Organization 
Strategies can exist at three main levels inside the organization, and these include the 
corporate level Strategy, business level Strategy, operational or functional level Strategy, 
financial Strategy and so on. Wright et al. (1998) discussed different strategic levels of action: 
corporate Strategy, business unit Strategy and functional Strategy. However, this hierarchical 
view does not necessarily represent the way Strategy is formulated (Slack et al., 2010) 
2.3.1.1 Business Unit Strategy:  
The strategic business unit is the next level after corporate-level Strategy, originally 
conceptualized for diversified companies. A business unit is an organizational sub-system, which 
has a market niche, competitors and organizational mission and goals diverse from other 
organizational subsystems in the same firm (Wright et al., 1998). This level of Strategy is about 
how to compete successfully in particular markets. The business level Strategy identifies and 
builds the strength the business needs in its long term competitive position in the marketplace. It 
is argued that achieving competitive advantage allows a business to differentiate its products or 
services from those of competitors to increase market share.  
'Competitive Strategy is 
about being different. It is 
about chosing differnt sets 
of activities to deliver a 
unique mix of values'
Porter, (1991, p. 60)
'a pattern in a stream of 
decisions'
Mintzberg, (2007, p.3)
'Managerial tool for delivering the 
objectives of the company'
UK CGC
'The game plan that management uses 
to  stake out a market position, 
conduct its operations, attract and 
please customers, compete 
successfully, and achieve 
organisational objectives'
Thompson and Strickland, (2003)
'The direction and scope of an 
organisation over the long term, which 
achieves advantages in a changing 
environment through its 
configurationof resorces and 
competences with the aim of fulfiling 
stakeholder expectations'
Gerry et al., (2009 p. 3)
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Business Strategy is sometimes called ‘competitive Strategy’ (Johnson et al., 2009). This 
includes issues such as pricing Strategy, cost leadership and innovation or differentiation, 
response to competitors’ moves etc. Strategic decisions relate to particular strategic business 
units (SBU) within the overall organization. Each SBU has a distinct external market for goods 
or services that is different from another SBU. However, it is argued that business-level 
strategies should not be disclosed as it directly impacts the survival of an organization against 
rivals, and such a disclosure would mean giving out business intelligence on a platter of gold. 
2.3.1.2 Operational / Functional Strategies  
Operational strategies are concerned with how the component of an organization deliver 
successfully the corporate-level and business-level strategies in terms of processes, people and 
resources (Johnson et al., 2009). Generally, because successful business strategies depend to a 
large extent on decisions that are taken or activities that take place at the operational level, 
operational strategies are vital to successful strategy implementation. Examples of operational 
strategies include a decision to raise external finance to fund rapid growth, possibly geared 
towards meeting investment needs. In their study, Pagliarussi and Liberato (2011) discussed the 
levels of Strategy, and observed that the disclosure with operational Strategy content occurs less 
frequently than corporate Strategy disclosure. Pagliarussi and Liberato (2011) argued that since 
the literature clearly indicates that operational Strategy is a way of creating competitive 
advantage, investors would be expected to know how to interpret operational Strategy disclosure 
in the valuation of their investment options.  
2.3.1.3 Corporate Level Strategy:  
Corporate strategy is concerned with “the overall purpose and scope of an organization and 
how value will be added to the different parts (business units) of the organization” Johnson et al. 
(2009, p.7). Thus, corporate-level Strategy is conceived in terms of variation in the portfolio of 
industries in which a firm does business (Beard and Dess, 1981) and in addition, according to 
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Hofer and Schendel (1978), the operational measures of resource deployment among businesses. 
Examples include; issues of geographical coverage, diversity of products/services or business 
units, acquisitions of new businesses, mergers, consolidation, and how resources are allocated 
between the different parts of the organisation. 
Most firms have simple corporate-level strategies, as they compete in only one industry 
among hundreds that are possible. Other firms however, such as the FTSE 100 largest firms on 
the London Stock Exchange, typically participate in several industries, and their top managers 
must contend with the varied and conflicting demands of their industrially specialized subunits 
(Beard and Dess, 1981). Hill and Jones (2011) stress that the clarity of corporate Strategy is 
important, and a disclosure of corporate-level Strategy should give an insight into the activities 
of the company and explicitly stating how shareholder value would be enhanced. Additionally, 
Johnson et al. (2009) contend that corporate-level Strategy is likely to be concerned with the 
expectations of owners - the shareholders and the stock market. This expectation could be 
implicitly or explicitly reflected in a statement of ‘mission’.  
 
2.4 BM  
According to Teece (2010) a BM describes the design or architecture of the value creation, 
delivery and mechanisms a business enterprise employs. Put in other words, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2010) described BM as the rationale of how an organisation creates, delivers and 
captures value. The essence of a BM is in defining the manner by which the enterprise delivers 
value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those payments to profit. 
Magretta (2002) asserts that a firm’s BM sets the economic logic of how the organization 
Strategy can create value for the customers at an acceptable price with reasonable profit. In a 
report, ICAEW (2010) argues that what a firm does internally and what it does through market 
transactions are described by its BM. Thus, a company’s BM relates to how and why a 
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company’s product and offerings can generate attractive revenues and still create value for 
customers. 
Further, Magretta (2002) argued that creating a BM is like writing a new story, which at some 
level is a variation on the generic value chain underlying all businesses. Accordingly, Stefanovic 
and Milosevic (2012) pointed out that a BM could be seen as a generic value chain underlying 
business. This chain has two parts. The first part includes all the activities associated with 
making something that satisfies an unmet need. The second part involves all activities focused 
on selling what was made in the first place. Thus, from the activity-based perspective, it can be 
argued that a BM defines the structure of the value chain (Zott and Amit, 2009). Put differently, 
Amit and Zott (2001 p. 511) contends that the BM can then be defined as ‘the structure, content, 
and governance of transactions’ between the focal firm and its exchange partners. Therefore, the 
overall objective of a BM is to exploit a business opportunity by creating value for the parties 
involved (Zott and Amit, 2009). In essence, a BM performs two important functions: value 
creation, i.e. a series of interrelated activities within a firm, and value capture, i.e. a firm earning 
a profit from some portion of its activities (Chesbrough, 2007).  
In their study Zott and Amit (2008) distinguished between two types of BM characterized by 
their design themes, which capture the common threads that orchestrate and connect the focal 
firm’s transactions with external parties. Zott and Amit (2008) contend that the design themes 
are not mutually exclusive: several design themes may be present in any given BM. Novelty-
centered BMs refer to new ways of conducting economic exchanges among various participants. 
The conceptualization and adoption of new ways of conducting transactions can be achieved, for 
example, by connecting previously unconnected parties, by linking transaction participants in 
new ways, or by designing new transaction mechanisms. Efficiency-centered BMs refer to the 
measures firms may take to achieve transaction efficiency (i.e., reduce transaction costs for all 
participants); they do not refer to the outcome (efficiency) itself. The essence of an efficiency- 
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centered BM is the reduction of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).  
In addition, (Magretta, 2002) contents that a powerful BM should pass two tests.  
1. The narrative test: The BM should tell a logical story about who your customers are, 
what they value, and how you’ll make money providing them that value. The story plot may turn 
on one of two links in the generic business value chain: making something that satisfies an 
unmet need; or, selling something in innovative ways.  
2. The numbers test: A BM’s story holds up only if you tie assumptions about 
customers to sound economics-the P&L must add up. 
More importantly is clarity about a BM. It can be used as a basis for employee 
communication and motivation. It can be used to get everyone in the organisation aligned around 
the kind of value the company wants to create (Magretta, 2002). Further, there are various 
approaches and categorisations of structures, or elements comprising a BM as pointed out by 
Amit and Zott (2001) such that it is up to an individual to make a choice regarding the 
underlying logic of a BM (see also Shafer et al., 2005; Voelpel et al., 2005; Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010). On the other hand, Magretta (2002) emphasized the importance of fitting all the 
elements of a BM into a working hole as a valuable planning tool.  
In essence, successful BM provides a guide to managers on how the entire business system 
will work, with every decision, initiative, and measurement providing valuable feedback 
(Magretta, 2002).  A BM is like a financial forecast. A profit and loss statement and a balance 
sheet forecast. A financial forecast is as good as the assumptions that go into computing the 
figures. A forecast must be continuously monitored and compared to actual for variance and 
corrective actions taken as soon as it is necessary. Profits give an indication that your BM is 
working. If expected results are not achieved, a re-examination of the model is necessary. 
Stefanovic and Milosevic (2012) stressed that a firm with a distinct BM that creates more 
value than that of its rivals’ holds a potential advantage. Consequently, a BM may affect a firm’s 
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performance outcome (Zott and Amit, 2008). Hence, the final concept of the ‘BM’ ought to be 
unique in some manner so that a firm can achieve competitive advantage. On the other hand, 
Teece (2010) argues that a BM (no matter how novel) is not capable of assuring competitive 
advantage. Once implemented, the gross elements of BMs are often quite transparent and (in 
principal) easy to imitate.  
A review of the literature on BM shows that the term ‘BM’ is broad and trying to define it, 
one risk either giving such a general definition that the result is musky at best (Porter et al., 
2001) or one includes too many elements in it, resulting in a definition that is not only unclear, 
but also difficult to understand and communicate. In order to enhance a fair and understandable 
disclosure of the BM of an entity, Giunta et al. (2014) developed a framework for the disclosure 
of BM based on the four main areas of the BM.  
Lastly, Beattie and Smith (2013) made an attempt to link the key features in the literature of 
strategic management on BM to contemporary debates on narrative reporting. In their study, 
(Beattie and Smith, 2013)concluded that the BM concept offers a powerful overarching concept 
in the strategic management literature that can usefully inform business reporting debate. 
2.5 The nature of the interaction between Strategy and BM 
(Hill and Jones, 2011) described competitive advantage as the advantage over rivals achieved 
when a company’s profitability is greater than the average profitability of all firms in the 
industry. On the other hand, sustained competitive advantage is achieved when a company is 
able to maintain above-average profitability for a number of years. Teece (2010) argues that a 
BM (no matter how novel) is not capable of assuring competitive advantage. Once implemented, 
the gross elements of BMs are often quite transparent and (in principal) easy to imitate. 
According to Magretta (2002) the flip side of Strategy formulation is a company’s BM. Even 
though some people use the term interchangeably, a firm’s BM describes how the components of 
the business as a system fits together but does not factor the critical dimension of performance 
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competition. One explains who your customers are and how you plan to make money by 
providing them value; the other, how you’ll beat competitors by being different. Stefanovic and 
Milosevic (2012) stressed that for a long time the primary focus of academics and practitioners 
in developing competitive advantage of a firm has remained on Strategy. Further, Hill and Jones 
(2011) argued that companies like Walmart, Southwest, and Dell computers have had a 
significant and sustained competitive advantage because they have pursued firm-specific 
strategies that result in superior performance. According to Porter (1991) the final determinant of 
advantage is firm Strategy, structure, and rivalry, or the context for competition in a region or 
nation. The national and local environments have a strong influence on management practices, 
forms of organization, and the goals set by individuals and companies.  
To ensure the protection of competitive advantage over the design and implementation of new 
BMs, coupling Strategy analysis with BM analysis is important. Teece (2010) argued that 
selecting a business Strategy is a more granular exercise than designing a BM. Coupling 
competitive Strategy analysis to BM design requires segmenting the market, creating a value 
proposition for each segment, setting up the apparatus to deliver the value, and then figuring out 
the various ‘isolation mechanisms’ that can be used to prevent the BM/Strategy from being 
undermined through imitation by competitors or disintermediation by customers. Teece (2010) 
stressed that unless the BM survives the filters which Strategy analysis imposes, it is unlikely to 
be viable, as many BM features are easily imitated. Hence, having a differentiated and hard-to-
imitate, but at the same time effective and efficient architecture for an enterprise’s BM is 
important to the establishment of competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, the BM can be a source of competitive advantage that is distinct from the 
firm’s product market position (Teece, 2010). Firms that address the same customer need, and 
pursue similar product market strategies, can do so with very different BMs. A firm with a 
distinct BM that creates more value than that of its rivals holds a potential advantage. All other 
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things being equal, it has the possibility to capture more value for its shareholders. According to 
Zott and Amit (2008) product market Strategy differs from the BM mainly through its focus on 
the positioning of the firm vis-a`-vis its rivals, whereas the BM is a structural construct that 
centres on the pattern of the firm’s economic exchanges with external parties in its addressable 
factor and product markets. Zott and Amit (2008)argue that the BM is a valid and distinct 
construct from received notions of a firm’s product market Strategy. Stating that because the 
BM, as a source of value, can help explain why some firms outperform others, it provides a 
rationale for value creation and appropriation that is distinct from (but may interact with) the 
firm’s product market Strategy. They concluded that BMs and business Strategy are 
complements and not substitutes. In line with this argument, Veit et al. (2014) noted that the BM 
concept is the missing link between business Strategy and Information Technology (IT). 
Additionally, Tikkanen et al. (2005) argued that the function of Strategy is to give a meaning 
and direction for the development of the company’s BM. Put differently, (Mintzberg and Waters, 
1982) contend that Strategy is a comprehensive pattern of a company’s actions and intents 
binding together all the components of the BM. Therefore, towards the integration of BM and 
Strategy to enhance competitive positioning, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) noted that 
BM refers to the logic of the firm, i.e. the way it operates and how it creates value for its 
stakeholders. However, they stated that Strategy is the choice of BM through which the firm 
competes in the marketplace (a BM can be seen as a reflection of the realized Strategy). Put 
differently, BM reflects how important elements in an organization are aligned, i.e. how the 
value is produced and delivered to the customers. If temporal dimension is induced into this 
picture, BM becomes a dynamic representation of organizational operating logic. It becomes an 
objective representation of the reality of the firm and its markets (Mason and Spring, 2011).  
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Figure 2.2 The strategic process of value creation 
 
From the literature on BM and Strategy and their effect on competitive positioning, it could 
be concluded that the BM is fundamental to the design or architecture of a business, while 
Strategy is a tool to deliver the BM uniquely and in such a way that the economic value that 
proceeds from the value creation exceeds the investment made. However, competitive advantage 
is dependent upon how well a BM and Strategy is integrated. Thus, BM and Strategy could be 
seen as complements and not substitutes.  
Magretta (2002) asserts that all the activities of Strategy – competitive advantage, low cost 
provision, product differentiation, segmentation and the development of competitive capabilities 
are aimed at achieving superiority over rivals by attracting and satisfying customers. If a 
company fails to meet its expected results, it would go back to re-examine its model and 
Strategy, and make the necessary corrections. Strategy and BMs are fundamental to 
performance; such that no organisation can afford fuzzy thinking about these concepts. 
Therefore, it is argued that the decision to disclose BM or Strategy should be strategically 
• BM
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• Competitive 
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33 
 
considered.  
2.6 Narrative Reporting and the Annual Reports 
Narrative reporting has been established in the IASB framework as a crucial complement to 
the preparation and presentation of financial statements in the annual (IASB, 2001). Research 
has shown that the annual report is a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure a company 
provides across all different forms of disclosure, e.g. press releases, initial public offerings 
(IPOs), web sites, company brochures, newsletters (Gelb, 2002; Botosan, 1997; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). Earlier studies have primarily focused on examining the annual report.  
2.6.1 The Development of Strategy and BMs Disclosures in the UK  
This section concentrates on changes in financial reporting, particularly the changing role and 
content of narrative reporting, and how corporate governance has influenced financial reporting. 
Narrative reporting in the form of an operating and financial review (OFR) was initially 
introduced as a best financial disclosure practice for large listed companies in 1993 in the UK to 
promote user-friendly financial reporting. Further, in 2005, the UK government put the OFR on 
a statutory footing, emphasizing forward-looking statements and the use of an OFR Reporting 
Standard (RSI) consequent upon the requirements launched by the European Accounts 
Modernization Directive (2003/51/EC).  
Further, in January 2006, the government removed the OFR from the statute and replaced it 
with a narrower “Business Review” in the directors’ report, based on best practice and not a 
mandatory RS. Although this development would not detract the requirement of making forward 
looking statements for the Business review in the directors’ report, it would however relieve the 
regulatory reporting burdens for the private sector. Critics of this decision argued that they 
consider the OFR a natural extension of management information, which can enhance 
information quality leading ultimately to expansion of shareholder value (Yeoh, 2010). 
However, nothing was mentioned the OFR and Business Review about Strategy and BM. 
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According to a report by the UK FRC, the UK has developed a market-based approach that 
enables the board to retain flexibility in the way in which it organizes itself and exercises its 
responsibilities, while ensuring that it is properly accountable to its shareholders (FRC, 2010b). 
This is done primarily through the UK Corporate Governance Code, which is maintained by the 
FRC. For the system to work effectively, shareholders need to have appropriate and relevant 
information to enable them to make the assessment of whether the company’s governance 
practices are effective in underpinning the sustainable success of the company. The role of the 
FRC as regulators is to ensure such information is available. The UK Corporate Governance 
Code operates on the basis of the ‘comply and explain’ principle and is regularly reviewed in 
consultation with companies and investors. It is argued that the rationale behind the UK 
approach is that boards must ensure that the business is sustainable and take account of long-
term consequences in setting its BM and strategies (FRC, 2010b).  
In 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code introduced a requirement for listed companies 
to disclose in their annual report their BM and Strategy for delivering corporate objectives 
(Combined Code, 2010) based on a ‘comply or explain principle’ (FRC, 2010b). The FRC 
believes that better regulation should be part of the framework for economic growth, directed at 
the next crisis rather than the last. Although the FRC stressed that excessive regulation could 
damage the spirit of innovation that the UK economy needs (FRC, 2010b). 
Additionally, it is assumed that regulation should begin with strong corporate governance, 
stating that it is the role of shareholders and boards to scrutinize and ensure that their companies 
are being led in the right direction over the long-term. Stressing that encouraging transparency, 
accountability and long-term stability will promote healthy long-term growth. Further, The FRC 
stated that to enhance effectiveness, such framework need to be implemented in a way that fits 
the culture and organization of the individual company (FRC, 2010b) This can vary enormously 
from company to company depending on factors such as size, ownership, structure and the 
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complexity of its activities. In line with this, (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008) showed that the extent 
of forward-looking disclosure is positively associated with the size of the company. Also, it 
depends on the industry to which the firm belongs (thus evidencing a sort of bandwagon effect) 
and is positively associated with the firm’s other form of disclosure offered in the period 
considered in the analysis.  
Interestingly, in 2012, the UK government proposed a new framework for narrative reporting 
to include a strategic report, though similar to the business review, but quoted companies will be 
required to include a report on their Strategy, their BM effective from October 2013 (FRC, 
2012b); Thus, moving towards a more mandatory disclosure. The FRC stated in the guidance 
draft “the description of an entity’s strategies allows shareholders to assess the current and past 
actions undertaken by directors in pursuit of the entity’s objectives and to predict the future 
developments in the business” (FRC, 2013 paragrph 6.35). This requirement is now part of the 
Companies Act, 2006. Further, the Act specifies that the purpose of the strategic report is to 
enhance the assessment of directors’ performance of their duty (Company’s Act, 2006; Section 
414A). The Act requires that the strategic report should contain among others, a fair review of 
the company’s business, and a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the 
company. 
Although this requirement is now mandatory, the regulation did not define what is meant by 
Strategy and BM. This implies that the content of Strategy and BM information disclosed 
remains at the discretion of managers.  In summary, this shows that there are three stages in the 
development of Strategy and BM in annual reports. The voluntary, Comply or explain, and the 
mandatory periods. 
2.6.2 Strategy Disclosure in Annual Reports 
According to Santema and Van de Rijt (2001) the commission on corporate governance in the 
Netherlands stimulates the disclosure of strategies and goals. However, Strategy disclosure is 
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voluntary in the Netherlands, thus, decisions on whether to disclose, what to disclose and how 
much to disclose is largely up to the individual company (Coebergh, 2011a). Coebergh and 
Cohen, 2009; cited in Coebergh (2011a) highlight that there is a mixed view on the pros and 
cons of communicating Strategy among leaders of Dutch publicly listed corporations, such as; 
“It is impossible to share ambitions with others in a clear and understandable way”. Also, 
evidence that some companies fear disclosure comes from the successful Dutch (family owned) 
retail firm Zeeman Groep, one of the largest 200 corporations in the Netherlands and with about 
1,000 outlets, one of the largest chains in Europe for low-cost confecting clothing. In 2006, the 
CEO of Zeeman Groep said to the press that they stopped publishing annual reports and financial 
statements since 2004, risking regulatory fines, commenting “Because of competition we do not 
disclose too much public information”.  
More optimistic is the CEO of Dutch electronics corporation Philips, arguing on a CEO 
conference that transparency is beneficial for corporations, and that with transparency having 
made a new move, their decisions are being scrutinized by shareholders, regulators, employees, 
the press and others; as such, failure to disclose and dialogue, will create a void that will be filled 
with more fear and uncertainty (Coebergh, 2011a). 
In a study, Santema and Van de Rijt (2001) investigated the extent to which Dutch firms 
disclose their Strategy in the Annual Report; the main finding of their study was that Dutch listed 
firms generally do not disclose a lot of information on their Strategy, firms’ disclosures were 
more backward looking rather that forward looking. They also found that future oriented action 
plans were rarely disclosed. This research identifies the Executive/Managing Board Report as 
the location of Strategy information in the annual reports of retail banks in the Netherlands. 
Further, in their study, Santema et al. (2005) compared the disclosure of Strategy in the annual 
reports of companies from five European countries. These countries include: The UK, The 
Netherlands, Germany, France and Poland. They concluded that the size of a firm has a positive 
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effect on Strategy disclosure. Also, that Polish firms disclose the least on Strategy. Interestingly, 
(Santema et al.) concluded that UK disclosed more on Strategy than others, except for Dutch 
firms.  
Furthermore, Padia and Yasseen (2011) argued that although Strategy disclosure is voluntary 
in South Africa, South African listed companies generally disclose a lot on their Strategy. This 
conclusion is based on their finding that firms disclosed both information about past 
performance and future oriented information. However, they opined that the content of such 
disclosure would not necessarily be such that could put the companies in ‘jeopardy’, but there is 
a tendency to make sufficient disclosure to appease the stakeholders. Thus, the literature review 
shows that prior research on Strategy disclosure have been on voluntary disclosure, Whittington 
and Yakis-Douglas (2010) highlighted the need for further research on external Strategy 
disclosure, particularly in the case for public enforcement of such disclosures.   
 
2.6.3 BM Disclosure in Annual Reports  
There are very few studies about the disclosure of BM. In order to enhance a fair and 
understandable disclosure of the BM of an entity, Giunta et al. (2014) investigated the disclosure 
of BM in the annual reports of Italian companies. They developed a framework for the disclosure 
of BM based on the four main areas of the BM. They concluded that companies that use the term 
BM more frequently are rarely those which provide more information about the model’s 
elements. They opined that this could be partly due to the ambiguity of the meaning of BM. 
Beattie and Smith (2013) made an attempt to link the key features in the literature of strategic 
management on BM to contemporary debates on narrative reporting. In their study, Beattie and 
Smith (2013) concluded that the BM concept offers a powerful overarching concept in the 
strategic management literature that can usefully inform business reporting debate. 
Additionally, Melloni et al. (2016) investigates the informativeness of BM disclosure 
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questioning whether companies adopt impression management strategies by manipulating the 
tone of the BM disclosures provided in their reports. Melloni et al. (2016) investigated the 
reports of firms from all the continents (Europe 54%, Africa 20%, America 17%, Asia and 
Australia 9%). They found that managers use BM disclosure as an impression management 
Strategy. Further, Bini et al. (2016) focused on the examination of BM disclosure quality, 
investigating the extent and nature of reporting BM constituent concepts. Bini et al. (2016) 
extended the BM disclosure framework proposed by Guinta et al., (2014). They focused on a 
sample of listed UK companies operating in the high-technology industries and used content 
analysis to investigate BM disclosure presented in the strategic report. Bini et al. (2016) 
concluded that companies rarely use BM disclosure to convey a cohesive story that highlights 
the interconnections among the different components of BM information disclosed. Bini et al 
(2016) stressed that these results might prevent stakeholders from understanding how companies 
create value, stressing that this might be influenced by the lack of specification of BM-
component description provided in the FRC guidance. Thus, they stressed the need for the 
development of a detailed framework that clearly identifies the role of BM within business 
reporting. 
2.7 The Relevance of Strategy and BM Disclosure in Annual Reports 
The demand for disclosure on the performance of listed companies has increased in recent 
times (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and the failures of large companies listed on the most important 
stock exchanges have placed extra pressure on standard setters and listed companies for an 
increase in the quality of corporate reporting (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Reporting 
information about Strategy and BM has been touted as a potential alternative to the (alleged) 
‘short-termism’ of providing quarterly earnings (Richard Lu and Wu Tucker, 2012). According 
to Whittington and Yakis-Douglas (2010) there is a concern that the long-term strategies of firms 
are not being adequately understood to serve the long-term interests of both firms and economies 
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more widely. Hence, they envisaged that Strategy communications would shift from the domain 
of voluntary disclosure towards more mandatory disclosure. They argue for a greater 
transparency of corporate strategies, note that very little research on Strategy disclosure exists 
even though it has been touted as a potential alternative to the (alleged) “short-termism”  
Further, the disclosure of Strategy and BM could help to improve the quality of financial 
reporting. A guideline by the CICA (2001) emphasizes the importance of disclosing according to 
a strategic view of business. This framework suggests that accompanying narrative information 
concerning company vision (core business and long-term business Strategy); critical success 
factors; capabilities (resources) for achieving desired results; expected results; and connected 
risks and opportunities should be included in annual reports. 
The quantity of information disclosed in the annual report and the richness of its content has 
been discussed in the disclosure literature (see Alberti et al., 2009). Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) 
defined richness as a function of both the width of the disclosures on different topics regarding a 
firm’s BM and value-creation Strategy, and the depth of the disclosures about the presence of 
insights into a firm’s future performance. The study demonstrates that disclosure quality captures 
dimensions of annual report disclosure that are considered useful by users (financial analysts) in 
forecasting earnings to support market participants in their economic decisions and in relation to 
the behaviour of financial analysts in revising earnings forecasts. Santema and Van de Rijt 
(2001) argued that Strategy disclosure has a positive influence on the quality of the annual 
report. (Santema and Van de Rijt, 2001) analysed annual reports of Dutch companies with 
respect to Strategy disclosure. The authors posited that the extent of Strategy disclosure 
presented in annual reports is positively related to disclosure quality. In line with this, in a report 
by ACCA (2008) the chief executive’s review was considered more useful as it contains 
meaningful information on future Strategy compared to the chairman’s statement. Thus, the 
impact of Strategy content on the value of the chairman’s statement was emphasized. 
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Additionally, the disclosure of Strategy and BM could enhance investment decision-making. 
In their study, Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) examined the efficacy of disclosure in improving the 
capabilities of financial analysts to appreciate the value-creation Strategy and expected financial 
results of a firm.  The study focused on the characteristics of forward-looking information used 
by financial analysts in analysing the fundamentals of a firm. Because one of the main tasks of 
financial analysts is forecasting future earnings, disclosure quality was defined in relation to the 
characteristics of information that can support the forecasting process. Following the adopted 
framework, disclosed information is considered quality information if it leads to better 
inferences from analysts and supports better estimates of future earnings.  
More so, Santema and Van de Rijt (2001) stressed that future-oriented actions are most 
valuable for readers of annual reports. (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008) suggested that the change in 
analyst forecasts is based on the quality of forward-looking information in annual reports as 
disclosure quality is associated with the percentage of change in earnings forecast and with the 
change in accuracy of earnings forecast. Also, the disclosure of BM makes visible how the 
company acquires and uses different forms of capital (intellectual, financial and physical) to 
create value (Beattie and Smith, 2013). Hereby, enhancing the assessment of management 
quality in terms of their ability to acquire, combine and utilise such resources. Furthermore, 
ICAEW (2010) argued that it is important to disclose BMs as this could provide an answer to the 
problem of the dispute over the proper limits of market prices – or fair value – in financial 
reporting. 
On the contrary, Baginski et al. (2014) opined that a voluntary Strategy disclosure is likely to 
be less useful based on management control of the disclosure content and the timing of such 
disclosures, for example, company initiated investor and analysts’ day presentations, as 
evidenced in Italian Companies. However, one would expect that the mandatory requirement that 
UK listed companies should disclose their Strategy and BM in the annual report gives discretion 
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for the content of the disclosure but not the timing.  
2.8 Benefits and Costs of BM and Strategy Disclosure 
Ferreira and Rezende (2007) contended that the disclosure of corporate Strategy to the outside 
world is credible as managers are concerned about their reputation. Such disclosure induces the 
firm’s management to undertake valuable Strategy-specific investments. In addition, Santema et 
al. (2005) argued that Strategy disclosure will have a positive impact on the international market 
scene. Similarly, Whittington and Yakis-Douglas (2010) stressed that considering recent 
theoretical understanding of sustainable competitive advantage as built on unique and inimitable 
resources (Barney and Clark, 2007)the threat of competitor exploitation of strategic disclosure is 
not necessarily severe. In line with this argument, the chief executive of the Financial Services 
Authority, a United Kingdom regulator, Hector Sants, who placed some of the blame of the 
recent financial crisis on poor oversight by financial analysts and institutional investors of the 
strategies of the major financial institution enjoined financial analysts and institutional 
shareholders to pay more attention to Strategy (Financial Services Authority, 11 March 2009). 
Also, that these Strategy communications are influential factors in how stakeholders value a 
firm’s potential.  
Bettis (1983) stated that though disclosure may bring a competitive reaction, it might also 
bring some reduction in the cost of capital. Further, (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008) argued that 
though the disclosure of forward-looking statements, such as the stage of implementation of 
business strategies, among others, in annual reports offer a picture of the firm through the eye of 
management to financial analysts, but may bear proprietary costs by damaging the firm’s 
competitive positioning. In addition, in their study, (Ferreira and Rezende, 2007) support the 
literature that suggests that managers face a trade-off when deciding whether to disclose their 
private information to outsiders. On one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become 
reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project 
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implementations decisions.  
On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate Strategy provides strong incentives 
for management of the firm to undertake Strategy-specific investments. They however concluded 
that these disclosure decisions do not support mandatory disclosure provisions. Thus, under a 
mandatory provision, shareholders might not be able to benefit from managers’ discretion to 
disclose decisions. Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) contended that the extent (quality) of disclosure 
depends on the industry to which the firm belongs.  
Similarly, in their study, Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2013) argued that innovative BMs can 
provide the basis for sustainable business success. Stressing that just as product and process 
innovations are hard to protect, BM innovations can be imitated. Thus, concluded that there 
should be a disclosure Strategy of whether to reveal new BMs (reviewed BMs) or instead 
conceal it by adopting the traditional, established logic of value creation and value capture to 
minimize the possibility of competitive imitation. In essence, the required disclosure of BMs 
could limit the innovation of BMs, especially when such innovations cannot be protected. 
Therefore, the appreciation of the disclosure offered by a firm requires the adoption of a 
multidimensional framework that jointly considers not only how much is disclosed (quantity of 
disclosure) but also what and how it is disclosed (FASB, 2001b). 
2.9  Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the conceptual framework of the study, which includes Strategy, BM, 
and financial reporting/disclosure. It also reviewed the literature on Strategy and BM disclosure. 
It showed that there are different levels of Strategy: business level Strategy, functional or 
operational level Strategy, and corporate level Strategy, among others. The business level 
Strategy is directly concerned with competitive positioning; the operational level Strategy links 
the corporate level and business level Strategy ensuring that the system functions integrated; 
corporate level Strategy deals with how to increase long-term profitability, direction and 
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resource distribution. Hence, it is argued that the clarity of corporate Strategy is important as it 
could enhance competitive advantage. However, it appears that corporate level Strategy gives an 
insight into how stakeholder value would be enhanced and therefore should represent the ‘width’ 
of Strategy. Second, this chapter showed that the BM describes the design of value creation and 
value capture (the act of making profit from value creation).  Thus, the chapter concluded that 
BM and Strategy are complements and not substitutes. 
The literature has shown that corporate disclosure whether voluntary or mandatory, in other 
words, transparency has the capacity to reduce information asymmetry and improve corporate 
governance. Most importantly, the value relevance of the disclosure of Strategy and BM 
particularly; consequent upon the need to increase the quality of annual reports, following the 
financial crisis has also been highlighted in the literature. However, this chapter argue that the 
costs and benefits of Strategy and BM disclosure have to be weighed against each other.  
The next chapter discusses the theoretical lens adopted in this study to explain the 
disclosure (non-disclosure) of Strategy and BM. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
In spite of the apparent recognition of the importance of communication of Strategy, 
there is no generally accepted comprehensive framework to understand the dynamics of 
communicating Strategy and BM (see Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Coebergh, 2011a). 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework through agency and 
signalling theory lens (Morris, 1987) that offers a richer appreciation of the complexities 
surrounding the disclosure of Strategy and BM in the annual reports of: banks, the food 
and drug retailers’ sector; and the gas, water and multi-utilities sector, incorporated in the 
UK, and with operations on the UK main market.  
‘A theory is a model or system consisting of (a) non-contradictory, primitive 
assertions or axioms; (b) definitions of basic concepts; and (c) the conclusions or 
predictions which are deduced from them’ (Morris, 1987 p.48). A theory’s assumptions 
and definitions are its sufficient conditions that underlie the theory’s conclusions. 
Different theories explain managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure. These 
theories include: agency, signalling, legitimacy and stakeholder theory among others 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Within the scope of this study, agency theory and 
signalling theory help to understand why companies use discretionary disclosure to 
reduce information asymmetry. Information asymmetry can be reduced through two types 
of information: information about quality and information about intent. Research on 
information asymmetry (such as agency theory) about behaviour and intentions majorly 
examines the use of incentives as mechanisms for reducing moral hazards as a result of 
individual’s behaviour (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). In contrast, 
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signalling theory focuses on understanding how parties resolve information asymmetries 
about latent and unobservable quality (see Connelly et al., 2011). 
Further, it is suggested that research into accounting narratives would benefit from the 
use of theoretical pluralism (see Beattie, 2014). However, while combining theoretical 
lens, it is important that the underlying assumptions of each theory are not too distant 
(Okhuysen and Bonardi, 2011).  
Agency theory states that agents act merely out of self-interest, and therefore 
incentives have to be offered that motivate them to adjust their aims to those of the 
company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While signalling theory posits that managers of 
above average firms have incentives to signal their quality and differentiate themselves 
from managers of below average firms (see Morris, 1987). 
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section discusses agency theory and 
how agency problem is potentially resolved, then signalling theory is discussed. This is 
followed by the discussion of the justification for combining the two theories. Thereafter, 
the relevance of both agency and signalling theory to this current study is discussed, 
illustrated with a theoretical framework.  
3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is concerned with the principal-agent problem in the separation of 
ownership and control of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, two problems 
arise as a result of this separation and delegation. First, when the desires or goals of the 
principal and agent conflict and it is expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is 
actually doing; second, when the principal and the agent may prefer different actions 
because of the difference in risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, these separations 
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produce conflicts. The focus of agency theory is therefore on resolving these two 
problems. 
Agency theory demonstrates that resolving these conflicts incur agency costs, hence 
the need for incentives to reduce the agency costs (Morris, 1987). Put differently, agency 
theory is concerned with resolving agency problem – how the agency costs arising from 
the delegation of decision-making rights are minimized (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency costs arising from the separation of 
capital providers from control include the loss in the firm’s value (agency costs of equity) 
when shareholders find that managers are not pursuing shareholders’ interest, especially 
where managers act inefficiently or do not choose projects as profitable as shareholders 
would like; as well as bonding and monitoring costs. The agency costs of equity are a 
manager’s opportunity loss, if not reduced by monitoring and bonding, because of the 
manager’s self-interest, and a way of avoiding this kind of costs is that shareholders build 
them into the firm’s share price (see Morris, 1987). Thus, there is a trade-off between the 
two categories of agency costs.  
On the other hand, agency theory assumes that equity holders bear the agency costs of 
debts (Morris, 1987; Armstrong et al., 2010). These costs could be in form of: excessive 
pay-out as dividend, risky investment decisions, the issuing of senior ranking debt, asset 
substitution, bankruptcy and reorganization costs (Smith and Warner, 1979); or the costs 
of monitoring and bonding. Debt holders or creditors anticipate such actions and will 
either price protect their claims to reflect the potential losses or choose not to lend. Thus, 
the agency costs are opportunity costs to equity holders if monitoring and bonding 
(governance mechanisms) are not used to reduce the manager’s ability to annex wealth 
from debt holders. 
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3.2.1 Governance Mechanisms 
Researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the principal and the 
agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms 
that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989), that is, monitoring and 
bonding devices. In other words, describing ‘why certain contractual relations arise’ 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.326). Two propositions capture the governance mechanisms 
which are identified:  
3.2.1.1 Outcome-based contracts 
When the contract between the principal and the agent is outcome based, the agent is 
more likely to behave in the interests of the principal: The argument is that outcome-
based contracts are effective in curbing agent opportunism and aligning the preferences 
of agents with those of principals because both of them depend on the same actions, 
hereby reducing the conflicts of self-interest between agent and principal (see Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In their study, Jensen and Meckling described how the increase of 
managerial firm ownership reduces managerial opportunism. This also includes writing 
restrictive covenants in debt contracts, and management bonus plans geared towards 
reported profits (Morris, 1987). 
3.2.1.2 Information Systems 
The second proposition is that information systems also reduce agent opportunism. 
The argument is that the availability and accessibility of relevant information at the 
disposal of the principal to verify the agent’s behaviour is more likely to ensure that the 
agent behave in the interest of the principal. This includes the production of accounting 
reports (see Morris, 1987). Additionally, Fama and Jensen (1983) described the 
information role that boards of directors play in controlling managerial behaviour. Fama 
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(1980) illustrated the information effects of efficient capital and labour markets on 
managerial opportunism.  
3.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was first developed by Spence (1974) to explain behaviour in the 
labour markets but can help to explain voluntary disclosures (see Watson et al., 2002; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Signalling is concerned with a reaction to informational 
asymmetries in markets. The issue is that companies have information that investors do 
not have, this creates an information gap. This information gap or asymmetry can be 
reduced if the party with more information signals to others.  
In line with the signalling argument above, accounting information plays two 
important roles in market-based economies (Beyer et al., 2010). First, capital providers 
such as shareholders and creditors are able to evaluate the return potential of investment 
opportunities (resulting in an ex-ante or valuation role if accounting information). 
Secondly, using accounting information, capital providers are able to monitor the use of 
their committed capital (resulting in an ex-post role of accounting information). However, 
if capital providers cannot fairly assess and evaluate the profitability of the firm’s 
investment opportunities, as a result of agents’ incentives to exaggerate their firms’ 
profitability, they will under-price firms with high profitability and overprice firms with 
low profitability, this is otherwise known as adverse selection, which could potentially 
lead to market failure (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Adverse selection 
occurs when principals cannot verify the value of the agent’s work due to their own lack 
of expertise in evaluating it (Eisenhardt, 1989; Varela, 2017). 
The costs arising from the problem of information asymmetry in form of opportunity 
loss for raising equity and debt capital are borne by the manager of the high profitability 
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firm because less would be paid for the firm’s equity or debt securities than would be 
paid when there is no information asymmetry (see Morris, 1987). In this case, managers 
of higher quality firms will wish to distinguish themselves from lower quality firms 
through voluntary disclosures (Watson et al., 2002) because they have an incentive to 
signal above average quality to reduce this opportunity loss. Ross (1973) opined that 
quality refers to the unobservable ability of the organisation to earn positive cash flows in 
the future, which may be signalled by financial structure and/or managerial incentives 
However, it is important for the signal to be credible in order to achieve a successful 
quality signal. Quality of information in signalling theory is a general phenomenon 
applicable in any market with information asymmetry, and it could be described in terms 
of a firm’s expected value, its risk, and the level of manager’s compensation (see Morris, 
1987).  
Verifiability of the quality of the firm establishes credibility in the long-run. It is 
assumed that the identification of any attempt of false quality signal would mean that no 
subsequent disclosures will be seen as credible (Watson et al., 2002). Further, agents 
naturally aim to mitigate the probability of being fired for inadequate performance 
(Varela, 2017). 
In social and environmental reporting, another theory that is very similar to Signalling 
theory is Greenwashing theory. Greenwashing is a form of selective disclosure whereby 
companies disclose positive organisational actions while concealing negative ones to 
create a misleadingly positive impression of overall performance (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2011). Both theories assume that there are costs associated with disclosure (Verrecchia, 
1983). Both theories also assume that benefits will accrue to ‘good’ corporate citizens 
and stakeholders will punish ‘bad’ corporate citizens (Clarkson et al., 2008). However, a 
significant difference is that while signalling theory considers that the ‘good’ corporate 
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citizens will be more willing to voluntarily disclose their private information than the 
‘bad’ corporate citizens because of the costs imposed by the society on those who do not 
disclose honest information. Greenwashing theory assumes that the ‘bad’ corporate 
citizens accrue more benefits and would be willing to disclose more voluntary 
information than the ‘good’ corporate citizens, although not necessarily honest 
information (Clarkson et al., 2008). Some of these benefits include; consumer loyalty and 
better attraction and retainment of employees (Marin et al., 2009; Greening and Turban, 
2000). The focus of this study is not on social and environmental disclosure; as such 
greenwashing theory will not be explored to explain the disclosure or non-disclosure of 
strategy and BM. 
3.5 Connecting Agency and Signalling Theories (Theoretical Pluralism) 
From the discussion of agency and signalling theories it can be seen that there is 
considerable overlap between the two theories (see figure 3.1). Morris (1987) examined 
the possibility of overlap between the two theories, considering whether they are 
consistent, equivalent or competing. Although these two theories are consistent, they are 
not equivalent.  
On one hand, though Jensen and Meckling (1976) opined that information asymmetry 
will not affect agency theory in large markets and where estimates are rational and errors 
are independent across firms. Morris (1987) contended that information asymmetry, a 
necessary condition for signalling theory is also implied by agency theory through the 
assumptions of positive monitoring costs and the separation of ownership and control of 
capital (see also Lan et al., 2013). Also, Ronen (1979) argued that moreover, because the 
incentive for adverse selection is as a result of information asymmetry, measurement 
errors will not be independent across firms.  
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Additionally, signalling theory is different from agency theory in that there are 
signalling costs, which have a negative relationship with the quality of information 
(Morris, 1987). Put differently, signalling theory extends agency theory by appreciating 
that the disclosure of valuable information such as Strategy and BM (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008; Coebergh, 2011a) can help overcome information asymmetries, avoid 
adverse selection and reduce signalling costs. Therefore, agency and signalling theories 
are not equivalent, that is, one is not implied by the other (Morris, 1987). 
On the other hand, signalling theory recognizes the separation between ownership and 
control and also the motivation of managers to disclose more information due to market 
pressures (Ross, 1973). Also, Morris (1987) stressed that both agency and signalling 
theory assume that market participants are rational wealth maximisers. Furthermore, the 
signals through the disclosure of more valuable information such as Strategy and BM 
might be consistent with monitoring and bonding devices in agency theory such as 
management compensation, dividend constraint, contractual debt covenant etc. (see 
Morris, 1987).  
Often, management compensation plans specify a threshold profit level below which 
no bonus would be paid. However, a better-quality manager may negotiate a higher 
threshold profit level to differentiate themselves from lower quality managers. Managers 
also have an incentive to offer protective debt covenants to increase the price at which 
debt is sold, and indirectly signal about expected future earnings and expected levels of 
management compensation (Healy, 1985). Research linking compensation and disclosure 
is however limited (Nagar et al., 2003). While, research linking debts with disclosure 
conclude that because firms with more debts incur more monitoring costs, they seek to 
reduce these costs by disclosing more valuable information in the annual reports (Meek et 
al., 1995). 
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Therefore, it appears that managers may signal their quality and ability in identifying, 
measuring and managing their Strategy and BM, hence, distinguishing themselves from 
managers who may be perceived to have less clarity about their Strategy and BM. The 
signal could present competitive advantage and corporate capability in a competitive 
market and encourage or induce stakeholders to make some decisions which are 
beneficial to the corporation (Zhang et al., 2008).  
Morris (1987) suggested that given this consistency between agency and signalling 
theory, it is possible to combine both agency and signalling theory to gain insights into 
why managers voluntarily disclose corporate information, because both theories provide 
companies with incentives to divulge information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3.1 Summary of agency and signalling theory assumptions 
Agency Theory Signalling Theory 
All market participants are rational wealth 
maximisers. 
All market participants are rational wealth 
maximisers. 
 
All firms operate in two periods. Managers make 
production/investment decisions in the first period 
which affects the firms’ expected values and 
variances in the second period. 
All firms operate in two periods. Managers make 
production/investment decisions in the first period 
which affects the firms’ expected values and 
variances in the second period. 
Firms have external equity and debt financing. The quality of firms competing for equity and debt 
funds in the capital market varies. 
There is separation of equity and debt capital 
suppliers and managerial control in the firm, and 
The actual quality of firms is objectively 
observable, ex post, in period 2. 
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Adapted: Morris (1987)  Signalling, Agency theory and accounting policy choice   
3.6 The relevance of the theories to this study 
Agency theory and signalling theory may explain why managers voluntarily disclose 
information (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Watson et al., 2002). Ronen (1979) criticized 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) for assuming that agency costs are always borne by 
agents/managers only, arguing that the presence of the incentive for adverse selection 
caused by information asymmetry prevents measurement errors from being independent 
across firms. Morris (1987) extended the observation of Ronen (1979) by drawing out the 
difference in who bears agency costs between higher profitable firms (hereafter above 
firms) and lower profitable firms (hereafter below average firms). 
Managers of above average firms bear the signalling costs, i.e., the opportunity loss 
for raising equity and debt capital, in form of less amount being paid for the firm’s 
securities than would have been paid in the absence of information asymmetry and the 
resulting adverse selection (see Morris, 1987), they have incentives to signal their quality 
so that they can reduce signalling costs and differentiate themselves from lower profitable 
firms. However, Morris (1987) concluded that some agency costs of below average firms 
are borne by investors. If the market regards the below average firm as average quality, 
then the agency cost will be borne by the investor. However, if investors are able to 
deduce or identify that the firm is below average then they would include the cost in the 
price paid for equity and debt securities of below average firms, hereby the agency costs 
would be borne by the manager (Morris, 1987).  
agency costs arising from delegation of decision 
making. 
  
Each manager receives compensation by salary and 
other bonuses. 
Ex ante, in period 1, information asymmetry exists 
between the manager of each firm and capital 
providers, and the manager’s information is 
superior to that of capital suppliers. 
Monitoring and bounding are available at a cost 
proportional to the value of the firm 
Signalling costs are inversely related to quality. 
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This study aims at investigating to what extent agency theory and signalling theory 
can explain the disclosure (non-disclosure) of Strategy and BM in corporate annual 
reports, considering the two governance mechanisms identified in agency theory 
(outcome – based contracts and information systems). In particular, it considers the 
availability (disclosure) of Strategy and BM information in the annual reports over the 
period of ten years, considering that agency theory assumes that if there is information 
availability and accessibility, the principal will be able to assess the performance of the 
agent. However, because the literature on Strategy and BM information considers these 
concepts as valuable information, this study combines signalling theory to explain the 
potential for managers (agents) of well performing firms to signal their performance 
through a better disclosure of these concepts, thereby enhancing the assessment of the 
profitability of their firm’s investment opportunities. Further, this study considers the 
potential determinants of discretionary disclosure of Strategy and BM apart from 
profitability and regulations that reduce agency and signalling costs. These theories 
therefore help to explain the disclosure (or non-disclosure) of Strategy and BM in terms 
of cost and benefit trade-off. 
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical framework for the study 
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3.7 Chapter Summary 
According to agency theory, managers would voluntarily disclose insider information 
to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. They would provide more 
information if required to do so. Signalling theory however, assumes that good 
performance (good news) / quality is positively associated with better (more) disclosure, 
particularly valuable information that could enhance the assessment of the company’s 
performance and future prospects; such as information about their Strategy and BM. 
Agency and signalling theory are consistent, they complement each other, but they are 
not equivalent. Simply put signalling theory extends agency theory in understanding the 
discretionary disclosure of valuable information to eliminate or reduce adverse selection 
and signalling costs. 
The Companies Act requires the disclosure of Strategy and BM in the annual reports 
of UK companies; however, the content of such disclosure remains at the discretion of 
managers. The aim of this study is to investigate what companies disclose as Strategy and 
BM, to what extent do they make such disclosure, and what are the potential determinants 
of such disclosures. As Eccles et al. (2002p. 192) remark `Why does better disclosure 
increase management's credibility in the eyes of the market? A management team that has 
confidence in both its own abilities and its Strategy will not shy away from telling the 
market its plans and how well it is doing today. 
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CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the relevant literature that could help with the development of 
hypotheses and the identification of potential determinants of Strategy and BM 
disclosure. Research on financial reporting generally suggests that Strategy and BM 
discussion are valuable and proprietary information (Coebergh, 2011b; Leung et al., 
2015) and managers would be reluctant to disclose their private information about these 
two narratives partly because of competition. The discussion examines three categories of 
incentives that could influence the discretionary disclosure of both Strategy and BM. 
These include: contractual, market and corporate governance incentives (Smith and 
Warner, 1979; Armstrong et al., 2010).  
Agency and signalling theories have been used to explain managerial behaviour 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Agency theory assumes that the absence of those 
who have invested funds in the management of the business poses a potential threat (see 
Fama and Miller, 1972). This is so because the self-interested manager has incentives to 
make decisions that misappropriate the investors’ funds (agency problem) as a result of 
information asymmetries arising from insider information. Thus, according to agency 
theory, managers would voluntarily disclose their insider information to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs (Armstrong et al., 2010). Signalling theory 
however, assumes that good performance (good news) is positively associated with 
greater disclosure (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Hereby, managers may signal their 
quality and ability in identifying, measuring and managing their Strategy and BM, hence, 
distinguishing themselves from managers who may be perceived to have less clarity 
about their Strategy and BM. 
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Although the aim of mandated disclosures and disclosure regulations is to alleviate 
agency problem, several accounting observers opined that mandated disclosures are 
becoming increasingly irrelevant, because they do not force managers to reveal pertinent 
information (see Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999b). The UK 
corporate governance code in 2010 required that listed companies should disclose 
information about their Strategy and BM in the annual reports. This requirement is based 
on a ‘comply or explain’ principle. In 2012 however, the UK Companies Act 2006 was 
amended and the disclosure of Strategy and BM became mandatory. Although the 
disclosure of these terms is mandatory, the content however remains at the discretion of 
managers. Hence, apart from regulation, the role of incentives in mitigating agency 
problem is a central theme in accounting research (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Managers’ 
incentives to choose the content of narrative disclosure could be explained through 
agency and signalling theories (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). This chapter will 
discuss disclosure incentives under three categories. These include: contractual 
incentives, market incentives and corporate governance incentives.  
4.2 Contractual Incentives 
Financial capital is a key factor of production that gives rise to an array of complex 
contracting relationships among owners, managers, and creditors (Armstrong et al., 
2010).  The role of capital in resolving agency conflicts between managers/shareholders 
and creditors is well known (for example, see a survey by Roberts and Sufi, 2009). The 
fact that certain contracting parties possess superior firm related information at various 
times before and/or during the contracting relationship either create or intensify a wide 
range of agency conflicts. Nonetheless even when all contracting parties are equally 
informed, more efficient contracts can be written when there is less uncertainty about 
current or future business conditions (Armstrong et al., 2010). Healy and Palepu (2001) 
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opined that one of the solutions to the agency problem is ‘optimal contracts’ between the 
investors (debt and equity) and the managers. These optimal contracts include 
compensation agreements and debt contracts. 
Creditors have concerns that owner/managers’ actions could increase the risk or 
probability of their investment return (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). This 
could be in form of risky investment decisions or such pay-out as dividends or share 
repurchases. A way of avoiding this credit default is that creditors will naturally 
anticipate such actions and will either price protect their claims to account for potential 
losses (and monitoring costs), or choose not to lend (Armstrong et al., 2010). Thus, 
shareholders being aware that they bear the costs of these agency conflicts, have 
incentives ex ante, to use contracting mechanisms that reduce the manager’s ability to 
annex wealth from creditors, ex post, hereby, reducing agency costs and increasing the 
efficiency of the contracting process. The proxies examined for contractual incentives 
include leverage, losses and financial distress (see Armstrong et al., 2010; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999).  
4.2.1 Debt Contract (Leverage) 
Information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are important with respect to 
debt contracting (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Besides information asymmetry, information 
uncertainty poses problems in debt contracting. This is so because the incomplete nature 
of debt contracts after managers and lenders enter into contracts with the same 
information creates a demand for mechanisms that allocate decision rights in the future, 
conditional on the realization of certain events, both foreseen and unforeseen (Armstrong 
et al., 2010). A debt contract constitutes a governance mechanism to the extent that 
creditor monitoring helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen, 
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1994; Core et al., 1999). This study uses leverage as a proxy for debts (Wang et al., 
2008). 
Leverage can be measured as the amount of debt used to finance a firm’s assets. 
Previous studies have suggested that agency costs are higher with firms that have more 
debts in their capital structures since potential wealth transfers from debt holders to 
shareholders and managers increase with leverage (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Meek et al., 1995). Arguably, agency theory predicts that investors’ 
information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In other words, because more highly leveraged firms incur more 
monitoring costs, they seek to reduce these costs by disclosing more information in 
annual reports. Hence disclosure will be higher for firms with proportionately more debt 
because of increased potential for wealth transfer from debt holders to shareholders and 
managers Put differently, voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase with leverage 
(Meek et al., 1995).  
Research findings on this relation are mixed. Meek et al. (1995) found a negative 
relationship between leverage and disclosure using samples of U.S., U.K. and Continental 
European companies. Coebergh (2011b) also found a negative but insignificant relation 
between leverage and Strategy disclosure in the Netherlands. Additionally, Camfferman 
and Cooke (2002) found a negative but insignificant relationship between gearing and 
disclosure in the UK. On the other hand, Prencipe (2004) found leverage to be 
significantly positively related to the extent of segment reporting, while Francis et al. 
(2005) concluded that industries with greater financing needs have higher voluntary 
disclosure levels. Ahmed and Courtis (1999 p. 51) also found that seven studies in the 
UK have reported a significant, positive relationship between leverage and disclosure. 
62 
 
Bradbury (1992) found a significant, positive relationship between leverage and 
voluntary disclosure for New Zealand firms.  
However, other researchers such as: Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) for New Zealand 
firms, and (Leuz, 2004) for German firms found no relationship between leverage and 
disclosure. Based on the mixed findings above, the second hypothesis is non-directional: 
H1. Leverage is associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
4.2.2 Poor Performance (Loss) 
According to signalling theory, managers of poor performing firms have incentives to 
reveal less information when firm performance is poor (Watson et al., 2002). In other 
words, well-performing firms have incentives to distinguish themselves from less 
profitable firms through higher voluntary information disclosure in annual reports, in 
order to raise capital on the best available terms (Foster, 1986; Cooke, 1989; Wallace et 
al., 1994). Furthermore, from the agency theory perspective, Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
argue that higher profitability motivates management to provide greater information 
because it increases investors’ confidence, and ultimately, increases management 
compensation. Thus, managers of poor performing firms have incentives to make it 
harder for investors to uncover information that the managers do not want to affect their 
stock prices and compensation (Bloomfield, 2002). Companies may disclose less 
information in order to conceal the reasons for losses (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Raffournier, 1995).  
Additionally, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that the level of perceived information 
asymmetry between managers and investors determines the relationship between 
disclosure and profitability, or losses. Given this discussion, the second hypothesis is: 
H2. Loss is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
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4.2.3 Financial Distress  
Studies suggest that managers in financially distressed firms may deliberately avoid 
discussion about their future viability (such as Strategy and BM)  in the absence of an 
optimistic outlook (see Boo and Simnett, 2002; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). Boo and 
Simnett (2002) analysed management’s perspective comments of 140 Australian public 
companies and concluded that financially distressed firms may omit information about 
managements’ perspective comments when they do not have optimistic information to 
disclose. Furthermore, Tennyson et al. (1990) analysed the narrative disclosures in the 
annual reports of 23 matched sample of bankrupt and 23 non-bankrupt U.S. companies 
and find that healthy companies voluntarily disclose strategic information (such as 
internal operations, growth and expansion information) whereas financially distressed 
companies avoid the disclosure of such strategic information. Based on the discussion 
above, the forth hypothesis is: 
H3. Financial distress is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
4.3 Market Incentives 
As discussed earlier, the information asymmetry between managers (insiders) and 
shareholders/lenders caused as a result of dispersed ownership and the separation from 
control raises an agency problem due to conflicting incentives (interests) between 
managers and shareholders/lenders (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Fama, 1970). Also, 
shareholders/lenders face an information problem when determining the value of 
investment opportunities and incentives because it is difficult to differentiate between the 
manager with the ‘bad idea’ and the managers with ‘the good idea’ causing an 
information or ‘lemons’ problem (Healy and Palepu, 2001). This can lead to a breakdown 
in the functioning of capital market (see Akerlof, 1970). Investors will value both good 
and bad news at an average level, if investors cannot differentiate between the two 
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(realising the possibility that the managers with the bad ‘ideas’ will try to claim that their 
ideas are as valuable as ‘good’ ideas). 
An efficient market assumes that security prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all publicly 
available information (Fama, 1970). Managers would disclose private information only if 
it increases firm value (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Thus, investors make efforts, or 
pay others to identify mispriced stocks (using public data). Thakor (2014) finds that 
valuable firms, and those whose strategies investors are most likely to agree with, 
disclose less information in equilibrium. Listing age and analysts following are the 
variables examined under market incentives. 
4.3.1 Analysts following 
Research has shown that financial analysts play a valuable role in improving market 
efficiency (Barth and Hutton, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Managers perceive analysts 
as one of the most important groups affecting the share price of their corporations 
(Graham et al., 2005). On one hand, analysts have incentives to make optimistic forecasts 
and recommendations as long as the information provided generates trading volume and 
investment banking fees for their brokerage houses (Lin and McNichols, 1998). 
On the other hand, studies have also shown that firms with more information 
disclosures have larger analysts following, and that analyst following is positively related 
to disclosure quality (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1995), partly because analysts could be sometimes seen as external monitors of managers 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With training in finance and 
substantial industry background knowledge, analysts can track corporate financial 
statements regularly. They have often been involved in the discovery of corporate frauds 
in companies such as Compaq Computer, Gateway, Global Crossing Motorola (Zingales 
et al., 2007). The relationship information disclosure and analysts following is a two-way 
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direction both can influence the other. As suggested above, one would expect a positive 
association between analysts following and Strategy and BM disclosure. Thus, the fourth 
hypothesis is: 
H4. Analyst following is positively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM.  
4.3.2 Listing age 
The length of time a company has been listed on a capital market may be significant in 
explaining the variability in the disclosure of information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Scholars have argued that younger firms have more reasons to disclose discretionary 
information, partly because they may need to raise additional capital at the lowest cost 
compared to older companies that may depend more on internal funds as a result of an 
established shareholder base (Choi, 1973). In addition, (Kim and Ritter, 1999) posited 
that the disclosure of non-financial information is important in the valuation of younger 
companies. Put differently, the disclosure of more information is pertinent for younger 
firms in order to reduce scepticism and boost investor confidence, as they may be 
perceived as riskier (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). (Coebergh, 2011b) found a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of Strategy in the Netherlands and listing age. 
As such the fifth hypothesis is: 
H5. Listing age is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM.  
4.4 Corporate Governance Incentives 
The phrase ‘corporate governance’ had been used by financial economists in the 
1980’s referring to agency problems that shareholders might encounter because directors 
knew more about the business than they did – information asymmetry (Tricker, 2012). 
According to Blair (1995 p.3) corporate governance could be defined as ‘the whole set of 
legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determines what publicly traded 
corporations can do, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
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allocated’. Though, the development of corporate governance is global such that the 
suitability of a given theory for a particular country or group of countries at any point in 
time may differ, depending on the level of development in terms of corporate structure, or 
ownership groups, influenced by the evolution of the economy, legal framework and 
political climate, cultural and religious background; all of which affect the development 
and accommodation of corporate governance within a country’s setting (Mallin, 2002; 
Solomon, 2007).  
Corporate governance is essential in cases where there is a separation between 
ownership and control, especially in firms with diverse ownership (Rose, 2016). The 
value of good corporate governance rests on the presumption that ‘best practice’ is not 
well defined or, in fact, is public knowledge (Rose, 2016). Thus, corporate governance 
establishes the framework for efficiency and probity, and for firms’ transparency and 
accountability. Corporate governance mechanisms are significant in explaining voluntary 
disclosure of information from agency theory perspectives (see Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
The UK adopts a ‘comply or explain approach to corporate governance. The comply or 
explain principle was originally put forward by the Cadbury Committee as a practical 
way of establishing good corporate governance while avoiding the inflexibility of the 
‘one size fits all’ hard law framework (see Sanderson and Roberts, 2013). 
CEO’s compensation and three board characteristics, namely; board composition, 
board size and active boards would be included as variables. 
4.4.1 Compensation 
Although management compensation is a contractual incentive, shareholders rely on 
an effective corporate governance system to achieve compensation related expectations. 
One of the mechanisms used to align management and shareholder interests among others 
include, the use of executive compensation plans that brings focus to shareholder value, 
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however, more agency costs are incurred to satisfy this. According to Harris and Raviv 
(1979) compensation agreements are developed in situations characterized by a 
divergence of incentives between the two parties and asymmetric information (i.e., moral 
hazard) with emphasis on the possibilities of acquiring information (reduction of 
information asymmetries).  
Shareholders mitigate the disclosure agency problem with incentive contracts based on 
performance measures that are informative about managerial disclosure activity (Nagar et 
al., 2003). Many formal management compensation plans specify some threshold profit 
level below which no bonus is paid to managers (Healy, 1985). One of the key functions 
of the compensation committee on the board is to design an executive pay structure to 
reduce agency costs, and to provide incentives for executives to work for the best interest 
of shareholders (Core et al., 1999; Conyon and He, 2011). 
Prior research has largely ignored the disclosure agency problem (Nagar et al., 2003). 
Thakor (2014) found that improved corporate governance leads to lower executive 
compensation and more information disclosure. In their study, Nagar et al. (2003) linked 
stock-based compensation with disclosure, and concluded that stock based compensation 
is positively associated with disclosure. However, Barth (2003) argued against the 
findings of Nagar et al. (2003) raising concerns on the validity of the study’s inferences 
about the effects of stock-based compensation. Barth stressed that their research design 
preludes obtaining direct evidence on whether stock-based compensation provides 
incentives that motivate managers to reveal their private information consistent with 
shareholder interests.  
Agency theory assumes that if corporate governance is effective, executive 
compensation would be lower and disclosure will be higher (see Thakor, 2014). 
However, signalling theory assumes that CEO’s with higher compensation would want to 
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signal quality through higher disclosure (see Morris, 1987). Although, it is unclear 
whether more disclosure is always in the interest of shareholders (Baiman and 
Verrecchia, 1996). Aligning disclosure incentive and disclosure timing is another issue 
(Barth, 2003). Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that managers opportunistically time 
disclosures to maximize the value of their stock option awards, which is contrary to the 
interests of existing shareholders. However, in the UK form 2013 companies are required 
to disclose their Strategy and BM in the annual reports. It appears that this development 
reduces the timing effect of disclosure. Due to the mixed findings, the sixth hypothesis is 
non-directional: 
H6. Compensation is associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
4.4.2 Board composition 
The main role of the board is to monitor the decisions of the management (Fama, 
1980)the second role is advising (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Corporate boards typically 
consist of inside (executive directors) and outside directors (non-executive directors). 
Executive board of directors are full time employees of the firm, are corporate insiders. 
By working alongside managers, it may prove difficult for executive directors to also 
objectively monitor managers’ actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The value of having 
outside directors on the board is partly derived from the directors’ broad expertise in 
areas such as Strategy, marketing and operations among others (see Yermack, 2004). 
Outside directors are experienced professionals, such as CEO’s and executives of other 
firms, university deans and presidents, former regulators and politicians, etc. Researchers 
opined that boards with a higher proportion of outside or independent directors will 
increase the quality of monitoring of management and limit managerial opportunism, as 
they are assumed to objectively protect shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Chau and Leung, 2006)Since corporate disclosure policy and annual report is prepared by 
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the board, a company board with a greater proportion of non-executive directors is in a 
stronger position to fulfill shareholder preferences for transparency and accountability 
(Gul and Leung, 2004). 
Hence, the presence of non-executive directors may help improve the quality of 
financial statements (Peasnell et al., 2000; Marrakchi Chtourou et al., 2001). Forker 
(1992) investigates the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the percentage of 
independent directors in the board and found that there is a positive relation between 
voluntary disclosure and the percentage of independent directors in the board. On the 
other hand, some researchers found no significant relationship between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and board independence in developing economies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001), while Barako et al. (2006) and Eng and Mak (2003) 
report a negative association between voluntary disclosure and board independence. 
Based on these mixed arguments, board composition (measured by the proportion of 
outside directors) the seventh hypothesis is non-directional: 
H7. The proportion of independent directors on the board is associated with the 
disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
 4.4.3 Board size 
The final decision reached in a large group is a compromise that reflects the different 
opinions of the group members (see Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; Sah and Stiglitz, 1991). This 
compromise is more challenging in larger groups because factions and coalitions form 
(O'Reilly III et al., 1989). Worse still, it is more difficult for a team to reach a 
compromise when dealing with complex issues (such as risky innovation projects). 
Additionally, (Cheng, 2008; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) opined that as board size 
increases, directors are more likely to face coordination problems when exchanging and 
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communicating information. Thus, suggesting that as board size increases, the 
inefficiencies outweigh the initial advantages.  
On the other hand, some scholars posited directors bring diverse resources such as 
information, skills, and legitimacy, thus larger boards are more effective than smaller 
boards, as larger boards can make better collective decisions, hence, higher performance 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Furthermore, a contingency approach 
suggests that as firm size increases, the negative impact of board size as a result of 
differences is mitigated (Zona et al., 2013). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) reported that 
board size including other governance-related variables strongly influence the quantity of 
information disclosed. Abeysekera (2010) concluded that larger board size can help 
boards to overcome skill deficiencies in making more discretionary disclosure related to 
future earnings. Based on these findings, the eighth hypothesis is: 
H8. Board size is positively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
4.4.4 Active boards 
A board that meets more often should be able to devote more time to issues such as 
Strategy and BM. More active boards (board diligence) as proxied by number of 
meetings may influence firm performance Vafeas (1999) hence the disclosure of Strategy 
and BM. A board that rarely meets may rashly approve management plans. Frequent 
board meetings would facilitate greater information sharing among directors (Laksmana, 
2008). Directors would have to dedicate adequate time and resources to learn the issues at 
hand before board meetings in order to ensure effective board decisions (see Conger et 
al., 1998; Beasley et al., 2005).  
It appears that there is no evidence on disclosure agency problem and active boards. 
Vafeas (1999) examined 307 firms over 1990-1994 and find that board meeting 
frequency is related to corporate governance and ownership characteristics in a manner 
71 
 
that is consistent with contracting and agency theory.  Based on the above discussion, the 
ninth hypothesis is: 
H9. The number of board meetings is positively associated with the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM. 
Hypotheses 10 and 11 relates to disclosure regulation and will be tested in chapter seven.  
  
4.5 Disclosure Regulation 
Disclosure requirements are part of the mechanisms that allow firms to commit to 
certain levels of disclosure and to improve the credibility of disclosed information 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Beyer et al. (2010) highlighted that 
regulators can enforce disclosures that shareholders cannot enforce on their own due 
to sanctions that are unavailable on private contracting, hereby reducing agency 
problem. Although there are benefits of voluntary disclosure, such as the reduction of 
information asymmetry among other, these benefits are not sufficient to justify 
mandatory disclosure (see Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). Also, as suggested by signalling 
theory, in order to reduce the effect of adverse selection and signalling costs, above-
average firms voluntarily disclose private information about their true value, 
considering the costs of such disclosure. It is assumed that once these above-average 
firms disclose, investors adjust the price paid for non-disclosing firms to reflect a 
lower value (see Ross, 1979; Verrecchia, 1983 and Dye 1985). Thus, an economic 
justification of mandatory disclosure has to show that market solution is unlikely to 
produce a desirable level of disclosure. 
In some cases, policies may arise alongside other regulatory interventions as 
substitutes or complements (see Weil, 2002). In other cases, mandated disclosure is 
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applied in an area independent of other regulatory interventions. In the UK, the 
disclosure of Strategy and BM was initially a Corporate Governance Requirement 
(Combined Code, 2010). The disclosure became mandatory after the amendment of 
the Companies Act 2006, effective from 1st October 2013. However, although the 
disclosure is mandatory, it is without a detailed regulation. As such, the disclosure is 
viewed as a trade-off between costs and benefits – a strategic managerial decision 
involving complex interdependencies (see Beattie, 2014). Based on the discussion 
above, hypotheses 10 and 11 are: 
H10: The Strategy and BM pre-corporate governance requirement and post 
resilience means are not equal 
H11: The Strategy and BM pre-mandatory requirement and post resilience means 
are equal. 
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CHAPTER 5  METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical underpinnings (agency theory and 
signalling theory) that might explain the disclosure of Strategy and BM. However, a 
central assumption of this thesis is that ‘all theories of organisations are based upon a 
philosophy of science and a theory of society’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.1). When 
carrying out empirical research, a selection between the various research paradigms is 
required, including a choice of the philosophy of science and the scientific approach most 
appropriate for the specific research objective(s) (Hallebone and Priest, 2009). The aim of 
this chapter is to develop a methodological framework that offers a rich appreciation of 
the complexities surrounding the disclosure of Strategy and BM in the annual reports of 
banks, the food and drug retailers’ sector, and the gas, water and multi-utilities sector, 
incorporated in the UK, with operations on the main market.  
The first section discusses assumptions that could help the understanding of social 
sciences. This includes the philosophical perspective that defines the nature of reality 
(Ontology) and the acceptable knowledge of knowing the reality, i.e., nature of 
knowledge (otherwise known as epistemology. Followed by explanations about the 
discussion of the alternative scientific approaches for research; specifying the most 
appropriate approach for the research objectives in this study. Next, the objectives of this 
current study were explained using the framework for research into accounting narratives 
proposed by (Beattie, 2014). Thereafter, the discussion of research method and research 
design employed for this study was explained. Lastly, it specifies the dependent and 
independent variables, and the models used to test the hypotheses.  
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5.2 Research Assumptions and Paradigms 
When carrying out empirical research, a selection between the various research 
paradigms is required, including a choice of the philosophy of science and the scientific 
approach most appropriate for the specific research objective (Hallebone and Priest, 
2009). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) first, this involves the assumption about 
the very essence of the phenomena under investigation. This includes the philosophical 
study of being, existence, and reality, and issues regarding questions about the existence 
of entities, i.e., whether or not entities exist. Thus, for social sciences, the ontological 
concern is “whether the reality to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing 
itself on individual consciousness from without - or the product of individual 
consciousness; whether ‘reality’ is of an objective nature, or the product of individual 
cognition; or whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or the product of one’s 
mind” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.1).  
There are two aspects of ontology, i.e. two dimensions of analysis that underwrites 
different approaches to social sciences, namely: objective or subjective dimensions 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders, 2012). Objectivism implies that social entities exist 
in reality external to social actors (Saunders and Lewis, 2009). Hence, there is a 
separation between the researcher and what is being researched due to an assumption that 
social ‘reality’ has an independent experience prior to human cognition (Johnson et al., 
2006). However, a subjectivist ontology implies that reality is a product of individual 
cognition or consciousness (Johnson et al., 2006). It stresses the importance of the 
subjective experience of individuals in the creation of the social world (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  
Closely associated with ontological issues are epistemological assumptions. These are 
assumptions about the grounds of knowledge – how one can sort out what is regarded as 
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‘true’ from ‘false’, about how one might begin to understand the world and communicate 
this knowledge to fellow human beings Burrell and Morgan (1979). Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2012) stressed that epistemology is about exploring the best ways of enquiry into the 
world. Saunders and Lewis (2012) consider epistemological assumption within four 
approaches to research: interpretivism, realism, positivism and pragmatism. This study 
adopts a pragmatic approach. 
The pragmatic approach relies on an abductive reasoning that moves back and forth 
between induction and deduction. In this sense, inductive results from a qualitative 
approach can serve as inputs to the deductive goals of a quantitative approach and vice-
versa. Thus, rather than discrediting the works of other researchers in other research 
paradigms, a pragmatic researcher search for a useful point of connection. Further, it is 
argued that the assumption of objectivity and subjectivity cannot be total. In other words, 
“complete objectivity” or “complete subjectivity” is impossible. Hence, a pragmatic 
approach emphasizes working back and forth the various frames of reference on an 
“inter-subjectivity” approach (Morgan, 2007). In addition, it is argued that the choice 
between whether knowledge is specific and context dependent or universal and 
generalizable is irrelevant. Rather, the issue is the extent to which knowledge gained 
through a method in a specific setting can be appropriately applied in other settings. 
Thus, the need to investigate whether knowledge gained can be transferred to other 
settings – “transferability” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
Thus, the pragmatist position calls for using “whatever philosophical and/or 
methodological approach that works for a particular research problem under study” 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 5). In other words, the pragmatic approach is about 
using whatever method is appropriate for the study. What is more important to this 
researcher is the nature of the research and not whether to use a qualitative or qualitative 
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method (Morgan, 2007).Neither does the researcher hold a priori commitment to using 
mixed methods; all are compatible and potentially useful. Mixing may occur in a 
particular study if the researcher decides it will help make the data collection and analysis 
more accurate or the inferences more useful (e.g., Patton, 1988; Cook and Reichardt, 
1979; Reichardt and Rallis, 1994). In addition, (Beattie, 2014, p.127) suggest that 
‘research into accounting narratives would benefit from the use of mixed methods’. This 
paradigm is therefore suitable for this current research, as the researcher is committed to 
using whatever method is appropriate for the study. 
The first objective of this study is to develop a comprehensive disclosure framework 
to evaluate the content of Strategy and BM disclosures in annual reports, to explore 
disclosure contents in annual reports over a longitudinal period and investigate distinctive 
practices in the information content of Strategy and BM disclosures on an inter-company 
and inter-industry basis. This objective also involves assessing the extent of Strategy and 
BM disclosure and investigating the effect of regulation of such disclosure. The 
methodological issues of importance here are thus the concepts themselves; their 
measurement and the identification of underlying themes. Hence the concern is with the 
identification and definition of these elements. This objective particularly relates to the 
investigation of how the change of Strategy disclosure from the domain of voluntary 
disclosure towards a mandatory disclosure in the UK has been able to influence 
distinctive practices of Strategy and BM disclosures on a micro and meso level (see 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Second, this current study examines the possible 
determinants of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual reports of UK companies. Here 
the focus is on the discovery of how the relationship between Strategy and BM and the 
disclosure by social actors can be expressed.  
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5.3 Framework for Narrative Disclosure Research 
Beattie (2014) developed a framework for thinking about research on accounting 
narrative disclosure. The first objective of this study attempts to address the first and fifth 
questions in the framework. The fifth question in the framework relates to what should be 
reported, and studies here found that such research has influenced policy. For example, 
DeFond (2010) find that earnings quality research has impacted policy. In examining 
what should be reported, this current study develops a disclosure corpus for both Strategy 
and BM using the literature, guidelines from regulatory bodies, and a bench mark of 
disclosure content in annual reports for 2015, of companies included in this study. The 
understanding from the findings may be used to inform regulation (see Buijink, 2006). 
Beattie (2014) posited that the first question ‘what is reported’ represents the core of 
the framework and are essentially descriptive in nature and focus on the topic content or 
the form of the narratives. Hereby the concern of such study is to explain the described 
practice, using a positivist, interpretive or critical approach. Further, methods adopted 
include content analysis, linguistic analysis and/or discourse analysis. This current study 
is a longitudinal study and uses both qualitative and quantitative content analysis. This 
first objective focuses on the topic content and quantity/level of disclosure, using 
qualitative content analysis technique. It explores the practice of Strategy and BM 
disclosure over a period of ten (10) years, incorporating periods before and after the 
introduction of regulatory requirements for disclosure.  
The first objective further investigates the extent of disclosure, examines the 
significance of regulatory requirements on the disclosure of Strategy and BM, and the 
disclosure items of Strategy and BM in the annual reports for the voluntary and 
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mandatory periods. The literature suggests that there is growing evidence that narrative 
disclosure is superior under a mandatory regime (see Aerts et al., 2013). Thus, the focus 
is to explore ‘what is reported’, comparing it with ‘what should be reported’ as developed 
in this study. Thus, the first objective of this study addresses the first and second 
empirical questions. 
The second objective is related to the second question in the framework, and it 
addresses the third empirical question in this study. It attempts to explain the observed 
practice of Strategy and BM disclosure, and investigates the influence of contractual, 
market and corporate governance incentives on such disclosures at the meso level. Thus, 
this objective involves the development of hypothesis to test the relationships. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Framework for narrative disclosure research 
Adapted from Beattie (2014, p. 126). 
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5.4 Research Design 
Research design is a structure that guides the execution of a research method and the 
analysis of the subsequent data  (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Bryman and Bell (2011) 
identify five types of research design: cross-sectional design; case study design; social 
survey design; experimental design; and longitudinal design. This study adopts a 
longitudinal design because it can allow some insight into the time order of variables and 
therefore may allow causal inferences to be made. ‘The longitudinal design is a distinct 
form of research design that is typically used to map changes in business and 
management research (Bryman and Bell, 2011, P. 57)’. Pettigrew (1990) emphasized the 
importance of using a longitudinal design to understand organisations as a way of 
providing data on the mechanisms and processes through which changes are created. 
5.4.1 Research Sample 
This study uses a non-probability stratified sampling method (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
This is because the purpose of the study is not to achieve objectivity in the selection of 
samples or necessarily to make generalisations (i.e., statistical inferences) from the 
sample being studied to a wider population of interest. Instead of generalisability of 
knowledge gained, the concern of a pragmatic approach is whether knowledge gained can 
be transferred to other settings. 
Levels of disclosure in corporate annual reports are not likely to be the same across all 
sectors of the economy. This may occur for a number of reasons. For example, Signalling 
theory might be able to explain how an industry that is internationally exposed will most 
likely disclose more or less information about its strategy and BM, not necessarily 
because of the need to raise external capital or match foreign exchange risks, but also to 
increase international awareness of their existence (Cooke, 1992). The industries chosen 
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for this study includes the banking sector; the food and drug retailer sector; and the gas, 
and water and multi-utilities sector. The study started with the banking industry, but two 
other industries were included to give an understanding of Strategy and BM disclosure 
practice between the financial and non-financial sectors. The companies included in the 
sample have been selected based on three criteria; country of incorporation (United 
Kingdom), and market (main market), the third criteria is based on the listing year of the 
company. Any company listed after 2006 (the benchmark for the voluntary period) is 
eliminated from the sample.  
The banking sector is a highly regulated industry. In a report, Deloitte (2015) it was 
highlighted that “the banks managed to make their reports considerably shorter but 
continued to produce the longest annual reports with an average report length of 392 
pages (2014:468). The reduction in length was primarily driven by a decrease in areas of 
the narrative including the section dealing with the disclosure of risks. It is not surprising 
that banks continue to produce the longest reports given the additional regulatory 
requirements, and lengthy financial instruments disclosures”.  
 Highly regulated industries such as the banking and utility sector will most likely be 
motivated to disclose information to try and reduce agency costs, in terms of costs of 
complying with legislation (see Ross, 1989) or because of the extent of regulation, these 
companies might feel justified and less motivated to disclose more information (Watson 
et al., 2002).  
In addition, sectors that are economically significant are expected to disclose more 
information. In the UK, the retail sector is a major contributor to the total economic 
output (11% of total economic output in 2017). In a house of commons’ report, “the retail 
sector is one of the few sectors with presence in every neighbourhood and it has a 
considerable multiplier effect” on local economies… (2013, p.15). If the disclosure of 
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Strategy and BM is considered as “best practice”, then such an approach may signal 
reporting quality (see Watson et al., 2002).    
Tables 5.1 – 5.3 shows the list of companies from these sectors after the first two 
criteria of country of incorporation and market have been applied. Table 5.4 shows the 
final list of the study sample after the listing date criterion had been applied. 
Table 5.1 Research sample for the banking sector 
List Date Company Sector Country of 
Incorporation 
Market Mkt Cap £m 
29/02/2012 BANK OF GEORGIA HLDGS 
PLC           
Banks UK Main Market 426.9625639 
31/12/1953 BARCLAYS                            Banks UK Main Market 27830.36072 
08/04/1991 HSBC HLDGS                          Banks UK Main Market 111122.9907 
08/10/1986 LLOYDS BANKING GROUP 
PLC            
Banks UK Main Market 28541.60907 
10/07/1968 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 
GROUP PLC    
Banks Us Main Market 16752.0976 
02/02/1970 STANDARD CHARTERED                  Banks UK Main Market 35014.75107 
 
Table 5.2 Research sample for the GWM sector 
17-Feb-97 CENTRICA PLC                        Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 10293.6934 
16-Aug-02 DEE VALLEY GROUP                    Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 64.3531362 
31-Jan-02 NATIONAL GRID                       Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 36850.6266 
12-Dec-89 PENNON GROUP                        Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 3633.2445 
12-Dec-89 SEVERN TRENT PLC                    Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 5107.55504 
28-Jul-08 UNITED UTILITIES GROUP 
PLC          
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities GB Main Market 6521.61184 
 
 
Table 5.3 Research sample for the food and drug retailers’ sector 
01-Jul-09 BOOKER GROUP PLC                    Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 2862.51157 
27-Apr-84 GREGGS                              Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 1054.04449 
28-Feb-14 MCCOLL'S RETAIL GROUP PLC           Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 145.287958 
30-Nov-72 MORRISON(WM.) 
SUPERMARKETS           
Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 4103.42908 
26-Jul-10 OCADO GROUP PLC                     Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 1463.34953 
11-Jul-75 SAINSBURY (J)                        Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 4622.32522 
15-Jul-14 SSP GROUP PLC                       Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 1361.34987 
23-Dec-47 TESCO                               Food & Drug 
Retailers 
GB Main Market 14016.0134 
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Table 5.4 Research sample for the study 
Industry Companies 
Banking  HSBC Holdings Plc 
 Barclays Plc 
 Lloyds Group Plc 
 Standard Chartered 
 Royal Bank of Scotland 
Food and Drug Retailers Sainsbury 
 Tesco 
 Morrison 
 Greggs 
Gas, water and Multi-utilities Centrica 
 National grid 
 Pennon Group 
 Severn Trent Plc 
 United Utilities Group Plc 
 
5.4.2 Sample Period 
This current study uses three criteria in the selection of companies included in the 
research – annual reports of companies incorporated in the UK, companies with 
operations on the main market, and companies with published reports between 2006 and 
2015. After the selection of sample companies, the period of time from 2006 to 2015 was 
framed for investigating Strategy and BM disclosures of 14 companies in three industries 
on a longitudinal, intra-industry and inter-industry study. The choice of 2006 as starting 
year for this longitudinal analysis was because 2006 mark the year listed companies were 
required to disclose forward-looking statements in the Business Review section of annual 
reports. However, there was no particular reference to Strategy and BMs.  
Further, in 2010, the UK corporate governance code required listed companies to 
disclose their Strategy and BM in the annual reports. Nevertheless, the UK corporate 
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governance code is based on a ‘comply or explain principle’, which implies that the 
requirement was not mandatory. In 2012, the UK government through the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) issued a mandatory requirement that listed companies should 
disclose their Strategy and BM in the Strategic Report section of the annual report - 
hereby, replacing the Business Review with the Strategic Report (Deloitte, 2014). The 
mandatory requirement is effective from 1st October (2013).  
5.4.3 Media Selection: Annual reports 
When conducting a content analysis, a choice needs to be made between which 
documents to analyse (Gray et al., 1995). All forms of data that are made available can be 
used in content analysis. Official documents, such as annual reports, letters, and notes, 
among others, also function as institutionalized traces. This means that they may 
legitimately be used to draw conclusions about activities, intentions and ideas of their 
creators or the organisations they represent. The annual reports as a choice of publication 
was mainly justified on the increased emphasis on corporate transparency and that an 
annual report is an important communication source and a legitimate document (Gray et 
al., 1995), they are prime materials to study the interaction of firms with their 
environment (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1983). 
Annual reports though, have been criticised to suffer from significant bias in the 
contribution of organizational actions and outcomes (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991). This 
is partly because they can be prepared by public relations specialists rather than the top 
management team (Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997). However, in the study of a 
cognitive phenomenon like Strategy and BM, annual reports have advantages over other 
sources of corporate information as they do not suffer from retroactive sense-making 
(Duriau et al., 2007). Osborne et al. (2001) noticed their reliability compared to 
interviews or questionnaires of senior executives. Also, researchers argue that they spend 
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considerable time outlining the content of the report, proofreading and changing the 
content to their taste   (Bowman, 1983; Barr et al., 1992). 
A second issue can be identified when deciding the location of Strategy information 
within the annual report. This research identifies Business Review in the directors’ report 
as the main location of strategic information in the annual reports from 2006. However, 
from periods ending on or after 30th September 2013, it is expected that the location of 
Strategy and BM disclosure should be in the Strategic Report, which replaces the 
business review within the director’s report (Deloite, 2013). Hence, for this study, the 
Business Review section of the annual report for 2006-2012 was investigated, and the 
Strategic Report section for 2013-2015. In addition, the chairman’s and chief executive 
reports were read. Keyword search was also used to identify if the disclosure of these 
concepts was located outside the selected areas in the documents. 
5.5 Research Method 
The previous sections have discussed the problems of information asymmetries and 
the need to continually improve the quality of annual reports to enhance comparability, 
understandability and standardization, in order to enhance investment decisions. 
Consequently, several techniques that aim to improve the interpretation of the contents of 
annual reports have been developed. For example, in corporate social reporting CSR) and 
its context (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Unerman, 2000), in studies on intellectual capital 
– IC (see Guthrie et al., 2004). Thus, for the purpose of this study, content analysis 
appears to be the most appropriate method to assess how Strategy and BM are disclosed 
in annual reports. In addition to corporate annual reports, this study will use data from 
databases, such as FAME and IBES for the analysis of the determinants of strategy and 
BM disclosures.  
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A major factor that distinguishes content analysis from other methods of enquiry is 
that content analysis analyses texts in the context of their uses (Krippendorff, 2013). 
Content analysis views data not as physical events but as texts, images, and expressions 
that are created to be seen, read, interpreted, and acted on for their meanings, thus, 
analysis must be with such uses in mind. It makes sense of what is mediated between 
people-textual matter, symbols, messages, information, among others, without affecting 
those who handle that textual matter. Content analysis is a primary tool used for 
analysing annual reports (Grbich, 2012). Elo and Kyngäs (2008) described content 
analysis as a method of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages. 
Content analysis is also known as a method of analysing documents.  
The choice of content analysis is because, researchers regard content analysis as a 
flexible method for analysing text data (Cavanagh, 1997). Examples of the usage of 
content analysis technique for the study of Strategy disclosure and BM disclosure in 
annual reports can be found in (Santema and Van de Rijt, 2001; Padia and Yasseen, 2011; 
Giunta et al., 2014; Bini et al., 2016). The method found its critics in the quantitative 
field, who considered it to be a simplistic technique that did not lend itself to detailed 
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, despite criticism, scholars argue that the method has 
flexibility in terms of research design (Harwood and Garry, 2003).  
The content analysis approach adopted used in this study to analyse the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM in the annual reports is disclosure index. Disclosure index studies are 
based on the general principles of content or thematic analysis (Weber, 1990; Holsti, 
1969). This is because the current researcher had to develop a framework for disclosure 
index at the beginning of this study, hereby reading the whole paragraph to build up a list 
that will form the disclosure index (Beattie et al., 2004; Marston and Shrives, 1991).  
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Disclosure studies using disclosure index often makes a fundamental distinction 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure as a justification for using index, and they 
are form-oriented (Beattie et al., 2004). Disclosure index score can give a measure of the 
extent of disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Also the focus of this study is on both 
the investigation of inter-company differences, and the distinction between mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure using longitudinal analyses (Camfferman, 1997).  
Further, this study uses descriptive statistics in answering some aspects of question 
two and regression analysis (hypotheses testing) to address the third empirical question 
(chapter 8). According to (Neuendorf, 2002) the concept of content analysis as a 
quantitative method includes hypothesis testing. Thus, the disclosure index score 
measured in this study is used as dependent variables to examine the determinants or 
incentives for the observed Strategy and BM disclosure practice. Section 5.7 describes 
the model adopted for this study. 
5.5.1 Unit of analysis 
Content analysis involves classifying text units into categories (Beattie et al., 2004). In 
addition, the use of content analysis involves deciding what should form the basis for 
coding (unit of analysis) and what should form the basis for measuring the amount of 
disclosure (unit of measurement) (Unerman, 2000). The recording unit for this study is 
paragraph. Krippendorff (2012) opined that sentences are the minimal recording unit of 
analysis for individual words but are not sufficient. Generally, the larger the context, the 
more meaningful it is for analysts to identify the direction of information. Further, the 
unit of measurement is an important consideration as one of the key assumptions 
underlying content analysis is that volume signifies the importance of items being 
disclosed. A choice of unit of measurement is not significant in this study because the 
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focus is not on multiple disclosures but on the presence or absence (Beattie and Thomson, 
2007). 
5.5.2 Research instrument 
In developing the disclosure index, the current researcher examined: Previous literature 
on Strategy and BM (Giunta et al., 2014; Santema and Van de Rijt, 2001); FRC guidance 
report 2013 for the BM criteria construction; Governance in focus: Deloitte (2012); IR 
(2013); and the most recent annual report of top 13 FTSE companies. I stopped at 13 
when I was not getting additional information. FTSE Index Ranking as at 24th June 2015. 
The current researcher read through each report severally and coded using categorical 
distinctions, not relying on keywords and headings. It is however expected that the 2014 
reports used for this checklist development would have sections for Strategy and BM, 
even if they were called by other titles.
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Table 5.5 Strategy Disclosure categories 
Category Description 
Strategic Priorities Reinforcing the firm’s objectives, strategic focus 
Corporate Strategy Translation of challenges into a road map for implementation. 
The overall Strategy. This Strategy is broader and generic in 
nature. For example, growth Strategy. 
Business unit Strategy Shows how each business unit contributes to the actualization 
of the corporate Strategy and strategic priorities. It shows 
how each business unit aligns with the overall/corporate 
Strategy. 
SWOT Analysis: Strength Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. 
Progress against strategic priorities Discussion of how Strategy was implemented the past year. 
Challenge mitigation How the entity intends to minimize the effect of the risk. 
Portfolio of businesses A list of business activities 
Customer segments Customer niche, target market. 
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Table 5.6 BM disclosure categories 
Category Key Words/Description 
Value creation This involves a more detailed description of the 
business activities. Focusing more on how customers 
benefit from the products and services. 
Value capture How income is recognized from the value created. 
This includes pricing. 
Unique offering (key success factor) Quality, peculiarity, uniqueness 
Expertise (competence) Competences  
Value creation framework Investment criteria 
Entity Structure Insight into how the organization is managed. That is, 
the board and other management team of the day-to-
day business. This includes roles/duties. 
Value Chain/process description Description of the process involved in creating value. 
Distribution Geographical presence 
Resources Human capital (employees), material, financial, 
values, technology, and global synergy. 
Relationships Suppliers, investors, regulators, partners, 
communities, and customers. 
Justification for business activities Economic role or importance of the business  
5.6 Reliability and Validity in Content Analysis 
Subjectivity occurs in content analysis when decisions are made throughout the 
process of recording and this can affect the reliability and validity of findings. Hence, 
measurement is related to the reliability and validity in the process of data capture and 
making inferences (Riffe et al., 2005). Thus, it is important that analysts require 
practicable measurement to analyse contents in a trustworthy way. The issue of reliability 
and validity has been widely discussed in the literature (see Bozzolan et al., 2003; Beattie 
and Thompson, 2007; Holsti, 1969).  
5.6.1 Reliability 
Reliability entails the researcher assigning the same numbers that would be generated 
by different coders, adopting the same classification criteria to the same content (Riffe, 
 
 
90 
2005). Put differently, high transparency about the procedure of analysis is necessary to 
ensure the reliability of results (see Beattie and Thompson, 2007; Bini et al., 2016). The 
actions of coders and the measurement procedures used are major factors in determining 
the reliability of data (Holsti, 1969; Riffe et al., 2005). Hence, (Berelson, 1952) stressed 
that objectivity is an important element in content analysis, as such analysts must reduce 
subjectivity in analysing communication content. It entails showing that the findings are 
consistent and could be repeated by means of leaving an ‘audit trail’ which is a 
transparent description of the research process in order to allow insight into how the 
analysis was conducted and conclusions were reached (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; 
Johnson et al., 2006).  
Therefore, in order to enhance reliability in content analysis, the coder’s skill and 
clarity of categories are two important factors. The coder’s ability relates to the coder’s 
skill, insight, fatigue, bias and experience which can be achieved through adequate 
training, reliability test and computer aids (Holsti, 1969; Neuendorf, 2002). Thus, the 
coder’s training, computer aids and reliability test (comparing coding results at different 
times) were employed to resolve these issues (Neuendorf, 2002, Riffe et al., 2005). Also, 
the clarity of categories requires a clarity of procedures for recording and the use of well-
defined categories, which can assist in achieving high level of reliability (Milne and 
Adler, 1999). In order to facilitate reliability and avoid poor management of coding 
scheme, this current researcher used a coding sheet to record the content attributes of 
each unit of content in the study (see Riffe, et al., 2005). This coding sheet has the same 
level of importance as a questionnaire in a random sample survey and the same rules for 
clarity of presentation apply. Also, the current researcher coded the data twice. A re-code 
was necessary to compare the scores achieved at different times (Creswell, 2012).  
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5.6.2 Validity 
Validity relates to demonstrating the interconnectedness between a conceptual 
definition and its measurement (Neuendorf, 2002). Weber (1990) described validity in 
connection with the validity of the classification scheme, or variables derived from it, or 
the validity of the interpretations relating content variable to their causes or 
consequences. Validity could either be external or internal validity (Neuendorf, 2002; 
Riffe et al., 2005). External validity involves showing that the findings are applicable in 
other contexts (generalisability). On the other hand, internal validity is concerned with 
establishing confidence in the ‘truth’ of findings. It entails the matching of a conceptual 
definition and an operational definition (measurement).  
As argued earlier, issue with a pragmatic approach to research is the extent to which 
knowledge gained through a method in a specific setting can be appropriately applied in 
other settings, rather than the choice between whether knowledge is specific and context 
dependent or universal and generalizable. Thus, what is important is whether knowledge 
gained can be transferred to other settings – “transferability” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
To achieve validity, this current researcher had a prolonged engagement with the text and 
context by means of repeated close readings and familiarization with surrounding context 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The researcher started by reading the relevant sections of the 
reports through several times to become immersed in the data. In making sense of the 
data, first, all passages that could be considered as part of Strategy and BM disclosures as 
categorized in tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively were highlighted. Thereafter, notes were 
written on marked passages, after carefully reading what kinds of issues were discussed 
in preceding or following sentences and chapters
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5.7 Model specification and variable measurement 
To test for an association between Strategy, and BM disclosure index and the possible 
determinants of such disclosures, three sub incentive categories, namely: contractual, 
market, and corporate governance incentives, and one overall model have been 
constructed. In addition to the explanatory variables described in Section 4, I also include 
industry dummy variables (Industry dummies) which are defined using Fame’s 2-digit 
SIC groupings, and year dummy variables (Year dummies). The dependent and 
independent variables are listed and defined in Table 5.4.  
The assumptions underlying the regression model were tested for multi-collineraity 
based on the variance inflation factor (VIF). None of the variables have a VIF value in 
excess of 10 (Neter et al.1983) suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a problem in 
interpreting the regression results.  I use the following regression models: 
SDI = α + β1 Contractual incentives+ β2 Market incentives + β3 Corporate Governance 
Incentives + β4 ROA + β5 Size + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε   (1) 
 
BMDI = α + β1 Contractual incentives+ β2 Market incentives + β3 Corporate Governance 
Incentives + β4 ROA + β5 Size + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε   (2) 
 
Where variables for contractual incentives include: Dloss, leverage, and Altman, 
while, variables for market incentives include: firm age and analyst following, and 
variables for corporate governance incentives are compensation (both CEO’s annual 
incentive bonus and total pay). The description for the variables is in Table 4.4 below. 
This study also uses the following regression models to examine the association between 
Strategy and BM disclosure and subcategories of disclosure drivers (contractual, market 
and corporate governance incentives). 
Contractual incentives as determinants of Strategy and BM disclosure: 
SDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 DLOSS + β4 Lev + β5 Altman + Industry    dummies + 
Year dummies + ε         (3) 
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BMDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 DLOSS + β4 Lev + β5 Altman + Industry    dummies 
+ Year dummies + ε         (4)  
 
Market incentives as determinants of Strategy and BM disclosure: 
SDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 Analfol + β4 Age + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε  
            (5) 
BMDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 Analfol + β4 Age + Industry    dummies + Year 
dummies + ε            (6) 
 
Compensation and corporate governance incentives as determinants of Strategy and 
BM disclosure: 
SDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 PAY + β4 AIS+ β5 Bsize + β6 BIND + β7 BMEET + 
Industry    dummies + Year dummies + ε       (7) 
 
BMDI = α + β1 ROA+ β2 Size + β3 PAY + β4 AIS+ β5 Bsize + β6 BIND + β7 BMEET 
+ Industry    dummies + Year dummies + ε       (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
To assess the extent of Strategy and BM disclosure in annual reports, a checklist 
containing 22 items (11 for each disclosure type) was constructed (see Appendix). A 
dichotomous procedure is applied whereby a company is awarded 1 if an item included in 
the checklist is disclosed and 0 if it is not disclosed. Accordingly, the Strategy disclosure 
index and the BM disclosure index are computed as the ratio of actual scores awarded to 
the maximum score attainable (11) by that company (see Ghazali, 2007). Thus, the index 
is measured for each company as the ratio of the score obtainable to the maximum score 
relevant for that company. All annual reports (on the companies’ websites) were read 
twice to ensure consistency in scoring. The second examination was done after analysing 
all annual reports in the first round to ensure consistency in scoring. In the few cases 
where differences existed between the first and second scoring, the annual reports (on the 
companies’ websites) were subjected to a third final assessment. Table 5.7 describes the 
variables included in the models. 
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Table 5.7 Definition of variables 
Variable name               Variable 
Abbreviation               
Variable Description                        Predicted 
sign 
Strategy Disclosure Index 
(dependent Variable) 
SDI Measured as a ratio of disclosure content point over the maximum 
score a firm can achieve 
 
BM Disclosure 
Index (dependent variable) 
BMDI Measured as a ratio of disclosure content point over the maximum 
score a firm can achieve 
 
Profitability ROA Return on Assts. Calculated by dividing net income by total assets  
Size Size Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of assets.  
Industry  Industry 
dummies 
Dummy variable for industry  
Year Year dummies Dummy variable for year  
Loss  DLOSS A dummy variable that equals 1 if profitability is less than or equal 
to 0 and 0 if otherwise. 
- 
Leverage LEV Calculated as ratio of book value of total debt and total assets ± 
Financial Distress Altman A measure of bankruptcy risk - 
Listing Age Age Listing age is the logarithm of the years since the firm was first 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
- 
Analyst following Analfol The natural log of the number of analysts following a firm. + 
Total Pay Pay Measured as the natural log of CEOs’ pay ± 
Annual Incentive Scheme AIS Measured as the natural log of annual bonus ± 
Board Meeting (Active 
board) 
Bmeet Measured as the number of board meeting held during the year ± 
% of Independent 
Directors 
BIND Proportion of independent directors on board ± 
Board Size BSize Board size is measured as the logarithm of the total number of 
directors. 
± 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter justifies the use of a pragmatic (mixed method) approach in the study of 
Strategy and business method, arguing that complete objectivity and complete 
subjectivity is impossible. Thus, both qualitative and quantitative analysis were adopted. 
Qualitative content analysis is concerned with the development of the meaning of 
communication and the identification of critical processes. Quantitative approach 
however, entails the use of systematic protocols, objective measures and the 
quantification of information. This chapter further outlined the basic steps involved in 
analysing content analysis, and demonstrated the importance of reliability and validity of 
data in ensuring credibility of findings drawn.  
Further, this chapter specified that this is a longitudinal study, focusing on a 10-year 
period (2006-2015). Finally, the model adopted for the third empirical chapter was 
described. This involves the definition of variables, both dependent and independent 
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variables and the three categories Strategy and BM disclosure determinants, namely: 
contractual incentives, market incentives, and corporate governance incentives.  
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CHAPTER 6 STRATEGY AND BM DISCLOSURE PRACTICE 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter aims to analyse and discuss the disclosure of Strategy and BM in the 
annual reports of a sample of 14 companies from three industries- The Banking; Gas, 
water and Multi-utilities & The Food and Drug Retailers industry. This section explores 
both micro (company) and meso (industry) level disclosure practice, using the proposed 
disclosure index. It attempts to answer the first objective of this study, and also the first 
question in the narrative research framework (Beattie, 2014). The aim is to employ a 
descriptive attempt to explain the described practice of disclosure using content analysis.  
Accordingly, Strategy and BM disclosure index are measured for each company as the 
ratio of actual sores awarded to the maximum score attainable (11 in each case) by that 
company (Ghazali, 2007). 
The first section analyses the trend in the disclosure level regarding the content of 
Strategy and BM disclosure on a micro level (explores disclosure for each company 
included in the sample). Thereafter, a meso level investigation is conducted to explore the 
disclosure practice of Strategy and BM within each industry for the ten-year period.  
6.2 Micro Level Analysis of the Banking Sector 
This section examines and describes the pattern of disclosure of Strategy and BM 
disclosure by each of the five banks in the banking industry over the ten-year period 
(2006-2015).  
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6.2.1 HSBC 
Table 6.1 displays the percentage disclosure level (disclosure index) for (HSBC, 2006-
2015) Strategy and BM. It shows that the disclosure of Strategy and BM items is not a 
new phenomenon that emerged after the corporate governance requirement for disclosure 
in 2010. Further, it shows that HSBC discloses more Strategy than BM up until 2013 
after the mandatory requirement to disclose both BM and Strategy. It shows that the 
disclosure level of Strategy drops in 2007, and then becomes stable between 2008 and 
2010. However, BM disclosure continued to drop between 2007 and 2009 (28% 
decrease), increasing between 2010 and 2011. It is perhaps likely, that HSBC was not 
clear about its future directions and the reliability of its BM at this period (financial 
crisis) and this impacted on its disclosure of Strategy and BM (see Hill and Jones, 2011). 
The financial crisis spans between 2007 and 2009 (Taylor, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Lins 
et al., 2015). On the other hand, the increase in the level of disclosure of both BM and 
Strategy between 2010 and 2011 might be due to the corporate governance requirement 
of 2010. 
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Table 6.1 HSBC Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 91 64 
2007 91 73 
2008 82 64 
2009 82 36 
2010 82 64 
2011 91 82 
2012 100 73 
2013 82 91 
2014 91 91 
2015 91 64 
 
6.2.2 Barclays 
Table 6.2 displays a rise and fall in the level of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual 
report of Barclays between 2007 and 2010 (between 68% and 36%). This might be due to 
the effect of the onset of the financial crisis. In addition, it could be as a result of lack of 
clarity about their Strategy and BM. ‘At a time of significant market turbulence, it is 
important to be clear about Strategy (Barclays A.R, 2007, p.8)’. However, there was an 
increase in the level of disclosure of both Strategy and BM from 2010. This might partly 
be explained by the change in CEO in 2010, and the corporate governance code 
requirement in 2010. The increase between 2013 and 2014 might also be as a result of the 
mandatory requirement effective from October 2013; however, there was a decline in the 
disclosure of Strategy and BM after the mandatory requirement. It appears that the 
corporate governance requirement and the mandatory requirement for disclosure has 
impacted on the disclosure of Strategy and BM in the narrative section of annual reports 
(Li, 2010; Beattie et al., 2008). 
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Table 6.2 Barclays Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Column1 Strategy BM 
2006 45 45 
2007 73 64 
2008 64 45 
2009 73 64 
2010 36 36 
2011 73 64 
2012 82 73 
2013 91 91 
2014 100 91 
2015 91 73 
 
6.2.3 Lloyds  
Table 6.3 shows an increase in the level of BM disclosure of Lloyds between 2006-2008, 
which stabilises between 2008 and 2009. Thereafter, there was a decrease between 2009 
and 2010. It appears that the management of Lloyds was trying to cope with the effect the 
changes caused by the financial crisis. The CEO left Lloyds in 2010, which might 
possibly be the reason for the decline in BM disclosure level that year. Between 2010 and 
2011 there was an increase, but it stabilises between 2011 and 2012. There was a 
decrease between 2012 and 2013, with an increase from 2013. On the other hand, it 
appears that Strategy disclosure did not change between 2006 and 2010 (during the era of 
the previous CEO – Eric Daniels). However, it shows a decrease in 2011, with a 
consistent level of Strategy disclosure till 2014.  
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Table 6.3 Lloyds Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 91 55 
2007 91 64 
2008 91 73 
2009 91 73 
2010 91 64 
2011 91 73 
2012 82 73 
2013 82 55 
2014 82 73 
2015 82 82 
 
 
6.2.4 RBS 
Table 6.4 shows that Strategy disclosure increased by 49% in 2008. This might be due to 
the change in CEO in 2008. However, the disclosure level reduced slightly in the 
subsequent years (2009 & 2010) by 11%. On the other hand, BM disclosure was 
consistent (55%) between 2006 & 2009. Thereafter, it continues to fluctuate between 
55% and 45%, though increases from 2013. This might be as a result of the revised 
Companies Act in 2013 and partly because of the change in CEO in 2013.  
 
Table 6.4 RBS Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 55 55 
2007 55 55 
2008 82 55 
2009 73 55 
2010 73 45 
2011 82 55 
2012 82 45 
2013 82 55 
2014 82 64 
2015 91 73 
 
 
 
 
101 
6.2.5 Standard Chartered 
Table 6.5 shows that Strategy disclosure for Standard Chartered was consistent up to 
2014 (2006-2013). In 2006, the new management brought continuity in Strategy, note 
that they came to start a new Strategy. ‘2012 was another year of good performance for 
Standard Chartered, thanks to a consistent Strategy, a stable management team… 
(Standard Chartered, A.R. 2012, p.6)’. This means that consistence in Strategy is seen as 
a key success factor. Further, BM disclosure level also remained consistent until 2013, 
but increased in 2014. The increase might partly be due to the amended CA 2006 in 2013. 
Additionally, Strategy was reviewed in 2012. Strategy changes based on context and 
challenges (See Standard Chartered, 2012 p. 10). Also, the management discloses, "it gets 
harder to deliver the same rates of growth as we get bigger" (See Standard Chartered, 
2012, p.8).  This might imply that with the new Strategy, it will be necessary to improve 
the BM to get performance at par. Overall, this finding also suggests that the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM is not new in the business world. Companies were disclosing 
components of both Strategy and BM before both the corporate governance requirement 
and the mandatory requirement. 
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Table 6.5 Standard Chartered Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 91 82 
2007 91 82 
2008 91 82 
2009 91 82 
2010 91 82 
2011 91 82 
2012 91 82 
2013 91 73 
2014 91 82 
2015 82 82 
 
6.3 Meso Analysis of the Banking Industry 
This section examines and describes the pattern of disclosure of Strategy and BM 
disclosure in the banking industry over the ten-year period included in this study (2006-
2015).  
6.3.1 Strategy Disclosure 
The lowest Strategy disclosure level for the banking industry before the corporate 
governance requirement was 36% for Barclays in 2010, while the highest was 91% for 
Standard Chartered. Interestingly, the highest recorded level of Strategy disclosure after 
both the corporate governance and mandatory requirement was 100% for Barclays in 
2014 and 91% in 2015 (RBS and Barclays).  
As discussed earlier, Although, Table 6.6 shows that Strategy is not a new term that 
emerged in 2010 after the corporate governance requirement. However, findings suggest 
that the disclosure level of Strategy in the banking industry was 82% and above after the 
mandatory requirement. In such a case, as suggested by agency theory the focus is 
reducing agency costs, which includes increasing the disclosure of insider information to 
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enhance investors’ investment decisions. This conclusion is consistent with the findings 
of Santema et al. (2005). 
Table 6.6 Banking Sector Strategy Disclosure Level 
Year HSBC Barclays Lloyds RBS 
Standard 
Chartered 
2006 91 45 91 55 91 
2007 91 73 91 55 91 
2008 82 64 91 82 91 
2009 82 73 91 73 91 
2010 82 36 91 73 91 
2011 91 73 91 82 91 
2012 100 82 82 82 91 
2013 82 91 82 82 91 
2014 91 100 82 82 91 
2015 91 91 82 91 82 
 
 
6.3.2 BM Disclosure 
Table 6.7 shows that Standard Chartered has the same level of BM disclosure 
throughout the period under investigation (82%) except in 2013 -73%. The lowest level 
of BM disclosure for the banking industry is 36% (HSBC: 2010; Barclays: 2009). While, 
the highest level of BM disclosure is 91% (Barclays: 2013; 2014). Hence, although there 
was a corporate governance requirement for the disclosure of Strategy and BM in 2010, 
firms were disclosing some components of BM often without the use of the term ‘BM’. 
Also, Figure 6.8 shows that banks disclosure of their BM became relatively above 73% 
after 2010. However, after the amendment of the Companies Act (a mandatory 
requirement for the disclosure of Strategy and BM in annual reports in 2013) most 
companies had a heading for the term ‘BM’.  
According to Margeretta (2002) bringing the components together, firms should be 
able to tell their BM story of how and why their products and offerings can generate 
attractive revenues and still create value for customers. Howbeit, Table 6.7 shows that the 
full components of BM is still not disclosed. This might partly be due to the lack of an 
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adequate specification of BM-component description by the Companies Act. The 
amended Companies Act requires that the strategic report should contain among others, a 
fair review of the company’s business, and a description of the principal risks and 
uncertainties facing the company. Further, it might be as a result of impression 
management strategies to manipulate readers’ perception (Gaia et al., 2016). This finding 
is also in congruence with the conclusion of Bini et al. (2016) that companies rarely use 
BM disclosure to convey a cohesive story that highlights the interconnections among the 
different components of BM information disclosed. Further, this finding is consistent 
with the conclusion of IFAC (2014) that although BM disclosure is on the increase, it is 
far from being a mature practice. The next empirical chapter investigates the extent of 
disclosure relating to the components of BM information.  
Table 6.7 Banking Sector BM Disclosure Level 
Year HSBC Barclays Lloyds RBS 
Standard 
Chartered 
2006 45 64 55 55 82 
2007 64 73 64 55 82 
2008 45 64 73 55 82 
2009 64 36 73 55 82 
2010 36 64 64 45 82 
2011 64 82 73 55 82 
2012 73 73 73 45 82 
2013 91 91 55 55 73 
2014 91 91 73 64 82 
2015 64 73 82 73 82 
 
6.4 Micro Level Analysis of the Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry 
This section examines and describes the pattern of disclosure of Strategy and BM 
disclosure by each of the five companies in the Food and Drug Retailers’ industry over 
the ten-year period included in this study (2006-2015).  
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6.4.1 Tesco PLC 
Table 6.8 shows that Strategy disclosure level for Tesco PLC had a lowest level of 
disclosure in 2006 (64%) reaching a high of 91% in 2009. Thereafter, disclosure level 
drops to 82% then 73% between 2010 and 2013. It again increased to 82% in 2014. On 
the contrary, BM disclosure had the lowest level of disclosure in 2006 and 2007 (36%), 
increasing thereafter to 64% in 2008 and 2009. Then it decreased to 45% between 2010 
and 2012. However, in 2013 and 2014 the disclosure level increased to 64% (42% 
increase). However, the annual report of 2015 reveals a downward trend in the level of 
Tesco PLC’s Strategy and BM disclosure. This might be partly explained by the loss of 
£6.4b declared by the company in 2015 and also the change in chairman and CEO.   
One might reason that the lack of consistency in Strategy and BM disclosure is 
partly due to the absence of clarity of Strategy, and the resulting ‘poor performance’. This 
might be partly suggested seeing the comment of a company from another industry ‘2012 
was another year of good performance for Standard Chartered, thanks to a consistent 
Strategy, a stable management team… (Standard Chartered, A.R. 2012, p.6)’.  ‘At a time 
of significant market turbulence, it is important to be clear about Strategy (Barclays A.R, 
2007, p.8)’. Additionally, Table 6.8 does not appear to reflect the effect of the corporate 
governance requirement for the disclosure of Strategy and BM, or the mandatory 
requirement. This might suggest that companies in the Food and Drugs Retailers’ 
Industry have not yet internalised the changes expected the disclosure of their Strategy 
and BM.  
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Table 6.8 Tesco Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 64 36 
2007 73 36 
2008 73 64 
2009 91 64 
2010 82 45 
2011 73 45 
2012 73 45 
2013 73 64 
2014 82 64 
2015 64 45 
 
6.4.2 Morrisons 
Table 6.9 shows an increase in the level of Strategy and BM disclosure between 2006 
and 2009. Strategy disclosure level dropped in 2010 (11%). The decline in Strategy 
disclosure level in 2010 and subsequent drop in BM disclosure level in 2011 might be 
partly due to the change in Morrisons’ CEO in November 2009 (Morrisons, A.R. 2010, 
p.3). There was also a slight drop in the level of Strategy disclosure in 2015. This drop 
might be insignificant but might also be due to the change in CEO earlier in the financial 
year. Overall, Table 6.9 appears to suggest that although the disclosure of Strategy and 
BM in the annual reports of Morrisons is not new after the corporate governance 
requirement, the disclosure of both Strategy and BM became more consistent afterwards.  
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Table 6.9 Morrisons Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 27 36 
2007 45 45 
2008 64 55 
2009 82 73 
2010 73 73 
2011 82 64 
2012 91 73 
2013 91 73 
2014 91 73 
2015 82 73 
 
6.4.3 Sainsbury 
Table 6.10 shows that Sainsbury’s Strategy disclosure increased between 2006 and 
2008. This might be due to a continuous review of Strategy by the new CEO - Justin 
King who joined the company in 2004 (Sainsbury A.R. 2008, p.4) which might have 
resulted in clarity of Strategy and thereafter, a consistent Strategy disclosure between 
2008 and 2015. On the other hand, Sainsbury’s BM remained consistent between 2006 
and 2014. This might be as a result of clarity in Strategy. “Our passion for healthy, safe, 
fresh and tasty food, our value, innovation and strong ethical approach to business 
provides differentiation between us and our major competitors and are what customers 
want and expect from Sainsbury’s (Sainsbury A.R. 2008, p.4). However, it could also 
mean that the management of Sainsbury did not change their approach to disclosure even 
after the requirements. Interestingly, 2015 annual report shows an upward movement in 
BM disclosure. This might be as a result of the appointment of a new CEO.  
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Table 6.10 Sainsbury Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 55 64 
2007 64 64 
2008 82 64 
2009 82 64 
2010 82 64 
2011 82 64 
2012 82 64 
2013 82 64 
2014 82 64 
2015 82 82 
 
6.4.4 Greggs 
Table 6.11 shows that Greggs’ Strategy disclosure level had a continuous drop 
between 2006 and 2008. The Strategy disclosure level increased in 2009 (62% increase). 
The increase might be due to the change in CEO in 2009. Thereafter, there was a slight 
decrease in 2010 (12% decrease). However, Greggs’ Strategy disclosure level increased 
between 2011 and 2012 (28% increase), then remained consistent between 2013 and 
2014. The increase in the level of Strategy disclosure between 2011 and 2012 might be as 
a result of the revised corporate governance code of 2010.   
On the other hand, BM disclosure level fluctuated between 36%, 45%, and 55% 
between 2006 and 2011, having a lowest level of disclosure rate in 2007 (36%). Greggs’ 
BM disclosure level increased to 64% in 2012 (16% increase), thereafter reducing to 55% 
in 2013 and 45% in 2014. The dramatic fluctuation in the disclosure of BM might be as a 
result of the fluctuation in the level of Strategy disclosure. This could be indicative of 
lack of clarity in Strategy. It is worth knowing also that Greggs changed its CEO in 2013. 
However, the Table shows that BM disclosure level improved in 2015. The improvement 
in Strategy clarity could be seen in the chairman’s statement in 2016.  
“In 2015, we delivered another excellent performance in the second year of 
implementation of our Strategy to transform Greggs from a traditional bakery business 
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into a modern, attractive food-on-the-go retailer. We have made significant progress 
across all areas of our strategic plan, with the result that our estate is stronger and our 
products, value and service are all improving the experience for customers” (Greggs AR, 
2015, p.16). 
Table 6.11 Greggs Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
2006 64 45 
2007 55 36 
2008 45 45 
2009 73 45 
2010 64 55 
2011 73 55 
2012 82 64 
2013 82 55 
2014 82 45 
 
6.5 Meso Level Analysis of Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry 
This section examines and describes the pattern of disclosure of Strategy and BM 
disclosure in the Food and Drug Retailers’ industry over the ten-year period included in 
this study (2006-2015).  
6.5.1 Strategy Disclosure for Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry 
Table 6.12 shows that Morrison had the lowest level of Strategy disclosure in 2006 
and interestingly the highest level of disclosure in 2013 and 2014 (91%). It also indicates 
how the disclosure of Strategy improved among these companies after 2010, ranging 
between 73% and 91%. This is contrary to lowest level of 27% and the variation in the 
level of Strategy disclosure among companies in the food and drug industry before 2010. 
The improved disclosure might be due to the corporate governance requirement of 2010 
and the revised CA 2006 that was released in 2013. This is in line with agency theory that 
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information asymmetry can be reduced through the interventions of institutions created to 
facilitate disclosure between managers and investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Table 6.12 Food and Drug Retailers' Strategy Disclosure Level 
Year Tesco Morrisons Sainsbury Greggs 
2006 64 27 55 64 
2007 73 45 64 55 
2008 73 64 82 45 
2009 91 82 82 73 
2010 82 73 82 64 
2011 73 82 82 73 
2012 73 91 82 82 
2013 73 91 82 82 
2014 82 91 82 82 
2015 64 82 82 82 
 
 
6.5.2 BM Disclosure in the Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry 
The lowest level of BM disclosure in the food and drug industry was 36%. Tesco had 
36% level of disclosure in 2006 and 2007, Morrison in 2006, and Greggs in 2007. Figure 
6.13 shows that Morrison’s disclosure level is highest between 2009 and 2014 (73%), 
except in 2011 when it reduced to 64%. It also shows that Greggs has the lowest level of 
disclosure up to 2015 (45%). Overall, it appears that the disclosure level of BM in the 
food and drug industry is relatively low. This might prevent investors from understanding 
how companies in this sector create, capture and deliver value (see also Gaia et al., 2016). 
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Table 6.13 Food and Drugs Retailers' Strategy Disclosure Level 
Year Tesco Morrisons Sainsbury Greggs 
2006 36 36 64 45 
2007 36 45 64 36 
2008 64 55 64 45 
2009 64 73 64 45 
2010 45 73 64 55 
2011 45 64 64 55 
2012 45 73 64 64 
2013 64 73 64 55 
2014 64 73 64 45 
2015 45 73 82 55 
 
6.6 Micro Level Analysis of Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry 
This section examines and describes the pattern of disclosure of Strategy and BM 
disclosure by each of the five companies in the Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities industry 
over the ten-year period included in this study (2006-2015).  
6.6.1 Centrica PLC 
Table 6.14 shows some levels of variation in the disclosure of Strategy and BM of 
Centrica Plc particularly before 2010. However, the disclosure level became consistent 
from 2010. This might be due to the introduction of the corporate governance 
requirement in 2010 and the subsequent 2013 revised CA 2006. It is worthy of note that 
the level of BM disclosure by Centrica declined between 2014 and 2015, this raises a 
question of whether the disclosure level will remain consistent after a period of time, 
partly because of the self-interest of managers, as suggested by agency theory (see 
Armstrong et al., 2010) and possibly proprietary costs (Healy and Palepu, 2001), or as a 
result of inadequate description and specification of BM components by the FRC 
guidance report. 
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Table 6.14 Centrica Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
 2006 91 55 
 2007 82 73 
 2008 82 73 
 2009 73 82 
 2010 82 82 
 2011 82 82 
 2012 82 82 
 2013 82 82 
 2014 82 82 
 2015 82 64 
  
 
6.6.2 United Utilities 
It is perhaps not surprising that the findings often reflect that the variation in the level 
of Strategy disclosure, results in variation in the level of BM disclosure. In other words, 
since Strategy and BM are complements (Zott and Amit, 2008), the disclosure level of 
Strategy is often complemented by a similar level of BM disclosure. Figure 6.15 shows 
that United Utilities’ Strategy disclosure fluctuated between 2006 and 2009 and then 
remained consistent between 2010 and 2012. Followed by a decrease in 2013 (28% 
decrease) and an increase in 2014 (28% increase). However, the BM disclosure level 
varied throughout the period of investigation (2006-2015). The highest BM disclosure 
level was recorded in 2006 and 2012 (73%) with the lowest of 55% in 2009 and 2010. It 
is worthy of note that the chairman and CEO’s statement of United Utilities for 2011-
2013 was combined. Also, the reporting of BM and Strategy for 2012 and 2013 were 
combined.  
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Table 6.15 United Utilities Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
 2006 82 73 
 2007 82 64 
 2008 73 64 
 2009 82 55 
 2010 82 55 
 2011 82 64 
 2012 82 73 
 2013 64 64 
 2014 82 64 
 2015 82 91 
  
 
6.6.3 National Grid 
Table 6.16 shows that National Grid’s Strategy disclosure was consistent at 73% 
between 2006 and 2008, then increased in 2009 and remained consistent at 82% between 
2009 and 2011. It fluctuated between 2012 and 2014 varying between 73% and 82%.  
Once again, it is not surprising that finding shows that the variation in the level of 
Strategy disclosure, results in a variation in the level of BM disclosure. This finding is 
consistent with the conclusion of Zott and Amit (2008) that Strategy and BMs are 
complements and not substitutes. 
Table 6.16 National Grid Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
 2006 73 55 
 2007 73 64 
 2008 73 64 
 2009 82 64 
 2010 82 82 
 2011 82 55 
 2012 73 73 
 2013 82 73 
 2014 73 82 
 2015 82 91 
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6.6.4 Pennon 
Table 6.17 shows that Pennon has a consistent Strategy disclosure level from 2007 
(91%), with the BM disclosure level showing a fluctuation between 2010 and 2011 (14% 
decrease). This might indicate that Pennon had a clear Strategy. One could also assume 
that the consistent level of Strategy disclosure relatively impacted on the consistent level 
of BM disclosure. This is consistent with the literature on the relationship between 
Strategy and BM as complementary and not substitutes (Zott & Amit, 2008).  
Table 6.17 Pennon Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
 2006 82 64 
 2007 91 64 
 2008 91 64 
 2009 91 64 
 2010 91 64 
 2011 91 55 
 2012 91 64 
 2013 91 64 
 2014 91 64 
 2015 91 64 
  
  
 
6.6.5 Severn Trent 
Table 6.18 shows that Severn Trent’s Strategy disclosure level varied between 82% and 
91% throughout the period under investigation. However, maintaining a relatively high 
level of 91% between 2012 and 2014. On the other hand, the BM disclosure level was as 
low as 36% in 2008 but reached a high of 73% between 2012 and 2014. It is also 
interesting to note that the variation in the level of Strategy disclosure shows an impact 
on the level of BM disclosure during the period under investigation (2006-2015).  
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Table 6.18 Severn Trent Strategy and BM Disclosure Level 
Year Strategy BM 
 2006 82 45 
 2007 91 55 
 2008 82 36 
 2009 91 64 
 2010 82 55 
 2011 82 55 
 2012 91 73 
 2013 91 73 
 2014 91 73 
 2015 82 82 
  
6.7 Meso Level Analysis of the Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry 
This section examines the pattern of Strategy and BM disclosure in the annual reports of 
the five companies in the Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities industry over the period 
included in this study (2006-2015). 
6.7.1 Strategy Disclosure in the Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry 
Table 6.18 reveals that the lowest level of Strategy disclosure for Gas, Water and Multi-
utilities before the corporate governance and mandatory requirement was 73% (National 
Grid in 2006). However, the lowest level of Strategy disclosure for Gas, Water and Multi-
utilities after the corporate governance and mandatory requirement was 64% (United 
Utilities in 2013) and the highest level of 91%. This finding appears to suggest that the 
disclosure practice of Strategy in this industry before the requirement for disclosure was 
not necessarily poor. Further, the finding however shows an element of irregularity in the 
disclosure level of Strategy and BM even after the regulations. In such a case, it appears 
that a better description and specification of Strategy-components might help improve its 
disclosure.  
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Table 6.19 GWM Strategy Disclosure Level 
Year Centrica United Utilities national Grid Pennon Severn Trent 
2006 91 82 73 82 82 
2007 82 82 73 91 91 
2008 82 73 73 91 82 
2009 73 82 82 91 91 
2010 82 82 82 91 82 
2011 82 82 82 91 82 
2012 82 82 73 91 91 
2013 82 64 82 91 91 
2014 82 82 73 91 91 
2015 82 82 82 91 82 
 
 
6.7.2 BM Disclosure in the Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry 
Centrica PLC and National Grid record the highest level of BM disclosure (91%), with 
Centrica having a consistent level of disclosure between 2009 and 2014 and National 
Grid between 2010 and 2014. On the other hand, Severn Trent had the lowest level of 
BM disclosure in 2008 (36%). It is however interesting that the lowest disclosure level in 
this industry after 2010 when the corporate governance requirement was introduced is 
55%, while the lowest BM disclosure level after the mandatory disclosure requirement is 
64%.  
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Table 6.20 GWM BM Disclosure Level 
Year Centrica United Utilities national Grid Pennon Severn Trent 
2006 55 73 55 64 45 
2007 73 64 64 64 55 
2008 73 64 64 64 36 
2009 82 55 64 64 64 
2010 82 55 82 64 55 
2011 82 64 55 55 55 
2012 82 73 73 64 73 
2013 82 64 73 64 73 
2014 82 64 82 64 73 
2015 64 91 91 64 82 
 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
The findings in this chapter appear to be consistent with the literature that suggests 
that Strategy and BM are complements and not substitutes. Also, it shows that clarity of 
Strategy impacts on a consistent and relatively high level of Strategy and BM disclosure. 
Further, the finding shows that the introduction of the corporate governance requirement 
for the disclosure of Strategy and BM, the subsequent mandatory requirement for such 
disclosure, and the relative increase and consistency in disclosure is in line with the 
suggestion of agency theory that information asymmetry could be reduced by the 
intervention of institutions, such as the regulatory institution (see Armstrong et al., 2010). 
However, it seems that there still remains an element of irregularity in the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM. A better description and specification of both Strategy and BM in the 
FRC guidance might help to improve the disclosure of these terms and enhance 
investment decisions and corporate evaluations. 3 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Graphical representation of the results is available in the appendix.  
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CHAPTER 7 THE EXTENT OF STATEGY AND BM DISCLOSURE 
IN ANNUAL REPORTS 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter seeks to address the second objective of this study. It assesses the extent 
of Strategy and BM disclosure. Also, it examines whether disclosure has been affected by 
regulation. To do so, a mean and median differences test is used. One would expect that 
the level of information would increase in the mandatory disclosure period so that the 
purpose of regulation, such as reduction of information asymmetries, could be met. 
Hence, this chapter further explores the first question in the accounting narrative research 
framework (Beattie, 2014). However, the focus is on the content of disclosure each year 
both during the periods of voluntary disclosure and after the regulations, rather than on 
the pattern of disclosure for the period under investigation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section examines the extent of Strategy 
and BM disclosure in the annual reports. This section would not compare the disclosure 
among industries. It focuses on using descriptive statistics to explain how companies 
disclose the items included in the disclosure index during the mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure domain. Thereafter, the chapter investigates the significance of regulation on 
the disclosure practice of Strategy and BM. Followed by an exploration of ‘what is 
reported’ and ‘what should be reported’, showing results for both before and after the 
mandatory requirement. The last section gives a summary of the chapter. 
7.2 Extent of Disclosure 
This section examines how companies voluntarily disclosed their Strategy and BM in 
the annual reports between 2006 and 2012 and mandatorily but with discretion of content 
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between 2013 and 2015. 
7.2.1 Extent of Strategy Disclosure during Voluntary Period 
Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics for voluntary Strategy disclosure by the three 
industries included in this study. It shows that on average, companies in the Gas, Water 
and Multi-utilities sector voluntarily disclosed about 83% of the disclosure index. The 
lowest disclosure for the GWM sector is seventy three percent, and the maximum 
voluntary disclosure is 91%. The banks on the other hand on average, voluntarily 
disclosed about eighty one percent of Strategy information, with the maximum voluntary 
disclosure being one hundred percent, and the minimum voluntary disclosure being 36%. 
Companies in the food and drug sector had an average voluntary disclosure of 71%, a 
maximum disclosure of ninety one percent, and a minimum disclosure of 27%. It is 
relatively likely that the variability in the disclosure of Strategy might affect 
comparability, such that investors might not be able to compare the performance of 
companies in the same industry or other industries. However, it can be seen that there is 
no firm with zero disclosure index in the voluntary period. The above average disclosure 
level in annual reports is consistent with the findings of Santema et al., (2005) who found 
that companies in the UK were disclosing information about their Strategy compared to 
four other European companies. 
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Table 7.1 Strategy Disclosures during Voluntary Period 
  Strategy GWM Banking 
Strategy 
Food Strategy 
N Valid 35 35 28 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 83.03 80.91 70.64 
Median 82 82 73 
Minimum 73 36 27 
Maximum 91 100 91 
Percentiles 25 82 73 64 
50 82 82 73 
75 91 91 82 
 
7.2.2 Extent of Strategy Disclosure during Mandatory Period 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 7.2 shows that on average, following the 
mandatory requirement to disclose Strategy in annual reports, companies in the Gas, 
Water and Multi-utilities sector on average disclosed 83% of Strategy information 
mandatorily, with a maximum mandatory Strategy disclosure of 91%, and a minimum 
mandatory Strategy disclosure of 64%. Banks disclosed relatively 82% of their Strategy 
in the annual reports, the maximum Strategy disclosure is relatively100% and the 
minimum is 82%. However, companies in the food and drug retailers sector on an 
average had a mandatory Strategy disclosure of 81%, a maximum disclosure of 91% and 
a minimum disclosure of 64%. 
This result in Table 7.1 shows that all companies disclosed at least above 50% of the 
items included in the checklist. Among the 14 companies, the lowest score is 64% while 
the maximum is at 100%. The present results appear to suggest that managers are aware 
of the need to disclose more information about their Strategy in their annual reports. 
However, the need for a full disclosure of the items to be disclosed is important. This 
would enhance comparability and aid decision making for investors. This result seems to 
suggests that there is need for regulators to increase the clarity of what firms are expected 
to disclose as Strategy and BM to enhance comparability and aid decision making for 
investors. 
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Table 7.2 Strategy Disclosure during Mandatory Period 
  GWM Strategy Banking Strategy Food Strategy 
N Valid 15 15 12 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 83.2 87.4 81.25 
Median 82 91 82 
Minimum 64 82 64 
Maximum 91 100 91 
Percentiles 25 82 82 82 
50 82 91 82 
75 91 91 82 
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7.2.3 Extent of BM Disclosure during Voluntary Period 
Table 7.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the voluntary disclosure of BM. It shows 
that on average, companies in the GWM had the same disclosure pattern as the banking 
sector. Banks voluntarily disclosed 65% of their BM, with the maximum voluntary 
disclosure being 82% and the minimum being 36%. However, on average companies in 
food and drug retailers sector voluntarily disclosed 55% of information on their BM, with 
a maximum of 73% and a minimum disclosure of 36%. This result shows some level of 
dispersion in the voluntary disclosure of BM in the annual report of companies included 
in this study. The lowest disclosure index score is 36% while the highest is 82%. As 
opined by Bini et al, (2016) BM descriptions are not always clearly distinguishable from 
other strategic components; managers might disclose some elements of BM with or 
without the aim of showing how these elements interact to enhance the value creation 
process, thus not necessarily reducing information asymmetry.  
Table 7.3 BM Disclosure during Voluntary Period 
 
  GWM BMD Banking BMD Food 
BMD 
N Valid 35 35 28 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 64.46 64.6 55.25 
Median 64 64 59.5 
Minimum 36 36 36 
Maximum 82 82 73 
Percentiles 25 55 55 45 
50 64 64 59.5 
75 73 73 64 
 
Table 7.4 shows the descriptive statistics for mandatory BM disclosure. It shows that 
on average, companies in GWM sector disclose seventy four percent of their BM 
information on average, with a maximum disclosure of 91% and a minimum disclosure of 
64%. Banks disclose 76% of their BM information in the annual report, with a maximum 
disclosure of 91% and a minimum disclosure of 55%. However, companies in the Food 
and Drugs industry disclose sixty three percent of their BM information on average, with 
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a maximum disclosure of eighty two percent and a minimum disclosure of 45%. This 
result shows a level of variability in the disclosure of BM among companies. The lowest 
disclosure index score is 45% while the highest is 91%. The present result appears to 
suggest that there is need for more regulation on the disclosure content of BM. 
 
Table 7.4 BM Disclosure during the Mandatory Period 
 
  GWM 
BMD 
Banking BMD Food BMD 
N Valid 15 15 12 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 74.2 76 63.08 
Median 73 73 64 
Minimum 64 55 45 
Maximum 91 91 82 
Percentiles 25 64 64 55 
50 73 73 64 
75 82 91 73 
 
7.3 The extent of the Influence of Regulation on Disclosure 
As anticipated, it is expected that the introduction of a regulation would increase the 
level of information under the mandatory domain, so that the purpose of regulation, such 
as the reduction of information asymmetry could be achieved. This section assesses the 
significance of the change in disclosure between voluntary and mandatory domain. It 
examines if the mean of resilience during the voluntary period is significantly different to 
the mean of resilience at the mandatory period, considering both the corporate 
governance requirement and the mandatory requirement. 
7.3.1 The extent of the influence of Corporate Governance on Strategy and BM 
Disclosure 
As discussed earlier in (see chapter 3.4), it is evidenced in the literature that corporate 
governance mechanisms are significant in explaining voluntary disclosure of information 
from agency theory perspectives (see Healy and Palepu, 2001). Hence, this study 
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anticipates a higher level of Strategy and BM disclosure after the corporate governance 
requirement. 
H10: The Strategy and BM pre-corporate governance requirement and the post 
resilience means are not equal. 
To test the alternative hypothesis that the Strategy pre-corporate governance requirement 
(M = 82.8, 78.68, and 67) and post resilience means (M = 83.8, 86.5 and 79.75), and the 
BM pre-corporate governance requirement (M = 63.20, 62.36 and 53.65) and post 
resilience means (M = 67.2, 70.2 and 59.25) are not equal, a dependent samples t-test 
was performed.  
The null hypothesis of equal resilience means was accepted for the disclosure of Strategy 
in both GWM and banking industry (t (33) = -0.47, p = 0.64); t (31.82) = -1.94, p = 
0.06). This appears to suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
disclosure of Strategy for companies in the GWM and the banking industry between the 
periods before and after the corporate governance requirement. However, finding shows 
that there is a significant difference in the disclosure of Strategy in the annual reports of 
companies in the food and drugs’ retailers industry between the voluntary period and 
after the corporate governance requirement.  
On the other hand, the null hypothesis of equal mean resilience is accepted for all the 
three industries included in this study. This result suggests that the post-corporate 
governance requirement disclosure of BM by all industries included in this study was not 
significantly higher than the pre-corporate governance requirement disclosure. 
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Table 7.5 Significance of corporate Governance requirement on Strategy & BM 
disclosures 
  Pre-mean Post mean t df 
GWM 
Strategy 82.72 83.80 -0.47 33 
BM 63.20 67.6 -1.09 33 
  
Bank 
Strategy 78.68 86.50 -1.94 31.82 
BM 62.36 70.20 -1.53 33 
  
Food 
Strategy 67 79.75 -3.04*** 25.95 
BM 53.65 59.25 -1.10 26 
                  Note: * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.  
7.3.2 The extent of the influence of mandatory requirement on disclosure 
H11: The Strategy and BM pre-mandatory requirement and the post resilience means 
are not equal. 
To test the alternative hypothesis that the Strategy and BM pre-mandatory requirement 
(M = 83.03, 80.91, and 70.64) (M = 64.5, 64.6, and 55.25) and the post resilience means 
(M = 83.2, 87.4, and 81.25) (74.2, 76, and 63.08) were not equal, a dependent samples t-
test was performed. The null hypothesis of equal resilience means was accepted for 
GWM Strategy disclosure i.e., t (48) = 0.09, p = 0.93. This finding suggests that there is 
no statistically significant difference between the disclosure of Strategy before and after 
the mandatory requirement. However, finding shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the disclosure of Strategy before and after the mandatory regulation 
for the other two industries – Banking and the Food and drugs retailers’ industry. Thus, 
the null hypothesis of equal resilience means is rejected t (47.8) = -2.26, p = 0.03); t 
(37.3) = -1.90, p = 0.00. 
On the other hand, the null hypothesis of equal resilience means was rejected for both 
GWM and Bank BM disclosure t (48) = -2.97, p = 0.01; t (48) = 2.72, p = 0.01. This 
finding suggests that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
discretionary disclosure of BM in the annual reports of banks and companies in the 
GWM industry in periods before and after the mandatory regulation. Meanwhile, finding 
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suggests that the discretionary information disclosed about BM in the Food and retailers’ 
industry before the mandatory requirement did not significantly statistically change after 
the introduction of the regulation. Thus, the null hypothesis of equal resilience means is 
accepted.  
Table 7.6 Significance of mandatory regulation on Strategy and BM disclosures 
  Pre-mean Post mean T df 
GWM 
Strategy 83.03 83.2 -0.09 48 
BM 64.46 74.2 -2.97*** 48 
  
Bank 
Strategy 80.91 87.40 -2.36** 47.8 
BM 64.60 76 -2.72*** 48 
  
Food 
Strategy 70.64 81.25 -3.05*** 37.3 
BM 55.25 63.08 -1.90 38 
Note: ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level.  
 
7.4 Disclosure Items 
This section attempts to answer the second question about what items of Strategy and 
BM are most disclosed in the annual reports Tables 7.7-7.9 relates to Strategy disclosure 
items during the voluntary and mandatory periods, while Tables 7.10 – 7.13 relates to 
BM disclosure items during the voluntary and mandatory periods. 
7.4.1 Strategy Disclosure Items 
Table 7.7 shows that disclosure of Strategy components included in the annual reports 
of banks has improved in the mandatory disclosure period, compared to the voluntary 
disclosure period. In the voluntary disclosure period, five disclosure items were the most 
disclosed, i.e., with full disclosure (these includes portfolio of businesses, threats, 
challenge mitigation, progress against strategic priorities and customer segments). 
However, during the mandatory period, eight items of disclosure are the most disclosed 
(these includes portfolio of businesses, threats, challenge mitigation, progress against 
strategic priorities, customer segments, opportunities, corporate Strategy and strategic 
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priorities). The finding shows that weakness is the least disclosed item both during the 
voluntary and mandatory period (14% and 13% respectively). This might indicate that 
banks place more emphasis on the disclosure of challenges and threats caused by external 
factors, and less emphasis on weaknesses due to inadequate internal operations. This 
finding provides some early evidence that the assumption of both signalling and agency 
theory based on the concept of achieving personal interest while avoiding penalty and 
seeking improved benefits (Li, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.7 Strategy Disclosure Items in the Banking Industry 
 Pre-reg  Post-reg  
Strategy Disclosure Items Pre-reg % of 
D 
Rank No of D % of D Rank 
 Banking     
Strategic priorities/focus 31 89 6 15 100 1 
Corporate Strategy 29 83 7 15 100 1 
Business unit Strategy 23 66 9 10 67 10 
Portfolio of businesses/business activities 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Strength/competitive uniqueness 24 69 8 13 87 9 
Weakness 5 14 11 2 13 11 
Opportunities 23 66 9 15 100 1 
Threats/challenges/risks 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Challenge mitigants/Risk management 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Progress against strategic priorities 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Customer segments/customer types 35 100 1 15 100 1 
       
Note out of: 35   15   
Pre-reg: 2006-2012; Post-reg: 2013-2015       
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Table 7.8 shows that there was full disclosure of six items in the annual reports of 
companies in the GWM sector during the voluntary period (these includes portfolio of 
businesses, opportunities, threats, challenge mitigation, progress against strategic 
priorities and customer segments). Conversely, during the mandatory period, findings 
show that there is an addition to the six full disclosure items during the voluntary period, 
which is strength. The disclosure of strength had improved from 74% disclosure to 100%. 
The next most disclosed item both during the voluntary and mandatory period is strategic 
priority. Similar to the banking industry, table 7.8 shows that weakness is the least 
disclosed item in gas, water and multi-utilities sector. This might suggest that managers 
place more emphasis on the disclosure of challenges and threats caused by external 
factors, and less emphasis on weaknesses due to inadequate internal operations. This 
finding confirms the assumption of both signalling and agency theory based on the 
concept of achieving personal interest while avoiding penalty and seeking improved 
benefits (See Li, 2006). 
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Table 7.8 Strategy Disclosure Items in the Gas, Water & Multi-utilities Sector 
Strategy Disclosure Items Pre-reg  Post-reg  
 No of D % of D Rank No of D % of D Rank 
 GWM   GWM   
Strategic priorities/focus 34 97 7 14 93 8 
Corporate Strategy 28 80 8 9 60 9 
Business unit Strategy 20 57 10 8 53 10 
Portfolio of businesses/business activities 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Strength/competitive uniqueness 26 74 9 15 100 1 
Weakness 2 6 11 0 0 11 
Opportunities 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Threats/challenges/risks 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Challenge mitigants / Risk management 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Progress against strategic priorities 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Customer segments/customer types 35 100 1 15 100 1 
       
Note out of: 35   15   
Pre-reg: 2006-2012; Post-reg: 2013-2015       
GWM: Gas, Water & Multi-utilities       
 
Table 7.9 shows that only two disclosure items (portfolio of businesses and customer 
segments) had full disclosure during the voluntary period in the food and drug retailers 
sector. On the other hand, the number of full disclosure items had increased to six items 
during the mandatory period (these include: strategic focus, opportunities, threats, risk 
management, progress against strategic priorities and customer segments). Additionally, 
it is worthy of note to highlight the level of disclosure of business unit Strategy in this 
industry as Table 7.9 shows that this item is the least disclosed item both during the 
voluntary and mandatory period. This might mean that companies in this industry are not 
well diversified or it is a practice that the Strategy for each business unit is either not 
explicit or not disclosed. However, the second least disclosed item is weakness and as 
discussed earlier in tables 7.7 and 7.8, it could indicate that managers place more 
emphasis on the disclosure of challenges and threats caused by external factors, and less 
emphasis on weaknesses due to inadequate internal operations. 
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Table 7.9 Strategy Disclosure Items in the Food and Drug Retailers Sector 
Strategy Disclosure Items Pre-reg  Post-regulation  
 No of D % of 
D 
Rank No of D % of D Rank 
 Food & Drug  Food & Drug  
Strategic priorities/focus 22 79 7 12 100 1 
Corporate Strategy 21 75 8 11 92 7 
Business unit Strategy 1 4 11 0 0 11 
Portfolio of businesses/business activities 28 100 1 11 92 7 
Strength/competitive uniqueness 24 86 3 11 92 7 
Weakness 2 7 10 2 17 10 
Opportunities 24 86 3 12 100 1 
Threats/challenges/risks 24 86 3 12 100 1 
Challenge mitigants/Risk management 18 64 9 12 100 1 
Progress against strategic priorities 24 86 3 12 100 1 
Customer segments/customer types 28 100 1 12 100 1 
Note out of: 28   12   
Pre-reg: 2006-2012; Post-reg: 2013-2015       
7.4.2 BM Disclosure Items 
Table 7.10 shows that the four most voluntarily disclosed BM items are value creation, 
relationships (both having full disclosure), distribution and resources; while value chain 
and value capture were the least disclosed items. The findings show an improved 
disclosure of BM with the discussion of value creation, expertise, distribution, resources 
and relationships having full disclosure. The improved disclosure might be as a result of 
the mandatory requirement. The discussion for the justification has improved from 54 
percent to 80 percent, key success factor from 69 percent to 80 percent, and value capture 
from 6 percent to 53 percent. On the contrary, the disclosure of investment criteria has 
not improved. Thus, it appears that the discussion of some BM disclosure items (value 
capture, investment criteria, entity structure and value chain) still needs to be improved 
upon in order to improve the illustrations among the interactions of BM components, 
which would help to enhance the understanding of how these components relate in a 
company’s value creation process (Bini et al., 2016). 
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Table 7.10 BM Disclosure Items for the Banking Sector 
 Pre-reg   Post-
reg 
  
BM Disclosure Items No of D % of 
D 
Rank No of 
D 
% of 
D 
Rank 
 Banking      
Value creation 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Value capture 2 6 10 8 53 9 
Key success factor(s) 24 69 6 12 80 6 
Expertise/Competence 30 86 5 15 100 1 
Investment criteria 24 69 6 10 67 8 
Entity structure 13 37 9 8 53 9 
Value chain 1 3 11 4 27 11 
Distribution 34 97 3 15 100 1 
Resources 32 91 4 15 100 1 
Relationships 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Justification for business activity 19 54 8 12 80 6 
Note: out of; 35   15   
Pre-reg: pre-regulation 2006-2012; Post-regulation: 2013-2015       
 
Table 7.11 shows that companies in Gas, Water and Multi-utilities sector had full 
voluntary disclosure of four BM items. These include; value creation, distribution, 
resources, and relationships. The least voluntarily disclosed BM item is investment 
criteria (value creation framework). However, Table 7.11 indicates that the items that 
were voluntarily fully disclosed are still the only items fully disclosed under the 
mandatory period. It also shows that the least disclosed BM item is investment criteria. 
This might mean that although the style of presentation of BM has changed during the 
mandatory period, with the addition of more picture and colures, and a BM section, the 
content has not necessarily changed in this sector. An exception is the disclosure of 
justification for business activities (44% increase) and value chain (30% increase). 
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 Table 7.11 BM Disclosure Items for the GWM Sector 
 Pre-reg   Post-
reg 
  
BM Disclosure Items No of D % of 
D 
Rank No of 
D 
% of 
D 
Rank 
 GWM      
Value creation 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Value capture 10 29 9 5 33 9 
Key success factor(s) 25 71 6 14 93 5 
Expertise/Competence 29 83 5 13 87 6 
Investment criteria 3 9 11 1 7 11 
Entity structure 9 26 10 4 27 10 
Value chain 15 43 7 11 73 8 
Distribution 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Resources 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Relationships 35 100 1 15 100 1 
Justification for business activity 15 43 7 13 87 6 
Note: out of; 35   15   
Pre-reg: pre-regulation 2006-2012; Post-regulation: 2013-2015       
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Table 7.12 shows that companies in the Food & Drug Sector had a full voluntary 
disclosure of four items. It shows that the discussion of relationships, value creation, 
distribution and resources were the four most disclosed items. However, the discussion of 
value capture and entity structure is the least voluntarily disclosed BM items. Although, 
the discussion of expertise has improved by 29 percent, while the discussion of 
justification for business activities has increased by 28 percent. It appears that there is no 
significant change in the content of disclosure after it became mandatory to disclose BM 
in the annual reports. As highlighted in the findings of the GWM, this might mean that 
although the style of presentation of BM has changed during the mandatory period, with 
the addition of more picture and colures, the content has not necessarily changed in this 
sector. Nonetheless, it might mean that there is need for more clarity from regulators of 
what the term ‘BM’ means. 
Table 7.12 BM Disclosure Items for the Food & Drug Retailers’ Sector 
 Pre-reg   Post-reg   
BM Disclosure Items No of D % of D Rank TtZA12Z % of 
D 
Rank 
 Food & 
Drug 
     
Value creation 28 100 1 11 92 5 
Value capture 0 0 11 0 0 11 
Key success factor(s) 19 68 7 9 75 6 
Expertise/Competence 20 71 6 12 100 1 
Investment criteria 3 11 9 3 25 8 
Entity structure 0 0 11 1 8 10 
Value chain 3 11 9 3 25 8 
Distribution 28 100 1 12 100 1 
Resources 28 100 1 12 100 1 
Relationships 28 100 1 12 100 1 
Justification for business activity 11 39 8 8 67 7 
Note out of: 28   12   
Pre-reg: pre-regulation 2006-2012; Post-regulation: 2013-
2015 
      
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The t-test result shows that there is no statistically significant difference between 
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BM disclosure during the voluntary and after the corporate governance requirement. 
Thus, companies did not necessarily disclose more BM information after the corporate 
governance requirement. However, there is a significant difference between Strategy 
disclosure during voluntary and after the corporate governance requirement for only one 
of the three industries included in this study. On the other hand, finding shows that there 
is a statistically significant difference in the disclosure of Strategy after the mandatory 
regulation for two of the three industries - banking and food and drugs retailers’ industry. 
Furthermore, finding reveals that after the mandatory regulation, there is a statistically 
significant difference in the disclosure of BM in the GWM and banking industry.  
Further, Table 7.5-7.7 (Strategy disclosure items) shows that the disclosure of Strategy 
before the regulations was above average as most of the disclosure items were above 
average except for the disclosure of weakness which was relatively low, even in the post 
regulation period. The finding regarding the level of disclosure being above average is 
consistent with prior studies (Santema et al., 2005). In addition, the low disclosure of 
weaknesses is consistent with the argument of Warner (2004) that “the vast majority of 
chief executives are prone to gild the lily when talking or writing about the businesses 
under their stewardship. Only when they first take control and have a vested interest in 
talking up the extent of the problems in their inheritance do they have any incentive to 
adopt a downbeat tone”. The current researcher opines that managers withhold 
information about weaknesses to maintain its position of relative power and avoid 
adverse publicity. 
For BM disclosure items, the most voluntarily disclosed items are Value creation, 
relationships, distribution, and resources, while the least disclosed item is investment 
criteria for banks and GWM, and value capture and entity structure for food and drug 
retailers sector. Further, finding shows that the mandatory requirement seems not to have 
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really impacted on the disclosure content of BM components particularly in the GWM 
sector (Table 7.9). This might be due to a lack of specification of the components of BM 
in the FRC guidance report. To improve illustrations among the components of BM and 
enhance the informativeness of BM information, the ‘BM story’ should include the 
discussion of investment criteria (value creation framework), value capture, entity 
structure and value chain.
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CHAPTER 8 THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY AND BM 
DISCLOSURE 
8.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter aims to examine other possible determinants of Strategy and BM 
disclosure apart from regulation as examined in the previous chapter. It attempts to 
address the last empirical objective, with the aim of investigating other potential factors 
that could also influence the disclosure of Strategy and BM. Hence; 
(a) What are the determinants of Strategy disclosure? 
(b) What are the determinants of BM disclosure? 
These determinants are assumed to help reduce information asymmetry (see Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Coebergh, 2011). As discussed earlier, (under hypothesis development) 
regulation on its own is not sufficient to mitigate the agency problem or the problem of 
information asymmetry. It is suggested that other factors, otherwise known as incentives 
could explain the discretionary disclosure of Strategy and BM.  
To answer the research questions above, these hypotheses apply: 
1. H1. Leverage is associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
2. H2. Loss is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
3. H3. Financial distress is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and 
BM. 
4. H4. Analyst following is positively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and 
BM.  
5. H5. Listing age is negatively associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM.  
6. H6. Compensation is associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
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7. H7. Higher proportion of independent directors on the boards is associated with 
the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
8. H8. Board size is associated with the disclosure of Strategy and BM. 
9. H9. The number of board meetings is associated with the disclosure of Strategy 
and BM. 
8.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 8.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables as part of the model 
examined, covering both dependent and independent variables. As the results in Table 8.1 
show, Strategy and BM was disclosed during the period under investigation (2006-2015) 
with varying levels of information. As discussed earlier, the maximum Strategy 
disclosure score found was relatively 100%, while the minimum was 27%. The mean of 
Strategy disclosure of 80% for the entire sample indicates a relatively high level of 
Strategy disclosure.  
In terms of BM disclosure, the maximum disclosure score was 91%, while the 
minimum was 36%. The mean of BM disclosure, 65% for the entire sample over the 
period covered indicates a relatively above average level of BM disclosure. This finding 
may be attributable to the presence of market regulations with regard to the dissemination 
of information about company’s Strategy and BM (Healy and Palepu, 2001). However, it 
is quite expedient that more public or financial intermediaries’ scrutiny is needed to 
ensure consistency and improve the disclosure of Strategy and BM in annual reports (see 
Bukh, 2003; Bini et al., 2016). An important question for investors and regulators is 
‘about what specific items of information do firms choose to omit or avoid disclosing’. 
Therefore, the UK regulatory bodies are recommended to pay more attention to this 
matter by enacting further regulations in order to improve transparency of the market.  
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The summary statistics also revealed that the mean score of the profitability ratio 
(ROA) was 7.4% with a maximum of 64.95% and a minimum of -75.15%, indicating that 
most of the companies included in the final sample were rarely being profitable. 
Moreover, it is also observed that the average percentage of leverage (debt ratio) was 
10.79%, ranging between 0.41 and 74.53%. In addition, the mean of Altman Z-score was 
1.31% with a maximum of -0.96 and a minimum of 3.74%, indicating that most of the 
companies included in the sample were not safe from bankruptcy.  
Further, the mean of annual incentive scheme was £59 with variation in the variable 
ranging from 0 to £9000. The mean of total pay was £2704, with a maximum of £11544 
and a minimum of £290. Additionally, the mean of board size is 12 with a maximum 
number of 21 and a minimum of 7. Also, the mean of firm age is 35 years, ranging from 9 
years to 70 years. The mean of analysts following is 15, with a maximum of 34 and a 
minimum of 1. There was considerable variation in these variables within the sample. 
Consequently, the natural logarithm for the variables was incorporated in the regression 
analysis to control for the wide dispersion in the variables, as reflected by their minimum 
and maximum. The average firm size in terms of total assets was 11.2 billion pounds.   
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Table 8.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variables Mean Minimu
m 
Maximum Median 
Strategy Disclosure Index 80.36% 27% 100% 82 
BM D I 64.81% 36% 91% 64 
Return on Assets 7.4 -75.15 64.95 5.6 
Annual incentive (log) 
(£27000-£9000000) 
5.36 0 9.1 6.34 
Listing age (log) 3.4 2.2 4.25 3.46 
LgSize 11.2 8 14.69 10.7 
Leverage 10.79 0.41 74.53 4.5 
Altman 1.31 -0.96 3.74 0.97 
% ind. Directors (log) 60.3 0 86.7 62.5 
Board Size (log) 2.4 1.95 3.04 2.4 
Analysts following (log) 2.45 0 3.53 2.71 
No of board meeting 9.65 5 28 9 
Total Pay (log) 
(£290000-£11544000) 
7.57 5.67 9.35 7.53 
DLOSS 0.12 0 1 0.000 
8.3 Correlation Analysis 
Table 8.2 presents the correlation analysis between Strategy disclosure index (SDI), 
BM disclosure index (BMDI) and independent variables. It shows that firms with a 
higher proportion of independent directors on boards and large number of analyst 
following are more likely to provide higher levels of Strategy discretionary disclosures. It 
shows that SDI is positively correlated with BIND (r 0.183) and ANALFOL (r 0.397) at 
5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
It also shows that SDI is negatively correlated with ROA (r -0.251) and Altman (r -
0.392) and these correlations are statistically significant at the level of 1%. This finding 
suggests that firms with higher profitability less distressed firms are more likely to 
provide less discretionary information about their Strategy, thereby, hypothesis H4 is 
supported. Further, the univariate analysis supports hypothesis H4 that analysts following 
is positively correlated with the level of Strategy disclosure. Further, finding shows that 
the proportion of independent directors on boards is positively associated with Strategy 
disclosure. 
Meanwhile, BM disclosure index (BMDI) is positively correlated with total CEO’s 
pay (PAY, r 0.400), analyst following (ANALFOL, r 0.274) and the proportion of 
independent directors on board (BIND, r 0.293) at 1% level of significance. Hence, this 
univariate analysis supports H1, H5 and H7 that compensation in terms of total CEO’s 
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pay, analyst following and the proportion of independent directors on the boards are 
positively correlated with the level of BM disclosure in annual reports. On the other hand, 
Altman (r -0.292 @ 1% level), listing age (r -0.195 @ 5%) and ROA (r -0.170 @ 5%) are 
negatively correlated with BM disclosure. This analysis also supports H11 and H6, 
however, rejects hypothesis H4. Hence, less distressed firms, older firms, and firms that 
have higher profitability are less likely to communicate discretionary information about 
their BM in the annual reports.  
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Table 8.2 Correlation 
SDI 1              
BMDI 0.541
** 
1             
Size -0.42 0.14 1            
ROA -
0.251
** 
-
0.17* 
-
0.021 
1           
Lev 0.02 0.032 0.647
** 
-0.15 1          
Altma
n 
-
0.392
** 
-
0.292
** 
-
0.456
** 
0.336
** 
-
0.618
** 
1         
AIS 0.014 0.056 -
0.227
** 
0.164 -0.16 0.08 1        
Pay 0.171 0.4** 0.471
** 
-
0.023 
0.352
** 
-
0.394
** 
0.332 1       
Age -
0.127 
-
0.195
* 
0.308
** 
0.074 0.162 0.129 -
0.309
** 
0.138 1      
Bsize 0.102 0.246
** 
0.611
** 
0.068 0.57*
* 
-
0.572
** 
0.081 0.652
** 
0.033 1     
BIND 0.183
* 
0.293
** 
0.328
** 
-
0.063 
0.315
** 
-
0.326
** 
-
0.129 
0.351
** 
-
0.235
** 
0.314
** 
1    
BME
ET 
0.1 0.075 0.077 -
0.218
* 
0.078 -
0.108 
-
0.184
** 
-0.05 -
0.036 
-0.1 -
0.19
8* 
1   
Analf
ol 
0.397
** 
0.274
** 
0.296
** 
-
0.179
* 
-
0.253
** 
-
0.037 
0.291
** 
0.182
* 
-
0.467
* 
-
0.081 
0.19
6* 
0.23
7 
1  
DLOS
S 
0.1 0.033 0.232
** 
-
0.525 
0.225
** 
-
0.171
* 
-
0.487
* 
0.043 0.125 -
0.095 
0.14 0.19
5 
0.1
05 
1 
Pearson Correlation Matrix. * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level. 
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8.4 Regression Results 
This section presents and discusses the finding of the regression analysis. 
8.4.1 Determinants of Strategy Disclosure in Annual Reports 
The result of the regression estimates for model 1-4 in Table 8.3 shows the 
relationship between Strategy disclosure index and the proxy variables that could explain 
the disclosure of Strategy. The overall model is significant at P<0.01 and explains 35% of 
the variation in Strategy disclosure level in the annual reports of companies investigated 
in this study. Table 8.3 shows the regression results for the three categories of incentives 
that could drive the disclosure of Strategy in annual reports, showing results for both 
separately and together.  
8.4.1.1 Contractual Incentives and the Disclosure of Strategy in Annual Reports 
For contractual incentives, finding shows that the coefficient estimate on Altman is 
negative and statistically significant at 10% level. Thus, hypothesis H3 is accepted. This 
finding suggests that less distressed firms disclose more information about their Strategy. 
This finding is consistent with the conclusion of (Ingram and Dugan, 1990). It is also 
consistent with the argument of signalling theory that managers of ‘higher quality or 
healthier firms’ will often attempt to distinguish themselves from less healthy firms by 
disclosing information that reduces the occurrence of adverse selection (Valera, 2017).  
Additionally, Table 8.3 shows that leverage has a negative coefficient that is 
significant in the contractual incentive model at 0.10 level, relatively indicating that 
managers in more highly levered companies are less likely to disclose information about 
their Strategy. This finding is consistent with the results of Meek et al. (1995) for seven 
studies in the UK and Coebergh (2011) who found a negative but insignificant 
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association between leverage and Strategy disclosure in the Netherlands. Although, 
agency theory predicts that more highly levered firms disclose more discretionary 
information, hence, if this assumption is not represented in this finding, then possibly 
political costs or proprietary costs, rather than agency costs may better explain the 
discretionary disclosure of Strategy (Meek et al., 1995). Another explanation for the 
negative findings might be that companies provide private information to ‘powerful’ 
lenders privately and not in the annual reports (Meek et al., 1995). Zarzeski (1996).  
Furthermore, from the results it is observed that loss has a negative but insignificant 
association with the disclosure of Strategy. A possible explanation for the negative 
relationship between loss and Strategy disclosure is that managers have incentives to 
reveal less information that could help assess reasons for losses and to possibly avoid 
questioning, reduced compensation and / or redundancy (see Raffournier, 1995; 
Bloomfield, 2002). Additionally, from signalling theory perspective, because there is no 
quality (good performance) to signal as a result of the loss, it is most likely that the 
disclosure of strategy will reduce (Ross,1973).  
8.4.1.2 Market Incentives and the Disclosure of Strategy in Annual Reports 
For market incentives, finding shows that analyst following is positively associated 
with Strategy disclosure and statistically significant at 1% level. This result is also 
reported for the overall model and supports hypothesis H5. This indicates that firms with 
a higher number of analysts following disclose more information about their Strategy in 
the annual reports. Lang and Lundholm (1996) explains that analyst following is 
positively associated to disclosure quality and reduction of information asymmetry 
according to agency theory (see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010, Varela, 
2017).  
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Interestingly, the result shows that listing age has a positive but insignificant 
relationship with the disclosure of Strategy. This implies that the length of time a firm has 
been listed will relatively influence a higher level of the disclosure of Strategy (see 
Coebergh, 2011). A possible explanation from agency perspective is that managers of 
older firms will want to protect their reputation and justify higher compensation by 
disclosing more information and reducing agency costs (see Healy and Palepu). Another 
explanation from signalling theory is that managers of older firms might want to signal 
quality by disclosing more information about their Strategy (Watson et al., 2002).  
8.4.1.3 Corporate Governance Incentives and Strategy Disclosure in Annual Reports 
In the corporate governance model, finding shows that compensation as measured by 
total pay, has a negatively significant association at 10% level for the overall model. This 
finding is however interesting as it shows that the claim that Strategy is aligned with 
incentive might be true. Management often claims that remuneration is based on expertise 
and skills and aligned with Strategy. “Executive pay rightly continues to be high on the 
agenda of shareholders and other stakeholders. Shareholders need the comfort that the 
team running the business is being paid in a way that reflects the performance of the 
business. There is an alignment between Strategy and incentive plans. The structure of 
incentives is mostly designed to align with the delivery of short and long-term objectives 
set out in Strategy, which aligns with shareholder value creation (Morrison A.R, 
2014/2015; Sainsbury A.R. 2015/2016)”. This result appears to suggest that companies 
with effective corporate governance systems pay less compensation and disclose more 
strategy information (Thakor, 2014). This is consistent with agency theory (see Morris, 
1987). Surprisingly, there is limited research on the disclosure agency problem. 
Further, the result shows that board meeting has a positive but insignificant association 
with the disclosure of strategy. Although it appears that there is no previous empirical 
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evidence on disclosure agency problem and board meeting (active boards), a possible 
explanation for the positive relationship between board meeting and strategy disclosure 
from agency theory perspective could be that boards that meet frequently will have more 
time to discuss strategic issues, which will in turn influence the level of information 
disclosed about their strategy and reduce information asymmetry (see Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Another explanation from signalling perspective is that firms with active boards 
will want to signal quality (board diligence) by disclosing more information about their 
strategy (Morris, 1987; Vefeas, 1999).  
Interestingly, there is a mixed result on the relationship between board size and board 
independence. For board size, the overall model shows a positive relationship but a 
negative relationship when only the variables under corporate governance are considered.  
However, these relationships are not significant. A possible explanation for this mixed 
finding is that apart from the size of the board, other factors such as skills and available 
information etc., (see Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Abeysekera, 2010), loss, financial 
distress, leverage, analysts following and listing age could influence the level of strategy 
information disclosed despite the board size. Depending on the intended outcome such as 
protection of board reputation, reduction of information asymmetry – agency theory, or 
signalling quality.  
Additionally, for board independence, the overall model shows a negative relationship 
while the corporate governance model shows a positive relationship. A reason for the 
mixed results could be that shareholders and creditors acquire strategy information 
through other avenues (or privately), rather than through public disclosure.  
8.4.1.4 Control Variables and Strategy Disclosure 
For control variables, this study controlled for profitability and firm size as a 
determinant of Strategy disclosure based on previous studies on discretionary disclosures. 
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Finding shows that the coefficient estimates on ROA are mixed (positive and negative) 
and are not statistically significant in any of the Strategy disclosure models. This finding 
is consistent with the conclusion of Lang and Lundholm (1993) that the level of 
perceived information asymmetry between managers and investors influences the 
relationship between disclosure and profitability. The difference in the results could be 
that the  
Further, Table 8.3 shows that firm size is negatively associated with the level of 
Strategy disclosure. This finding is statistically significant at 1% level for models 1-3 and 
at 5% level for the overall model (model 4). The negative association implies that larger 
companies disclose significantly less Strategy information in their annual reports. 
Although, firm size has been found to be to be a significant influence in prior disclosure 
studies (e.g. Meek et al., 1995; Coebergh, 2011); The result appears to support the 
argument that larger firms are in a better position to “hide” proprietary information, i.e. 
profitable segments. Another possible explanation could be that the proportion of shares 
held by executive and independent directors influences the level of Strategy disclosure. It 
is expected that managerial ownership has a negative association with discretionary 
information (see Eng and Mak, 2003). Perhaps, future research could investigate the 
association between disclosure and the proportion of shares owned by directors. 
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Table 8.3 Regression results for Strategy disclosure 
  Contractual   Market incentives Corp. Gov   All   
Table 8.3 Regression result for the determinants of Strategy disclosure in annual reports    
Incentive Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Contractual:               
Altman -3.047* -1.72         -1.959 -0.94 
DLOSS -0.191 -0.06         -3.025 -0.71 
LEV -0.192* -1.8         -0.122 -1.19 
Market:                 
Age    2.729 0.91     3.439 1.09 
ANALFOL     3.717 2.69***     5.206 2.84*** 
Corp. Gov:                 
BSize        -0.812 -0.14 6.431 1.17 
BMEET        0.087 0.22 0.398 0.98 
BIND        0.062 0.47 -0.009 -0.07 
AIS        0.538 1.12 -0.128 -0.25 
PAY         -1.105 -3.94 -3.237 -1.71* 
Control Variables:               
ROA -0.039 -0.49 0.089 0.63 -0.05 -0.66 0.128 0.62 
Size -2.962 -3.09*** -3.834 -3.63*** -3.817 -3.94*** -2.974 -2.21** 
Industry dummy Included   Included   Included   Included 
Year dummy Included   Included   Included   Included 
Cons_ 132.805 9.99*** 97.216 5.33*** 144.347 5.82*** 87.681 3.472*** 
Adjusted R Square 0.31   0.36   0.27  0.35 
Observation/groups 140/3   140/3   140/3   140/3 
Note: * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% 
level. 
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8.4.2 Determinants of BM Disclosure in Annual Reports 
 
The result of the regression estimates for model 5-8 in Table 4 shows the relationship 
between BM disclosure and the proxy variables that could explain the disclosure of BM. 
The overall model is significant at P<0.01 and explains 31% of the variation in BM 
disclosure level in the annual reports of companies investigated in this study. 
Surprisingly, it appears that previous studies on the disclosure of BM did not investigate 
the determinants of such disclosure. 
8.4.2.1 Contractual Incentives and BM Disclosure 
The result for financial distress in model 1 (contractual incentive) shows a relative 
significantly positive coefficient at 10% level as measured by Z-score variable. Also, 
model 4 (overall model) shows a positive but insignificant association between current 
poor performance and Strategy disclosure. This finding indicates that less distressed firms 
tend to disclose less information about their BM in the annual reports. Thus, hypothesis 
H3 is rejected. This finding however is consistent with the conclusion of Miller (2002) 
and appears to suggest that the pressure of raising support from banks, suppliers, etc., 
might impose a greater demand for information about future prospects on companies 
facing financial distress. Also, as discussed earlier, another possible explanation is that 
investors and creditors of healthier firms acquire information about the company’s BM 
through other means other than the annual reports.  This is also consistent with the 
assumption of agency theory (Meek et al., 1995).  
Further, finding shows that the coefficient estimates on leverage is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level for both model 1 (contractual incentive) and 
model 4 (overall model). In other words, leverage is negatively associated and has a 
relatively low significance to the disclosure of BM. This implies that firms with higher 
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debts are less likely to disclose information about their BM. This finding is consistent 
with the results of Meek et al., (1995) and Camfferman and Cooke (2002) who found a 
negative but insignificant relationship between gearing and disclosure in the UK.  
In addition, result shows that loss has a mixed relationship with the disclosure of 
Strategy. The contractual incentive model shows a negative relationship, consistent with 
the hypothesis. This implies that firms disclose less BM information when there is a loss. 
While, the overall model shows a positive relationship, implying that firms disclose BM 
information when there is a loss. A possible explanation for this difference is the 
relationship of this proxy (loss) with other proxies in relation to BM disclosure.   
8.4.2.2 Market Incentives and BM Disclosure 
Finding shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between market 
incentive variables included in this study (listing age and Analfol) and BM disclosure. 
However, finding shows that listing age is negatively associated with the disclosure of 
BM. This means that younger companies disclose more BM information. A possible 
explanation for this is that younger companies need to boost investor confidence, give 
information necessary for valuation (see Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Also, younger firms 
could signal quality by disclosing more information about their BM (Morris, 1987). 
On the other hand, analysts following (Anafol) shows mixed results. A positive 
relationship is shown in model 2 (market incentives) and a negative relationship under the 
overall model. A likely reason could be that managers would disclose more or less 
information about their BM in the annual reports depending on the cost and benefit 
analysis of such disclosure. It also suggests that the disclosure of BM information in the 
annual reports is dependent on other incentives that can explain the disclosure or non-
disclosure of such information. 
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8.4.2.3 Corporate Governance Incentives and BM Disclosure 
Table 8.4 shows that there is a significantly positive association between CEO’s total 
pay and the disclosure of BM, significant at 1% and 5% level for both model 3 and model 
4 respectively. This finding implies that highly paid CEO’s are more likely to disclose 
information about their BM in the annual reports. This is consistent with the conclusion 
that shareholders link compensation with performance measures that are informative 
about managerial disclosure activity (see Nagar et al., 2003).  However, surprisingly, the 
results show that CEO’s annual incentive scheme has a negative relationship with the 
disclosure of BM. This implies that the lower the annual bonus, the higher the disclosure 
of BM. A possible explanation could be that because the annual bonus is linked to 
profitability, the CEO might want to signal quality even when target is not met (Nagar et 
al., 2003). It is also consistent with the literature linking quality management with BM 
framework (Beattie and Smith, 2013).  
Furthermore, finding shows that board size and board meeting are positively but 
insignificantly associated with the disclosure of BM. This suggests that boards with more 
members disclose more BM information and boards that meet more frequently 
communicate more BM information. A possible explanation for these results is that larger 
boards can help to overcome skill deficiencies (Abeysekera, 2010) and make better 
collective decisions (Dalton and Dalton, 2005).  
In addition, the result shows that board independence is negatively but insignificantly 
related to the disclosure of BM. The result is consistent with the finding of Eng and Mak 
(2003). This appears to suggest that outside directors play a substitute-monitoring role 
rather than a complementary role to disclosure. Another possible explanation is that 
shareholders and creditors are able to acquire BM information directly.  
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8.4.2.4 Control Variables and BM Disclosure 
In relation to control variables, findings indicate that firm size is negatively associated 
with the disclosure of BM (how value is created, value capture in terms of pricing, 
processes and delivery etc.) and significant at 1% level for models 1, 3 and 4 and 5% 
level for model 2. This result shows that larger firms do not necessarily disclose more 
information about their BM. The possible explanation for the negative association 
between firm size and the disclosure of BM might be because larger firms depend more 
on internal funds as a result of an established shareholder base, compared to smaller firms 
who might need to raise additional capital at the lowest cost. Also, considering that 
Strategy and BM discussions are valuable and proprietary information (Leung et al., 
2015, Coebergh, 2011) larger firms might be more reluctant to disclose the information 
about their Strategy and BM voluntarily.  
Profitability has a positive and only relatively significant in explaining the association 
between market incentives and BM disclosure (model 2). This result supports the notion 
of signalling theory and the results of some studies on CSR and social disclosure that 
managers of well performing firms want to disclose more information to signal their 
strength (Ahuja (1983) and Balabanis et al., 1998; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989).
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Table 8.4 : Regression result for the determinants of BM disclosure in annual reports 
  Contractual Market incentives Corp. Gov All   
Table 8.4 Regression result for the determinants of BM disclosure in annual reports   
Incentive Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Contractual:               
Altman 3.418 1.69*         3.773 1.48 
DLOSS -3.145 -0.83         0.613 0.12 
LEV -0.211 -1.73*         -0.221 -1.76* 
Market:                 
Age    -2.391 -0.61     -4.372 -1.1 
ANALFOL     1.631 0.9     -1.786 -0.8 
Corp. Gov:                 
BSize        5.263 0.87 10.096 1.5 
BMEET        0.304 0.74 0.621 1.25 
BIND        -0.013 -0.09 -0.128 -0.83 
AIS        -0.635 -1.25 -0.773 -1.24 
PAY         5.9 2.74*** 4.372 2.14** 
Control 
Variables: 
                
ROA -0.044 -0.48 0.338 1.83 0.002 0.2 0.209 0.823 
Size -3.585 -3.27*** -3.38 -2.45** -2.918 -2.84*** -5.15 -3.13*** 
Industry 
dummy 
  Included   Included   Included   Included 
Year dummy   Included   Included   Included   Included 
Cons_ 130.451 8.57*** 96.738 4.02*** 51.617 1.964** 68.02 2.2** 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 0.29   0.26   0.3  0.31 
Observation/groups 140/3   140/3   140/3   140/3 
    Note: * Significance at 10% level. ** Significance at 5% level. *** Significance at 1% level. 
8.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter contributes to the understanding of Strategy and BM disclosure by 
adopting an agency and signalling theory perspective to explain the disclosure of Strategy 
and BM in the annual reports of UK listed companies.  Finding shows that distressed 
firms, highly levered firms and highly paid CEO’s do not necessarily disclose more 
information about their Strategy in annual reports. However, firms with higher number of 
analysts following disclose more information about Strategy in annual reports. On the 
other hand, distressed firms and highly paid CEO’s are likely to disclose more 
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information about BM in annual reports. While, highly levered firms disclose less 
information about their BM. 
Interestingly, finding shows that while less distressed firms disclose more information 
about their Strategy, they (less distressed firms) disclose less information about their BM 
in the annual reports. The analysis in chapter 7 of this thesis reveals that the information 
disclosed as Strategy include information on overall Strategy/corporate goal, threats, 
strategic priorities, risk management, customer segments and products. On the other 
hand, while disclosing BM information about business activities (i.e., value creation), 
justification for business, distribution, and resources, firms disclose less BM information 
that relates to value capture (pricing), investment criteria (value creation framework) and 
value chain (process description). It appears that the Strategy information disclosed 
relates more to the width than the depth of information about the insights into the firm’s 
future performance (see Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). Put differently, much of the BM 
information appears to be affected by proprietary costs and managers would use their 
discretion in disclosing such information. Another possible explanation is that the 
disclosure of BM is far from being a mature practice. This finding is consistent with the 
conclusions of (Bini et al., 2016; Melloni et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, finding reveals that highly paid CEO’s do not necessarily disclose more 
information about their Strategy in the annual reports, but discloses more information 
about their BM. A possible explanation for this is that remuneration committees adopts a 
pay structure that works best for the interest of shareholders (Core et al., 1999; Conyon 
and He, 2011), in which case, a compensation committee might have specified in advance 
the appropriate disclosures for all future contingencies. This might mean that companies 
with effective corporate governance systems pay less executive compensation and 
disclose more information about their strategy. However, this finding appears to suggest 
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that highly paid CEO’s might want to signal their quality by disclosing more information 
about their BM to differentiate themselves from other CEOs’ (see for example Watson et 
al., 2002). This finding is consistent with signalling theory. 
The next chapter presents the discussion, summary and conclusion of the thesis, 
reflecting the conclusion of this intellectual journey. In the chapter, the findings of the 
study are discussed with a view to seeing how the set objectives have been achieved 
through providing answers to the research questions put forward. It will also be 
considering the contribution of the study to the existing literature, the limitations of the 
study and the identified areas of further studies.  
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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 Chapter Overview 
This last chapter seeks to summarise the thesis and to outline the limitation and 
suggestions for future research in the area of Strategy and BM disclosure. The most 
important objective of this chapter is to underline the original contributions of this 
research on the corporate disclosure literature.  
9.2 Summary 
The main objectives of the study were set in chapter 1 as follows: The first objective 
of this study is to develop a comprehensive disclosure framework to evaluate the content 
of Strategy and BM disclosures in annual reports, and to investigate current practices of 
Strategy and BM disclosure. The methodological issues of importance here are thus the 
concepts themselves (Strategy and BM); the identification of underlying themes and their 
measurement (measured as 1 if disclosed and 0 for non-disclosure). Additionally,  this 
first objective relates to the first and fifth questions in the proposed narratives research 
framework (Beattie, 2014) ‘what is reported and what should be reported’. Thus, the first 
objective of this study further examines how companies voluntarily disclosed their 
Strategy and BM in the annual reports between 2006 and 2012 and mandatorily but with 
discretion of disclosure content between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the components of 
Strategy and BM that are most and least disclosed are identified. Thereafter, this first 
objective investigates the effect of regulation (both corporate governance requirement 
and mandatory requirement) on the disclosure of Strategy and BM. Second, this study 
examines the potential determinants of Strategy and BM disclosures in annual reports of 
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UK companies, using regression analysis. These research objectives drive the research 
questions and findings in Table 9.1.  
The problem of information asymmetry and the resulting managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour can partly be resolved through corporate disclosure. The review of literature in 
chapter 2 suggests that disclosure in line with the strategic view of the business will 
increase the quality of corporate information disclosed. The quality of such information 
will be a function both of the width of the disclosures on different topics about a firm’s 
BM and value-creation Strategy and of the depth of the disclosures about the insights into 
a firm’s future performance. In their study, Bini et al. (2016) investigated the quality of 
the disclosure of BM in the annual reports of companies in the high-technology industries 
in the UK and found that companies rarely convey their BM information in a manner that 
communicates their BM story, which involves showing connections among the different 
components of the firm’s BM. The focus of this study however, is not on the quality of 
the disclosure of Strategy and BM. This study instead, examines the extent of disclosure 
of Strategy and BM between 2006 and 2015, investigating the changes in the level of 
such disclosure from one year to another and also among companies in the same industry. 
The essence of this enquiry is to know the disclosure practice of these companies in 
periods before the introduction of disclosure requirements, during the Corporate 
Governance requirement and the mandatory requirement. To see if the movement 
towards a more mandatory requirement has improved the disclosure of the concepts. 
Content analysis and descriptive statistics were used to explore this enquiry. 
Finding shows that the disclosure level of strategy and BM have improved over the 
10-year period. The Corporate Governance requirement for disclosure introduced in 2010 
appears to have influenced an increase in the disclosure of Strategy in the annual reports 
of companies, but not necessarily on the disclosure of BM information. On the other 
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hand, finding suggests that the mandatory requirement introduced from periods after 30 
September 2013, have been able to influence an increased level of BM information 
disclosure in the annual reports. 
Although, it is interesting to find that some of the components of both Strategy and 
BM are often omitted from the disclosure. A possible explanation for the omission of 
some components of Strategy (e.g., business unit strategy and weaknesses – due to 
inadequate internal operations) and BM (e.g., value capture, investment criteria and value 
chain) is that as the literature appears to suggest that a full (depth) disclosure of Strategy 
and BM may not always be possible depending on the outcome of a cost-and-benefit 
analysis of such disclosure. Hence, it is the discretion of management to choose what to 
disclose and what not to disclose. Further, this appears to explain the approach of the UK 
FRC in the Corporate Governance requirement, ‘a comply or explain’ principle, and the 
subsequent mandatory requirement for the disclosure of Strategy and BM – ‘a mandatory 
disclosure requirement without content specification’, perhaps, ‘a mandatory-voluntary 
disclosure’. A possible reason for this flexible mandatory regulation that gives the 
disclosure of Strategy and BM a compulsory disclosure with a discretionary content is an 
attempt not to jeopardise the competitiveness of the industries.  
It is thus expedient to examine other factors that could help understand the disclosure 
of Strategy and BM apart from regulations. In this study, Agency and Signalling theories 
were used to explain the disclosure or non-disclosure of both Strategy and BM in the 
annual reports of companies included in the sample as discussed in chapter 3. The 
incentives for the disclosure of Strategy and BM investigated in this study include 
contractual, market and corporate governance incentives.  
Optimal contracts have been highlighted as a solution to agency conflicts as a result of 
information asymmetry. Contracting mechanisms are often used to reduce agency costs 
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and to increase the efficiency of the contracting process. The proxies examined for 
contractual incentives in this study include; leverage, losses and financial distress 
(Altman). Although agency theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and 
disclosure, previous studies have reported a mixed conclusion on the relationship 
between leverage and disclosure. The findings of this study show that firms that are 
highly leveraged disclose less information about their Strategy and BM (a significant 
negative relationship). A less disclosure of Strategy and BM information in the annual 
reports of highly leveraged firms appears to suggest that valuable information about 
Strategy and BM is disclosed privately to shareholders and creditors through other 
mediums of communication.  
In addition, previous studies have found that managers of firms with losses have the 
incentives to make it harder for investors to identify the information that could affect 
stock prices and compensation. This current study finds that the disclosure of Strategy is 
negatively associated with losses, consistent with previous studies. However, there is a 
mixed result for BM disclosure. The result for Model 1 (contractual incentives) shows a 
negative relationship while, Model 4 (Model 1-3) shows a positive relationship. The 
reason for this difference might be as a result of the relationship of this proxy (loss) with 
other proxies in relation to BM disclosure. Some or one of the proxies might be having an 
independent effect or not. The implication of this finding is that managers of firms with 
losses would disclose less or more information about their BM in the annual reports 
depending on other incentives (contractual, market or corporate governance).  
Further, consistent with previous studies, this study concludes that managers of 
healthier firms disclose more information about their Strategy. A possible reason might 
be that these managers have optimistic information about the future plans to disclose, are 
motivated by their performance and might want to signal strength. On the other hand, the 
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finding shows that managers of healthier firms disclose less information about their BM. 
This appears to suggest that BM information might be disclosed to investors through 
other mediums, depending on the cost and benefit analysis of such disclosure. 
Managers also have market incentives to disclose their private information about 
Strategy and BM. Managers would disclose information about their Strategy and BM if it 
increases firm value. Analysts following and listing age are proxies examined for market 
incentives in this study. Firms with a larger number of analysts tend to disclose more 
information about their Strategy. This finding is consistent with previous findings that 
managers perceive analysts as one of the most important groups affecting the share price 
of their organisations. Interestingly, BM information disclosure appears to be dependent 
on the relationship between analyst following as a proxy and other proxies included as 
incentives for such disclosure. Managers would disclose more or less information about 
their BM depending on other incentives influencing the decision for disclosure. 
In addition, firms that have a higher listing age appear to disclose more information 
about their Strategy in the annual reports. This is different from the conclusions of 
previous studies on disclosure and listing age. It appears to suggest that older firms signal 
strength through the disclosure of their Strategy information. However, firms with lower 
listing age relatively disclose more information about their BM. This might mean that 
managers of these younger firms would want to increase investors’ confidence possibly 
to raise capital. While, it appears that managers of older firms disclose their BM 
information to investors through other mediums.  
Agency theory postulates that corporate governance mechanisms are significant in 
explaining the disclosure of Strategy and BM information the annual reports. Good 
governance system has been seen as a device for establishing efficiency, transparency and 
accountability. Compensation, board composition, board size and board meeting, are the 
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proxies examined for this incentive. Less paid managers tend to disclose more 
information about their Strategy in the annual reports. This finding is different from the 
conclusions of previous studies. A possible explanation is that an effective corporate 
governance system reduces the compensation of managers and increase the disclosure of 
strategy. On the other hand, highly paid managers disclose more information about their 
BM in the annual reports. This appears to suggest that well paid managers signal their 
quality through the disclosure of BM information. 
This study concludes that the number of independent directors determines the 
disclosure of Strategy in the annual reports depending on the effect of other proxies on 
board composition. Although, corporate governance proxies show that if there is a higher 
number of independent directors, the disclosure of Strategy information increases. The 
conclusions of previous studies on the relationship between disclosure and board 
composition are also mixed. However, this study finds that firms with a higher number of 
independent directors disclose less information about their BM. This appears to suggest 
that firms with a higher number of independent directors communicate BM information 
to their investors through other mediums. 
Further, findings of previous studies on the relationship between board size and board 
meeting have been mixed. This current study finds that considering corporate governance 
incentives, a larger board size reduces the level of Strategy disclosure. However, 
managers would disclose more or less Strategy information depending on the relationship 
between the size of their board and other variable incentives. On the other hand, this 
study shows that firms with a higher number of board members disclose more 
information about their BM in the annual reports. 
In addition, this study concludes that boards that meet frequently (active boards) 
disclose more information about their Strategy and BM in the annual reports. It is 
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assumed that an active board is a diligent board. Previous studies have investigated the 
relationship between active boards and performance, however, it appears that there is no 
evidence on disclosure agency problems and active boards. 
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9.3 Research Questions and Key Findings 
 Table 9.1 Overview of research questions and answers 
Research questions Findings 
RQ1 Has there been any change in the 
level of Strategy and BM 
disclosure between 2006 and 
2015? 
• The disclosure of Strategy and BM is 
not a new practice that began after the 
requirement for disclosure. However, 
companies were disclosing some 
components of BM often without the 
use of the term BM.  
• Overall, a marked increase in Strategy 
and BM disclosure was identified over 
the 10 years. 
• The disclosure level of Strategy and 
BM reflects the same pattern of 
disclosure level of BM.  
RQ2a What items of Strategy and BM 
are most disclosed in the annual 
reports? 
• There was a relatively greater level of 
dispersion in the disclosure of Strategy 
and BM before the requirements. 
• The disclosure of weakness as a result 
of inadequate internal operations, is the 
least disclosed Strategy item. 
• The disclosure of BM items is yet to be 
a mature practice. BM components 
such as value capture, investment 
criteria, entity structure and value 
chain/process, still needs to be 
improved upon. 
RQ2b How has regulation been able to 
influence the disclosure of 
Strategy and BM? 
• Companies did not necessarily disclose 
more BM information after the 
corporate governance requirement 
• There is a relatively positive significant 
difference in the disclosure of Strategy 
after the corporate governance 
requirement. 
• The mandatory requirement has 
significantly influenced the disclosure 
of BM in annual reports 
• The mandatory requirement has no 
significant influence on the disclosure 
of Strategy. 
• Companies have improved the 
presentation of Strategy and BM 
particularly after the Mandatory 
requirement.  
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RQ3 What are the determinants of 
Strategy and BM disclosure in 
annual reports? 
• Analyst following, financial distress, 
leverage and CEO’s remuneration are 
determinants of Strategy disclosure in 
the annual reports. 
• CEO’s remuneration, financial distress 
and leverage are determinants of BM 
disclosure in annual reports. 
• Less distressed firms disclose more 
information about their Strategy but 
less information about their BM. 
• This result appears to suggest that 
companies with effective corporate 
governance systems pay less 
compensation and disclose more 
strategy information. This is consistent 
with agency theory. However, finding 
shows that highly paid CEOs’ might 
want to signal their quality by 
disclosing more information about their 
BM in the annual reports. 
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9.4 Summary of Contributions 
Having presented the findings of this study, this section presents some of the key 
contributions of the study to the existing literature in general and narrative reporting in 
particular. The contributions of this study have empirical, methodological and policy 
implications. This is the first study to examine the disclosure of Strategy in a mandatory 
domain, and also using a theoretical lens. It is also the first longitudinal Strategy and BM 
disclosure study. This study contributes to the understanding of Strategy and BM 
disclosure, using a longitudinal method to assess the extent of such disclosure, the effect 
of regulation on disclosure and the possible determinants of such disclosures. It links the 
accounting literature with Strategy and BM literature and develops a disclosure index that 
can help inform future research.  
At the same time, this study has successfully answered the call to assess the extent 
of disclosure (Beattie and Smith, 2013), and examine the potential determinants of 
disclosure, focusing on different industries (Bini et al., 2016). In addition, based on the 
findings of this study, it is argued that although there is an improved presentation of 
Strategy and BM information in the annual reports, and the disclosure of Strategy and 
BM is on the increase, BM disclosure practice is far from being a mature practice. Also, 
companies and regulators need to be aware of the problem of ‘clutter’. Furthermore, the 
FRC need to be more specific on the disclosure content of these concepts. Also, it is 
crucial to improve the illustrations among the interactions of BM components, which 
would help to enhance the understanding of how these components relate in a company’s 
value creation process 
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9.5 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations for Future Study 
This thesis has investigated the disclosure of Strategy and BM practice, in particular, it 
investigated the trend in such disclosure over a longitudinal period, the extent of such 
disclosure, the items/components disclosed, the extent of the influence of regulation on 
such disclosure, and the determinants of the extent of such disclosures. It has shown that 
companies were disclosing both Strategy and BM before the requirement for disclosure, 
however, that there was a high level of dispersion in disclosure during the voluntary 
period.  
The finding shows that the management would rather disclose information about 
external threat than information about weaknesses caused by inadequate internal 
operations. Additionally, finding appears to suggest that companies with effective 
corporate governance systems pay less compensation and disclose more strategy 
information. This is consistent with agency theory. Lastly, it revealed that analyst 
following is highly statistically significant in the disclosure of Strategy, while, CEO’s 
remuneration is highly statistically significant in the disclosure of BM.  
Despite the contributions this study will be making to the existing literature, it is 
however not without limitations. One limitation is that there are only three industries, and 
the study was limited to UK companies, this was due to time and resources constraint. 
Studying longitudinal Strategy and BM disclosure practices in other countries, for 
example the US and Europe may find different levels and trends in disclosure due to 
different regulatory regimes and cultures. Additionally, future studies could conduct 
interviews with representative of companies to obtain a better understanding of the 
narrative choices of human actors in Strategy and BM disclosures, and the consequences 
of these choices in the complex information environment. Engagement with companies to 
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gather evidence about managers perception on the importance and value of Strategy and 
BM disclosure would be very interesting.  
Further, future research could examine the longitudinal relationship between 
Strategy and BM disclosures and capital market variables such as MV/BV or stock prices. 
This study would be highly significant in investigating the relevance of Strategy and BM 
information over time. Lastly, the findings in the accounting literature concerning analyst 
and investor needs, in form of information to help them assess the quality of management 
are embedded in the BM framework. Thus, there is need for a better linkage between the 
accounting literature and Strategy and BM literature in order to consolidate knowledge.  
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Figure 0.1  Disclosure Level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.2 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.3 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.4 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.5 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.6 Banking Industry Strategy Disclosure 
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Figure 0.7 Banking Industry BM Disclosure 
 
 
 
Figure 0.8 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.9 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.10 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.11 : Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.12 Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry Strategy Disclosure 
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Figure 0.13 Food and Drug Retailers’ Industry BM Disclosure 
 
 
Figure 0.14 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.15 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.16 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.17 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
 
 
 
Figure 0.18 Disclosure level (%) of Strategy and BM 
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Figure 0.19 Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry Strategy Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 0.20 Gas, Water and Multi-Utilities Industry BM Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91
82 82
73
82 82 82 82 82 8282
73
82
64
73 73 73 73
91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Strategy (GWM)
Centrica United Utilities national Grid Pennon Severn Trent
55
73 73
82 82 82 82 82 82
64
73
64 64
55 55
64
73
64 64
91
64
55
73
64 64 64
45
55
36
73
82
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
BM (GWM)
Centrica United Utilities national Grid Pennon Severn Trent
